British foreign policy and the Carlist Wars, 1833-1841 / by Jones, Peter Edward,
INFORMATION TO USERS
This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While 
the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original 
submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to  obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent 
pages to  insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it 
is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have 
moved durmg exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map. drawing or chart, etc.. was part of the material being 
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in 
"sectioning" tfw material. It is customary to begin photoing at tfie upper 
left hand comer of a large Aeet and to continue photoing from left to 
right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is 
continued again -  beginning below the first row and continuing on until 
complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, 
however, a somewhat highar quahty reproduction could be made from 
"photographs" if aasential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver 
pnnts of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing 
the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and 
ipeafic pages you wish reproduoad.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as
Xarox Unlvdrtify MIcfOfHm t
MO Mo m
UrfO U K  4010S
73-26,319
JONES, Peter Edward, 1943- 
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CARLIST 
WARS, 1833-1841.
The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1973 
ffl^ tory, modem
University Microfilms, A XERQXCompany, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Copyright by 
Peter Edward Jones 
1973
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFIUED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CARLIST WARS,
1833-1841
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
PETER EDWARD JONES 
Norman, Oklahoma 
1973
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CARLIST WARS,
1833-1841
APPROVED BY
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. William H. 
Maehl, Jr., my major professor, who has given unstintingly 
of his time, energy, and expertise in helping me to complete 
the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in 
British history at the University of Oklahoma. I also wish 
to thank the members of my graduate committee who were always 
encouraging and helpful. Dr. Max Moorhead, Dr. Jack Kendall, 
Dr. Jonathan W. Spurgeon, and Dr. Robert Nye.
I would be remiss in my duty if I failed to extend 
thanks to the many people of the University of London, the 
British Museum, and the Public Record Office, London, to whom 
I turned for help. Mr. Stephen West of the Long Room, the 
Public Record Office, deserves special mention because of 
his kindness and generosity in helping me.
Finally, I would like to express my deepest and most 
sincere thanks to my wife, Joan, without whose support and 
skill this accomplishment would not have been possible.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION................................. 1
II. GENESIS OF THE QUADRUPLE TREATY..............  20
III. THE ILLUSION OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE
SHATTERED...................................  63
IV. THE FRENCH BID FOR SPAIN, 1836 ..............  112
V. MOLE VERSUS PALMERSTON, 1837-1838............  158
VI. TO THE BRINK OF WAR AGAIN.......................197
VII. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CARLIST WARS,
1833-1841...................................  224
BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................228
XV
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CARLIST WARS,
1833-1841
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the 1830's Iberia was the scene of succession crises 
in both Spain and Portugal. Civil wars resulted and for a 
brief period of time the two conflicts almost became one.
Spain also became the stage upon which the advocates of oppos­
ing principles fought throughout the decade. Liberal consti­
tutionalists battled with absolutists and in so doing found 
support among the great powers. The Eastern Powers provided 
moral and financial aid to the absolutists. Britain and France 
joined the liberals of Spain and Portugal to create a Quadruple 
Treaty.
This alignment is commonly understood as the recognition 
of an Anglo-French entente that began with the Belgian revolt 
and lasted until the 2nd Middle East Crisis. R. W. Seton-Watson 
speaks of an entente cordiale and says Palmerston viewed good
1
relations with France as essential. H. C. F. Bell, Sir 
Llewellyn Woodward, and Sir Charles Webster all endorse this 
view with only minor differences among them. Webster, for 
example, argues the entente cordiale lasted only until 1835. 
William Langer points to Iberia to show how Britain and France, 
being partners in an entente cordiale, worked to establish a 
constitutional government in Spain during the Carlist Wars.^  
The Quadruple Treaty was not an entente cordiale but 
rather it reflected the mutual suspicion and tension that 
existed between Britain and France. At no time during the 
1830's did Anglo-French relations approach a rapprochement. 
After the signing of the Quadruple Treaty the French govern­
ment failed to implement the terms of the agreement and rather
R. W. Seton-Watson speaks of an entente cordiale and 
says Palmerston viewed good relations with France as essential. 
What Palmerston regarded as essential was the continued French 
separation from the Eastern Courts and a curtailment of Louis 
Philippe's expansionist activities. See below page 12. R. W. 
Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914; A Survey of Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge: The University Press, 1937), p. 183. H. C. F.
Bell supports the entente idea as also do Woodward and Webster;
H. C. F. Bell, Lord Palmerston, 2 vols., (Hamden, Conn.: Archon
Books, 1966), I, 192; Sir Llewellyn Woodward, The Age of Reform, 
1815-1870 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 231; Sir Charles
Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841; Britain 
the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question, 2 vols., (London:
G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1951), I, 55; and William L. Langer, 
Political and Social Upheaval, 1832-1852 (New York : Harper and
Row, 1969), Chap. III.
than cooperating with Britain to defeat the Carlists under­
mined the allied cause. Despite the suspicion and distrust 
both governments repeatedly and publicly stated their support 
for the Anglo-French understanding. The public statements 
belied the real struggle for control of Spain and predomi­
nance in other parts of the world. Britain and France agreed 
to the treaty because of their isolated positions in European 
international relations.
Spanish affairs also attracted the attention of the 
Eastern Powers which wanted to preserve the area for absolu­
tism and to prevent an Anglo-French accord. Money and supplies 
were sent by these powers and their agents to help Don Carlos, 
the absolutist pretender, to the Spanish crown. The Eastern 
Powers planned to surround France with conservative govern­
ments to help control that revolutionary state. At no time 
did these powers seem to realize that the most effective way 
of defeating liberalism in the West was an appeal to the con­
servative side of Louis Philippe, the French king, which could 
have resulted in the complete isolation of Britain and the 
defeat of liberalism in Europe.
The Spanish policies of Viscount Palmerston, British 
foreign secretary for most of the 1830's, differed noticeably 
from those of the Eastern Courts. Following the death of the
reactionary king of Spain, Ferdinand VII, which left a dis­
puted succession, Palmerston tried to implement the three 
basic objectives of his Spanish policies. He wanted to es­
tablish British influence within the Madrid government and to 
exercise some control over French foreign policies while lend­
ing encouragement to liberalism and constitutionalism. Moti­
vation for these policies came from Palmerston's acceptance 
of liberal concepts and his belief that Iberia was vital to 
Britain's defense. Furthermore, he anticipated expanded 
British trade through a liberal Spanish commercial treaty 
he hoped to obtain. Palmerston also distrusted the French 
government which he thought was expansionist and might try 
to reaffirm the Franco-Spanish family compact.
The French government was an interested party in the 
affairs of the Iberian Peninsula and had been for a long time.
On two previous occasions in the 19th century French troops 
had occupied Spain. In the 1830's the government of Louis 
Philippe wanted to protect its interests in Spain. Trade and 
dynastic relations which included the old idea of the family 
compact were two reasons why Louis Philippe expressed a lively 
interest in the country. He also feared domination of the 
Spanish government by a hostile power and the threat of a 
two-front war that suggested. Because of the fear of domination
he was extremely sensitive about the problem of Spanish 
marriages. The French government also worried about a 
liberal or democratic government gaining power in Madrid. 
Consequently, Louis Philippe's government pursued policies 
in Spain that protected France from Spanish liberalism, com- 
batted foreign domination of the Madrid government and main­
tained French commercial interests.
All of the great powers of Europe had expressed some 
interest in Spanish affairs since the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars, but Britain had been particularly concerned. Although 
initially in general concert with the other great powers by 
1820 Lord Castlereagh, British foreign secretary, began forg­
ing an international role for England as the defender of 
liberalism. In a memorandum he issued in 1820 Castlereagh 
publicized his policies on the occasion of the Colonel Riego 
revolt in Spain and the Congress of Troppau. He opposed 
foreign intervention in the internal affairs of other states, 
and he recognized the importance of public sentiment in Britain 
that ran strongly against the reactionary policies of Ferdinand 
VII of Spain. Castlereagh pointed out that the alliances of 
1814-15 were aimed at preventing a military threat to Euro­
pean peace and not against the spread of "Democratic Princi­
ples." This statement suggests that the foreign secretary was
neutral toward the liberalism in Spain reintroduced by the
2
Colonel Riego revolt of 1820.
George Canning, foreign secretary following Castlereagh's 
death in 1822, supported the May 5, 1820 memorandum.^ Actually, 
it had been Canning who first formulated the concepts set forth 
by Castlereagh in 1820.^ Like Castlereagh he had begun to 
object to the system of meetings (congresses) that Austrian 
Prince Clement von Metternich favored in the years after the 
Congress of Vienna. Canning in 1823 insisted upon strict neu­
trality towards Spain and berated France for its hostile pos­
ture toward the rebels of that country, the liberals and con­
stitutionalists. His Spanish policies in 1822-24 alienated 
the government of Spain and failed to prevent the entry of 
French troops into the country to restore Ferdinand VII.
France and Spain became reunited, a situation Canning had 
hoped to prevent.
The Eastern Courts joined with these two governments 
in loudly protesting Britain's New World policies that recognized
2
Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, Foundations of 
British Foreign Policy From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) or 
Documents Old and New (Cambridge: University Press, 1938),
pp. 47-63.
^Ibid., pp. 64-66.
4
H.M.V. Temperley, Life of Canning (London: James Finch
and Co., Ltd., 1905), p. 141.
the independence of several Latin American nations. Canning 
did get the Polignac Memorandum from France which stated that 
the French had no intention of restoring the American colonies 
to Spain. But no mention was made of France's occupation of 
Spain. Herein Canning's policies of neutrality and noninter­
vention failed him as the family compact was reinstated.^ 
Canning recognized the revolutionary states of America in 
order to thwart French and United States designs there and 
to retain the area for British commerce, but in so doing he 
forfeited any influence the London government had previously 
established at Madrid.
Canning modified his policies of neutrality in the 
Portuguese situation when Don Miguel defied King Pedro's 
settlement of the Portuguese crown on his daughter Donna Maria. 
Don Miguel had been named regent to Maria but later moved 
against the constitutional state created by Pedro. This con­
stitutional opposition aroused Canning and prompted the British 
intervention of 1827 which ended when Miguel in early 1828 
promised to respect the constitution. Once relieved of the 
British presence Miguel led a coup d' etat in 1828 and pro­
claimed himself the king.
Sibid.
8Whatever the relations had been among the five great 
powers of Europe since 1815 the revolutions of 1830 split 
the group into two sections, one autocratic and the other 
liberal. The autocratic powers of Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria fought liberalism, nationalism, and constitutionalism 
wherever they encountered it. These states enjoyed some suc­
cess in Poland, Italy, and the Germanies. At Munchengratz in 
1833 they reaffirmed the Holy Alliance. In contrast Britain 
and France appeared as the liberal powers after the July 
Revolution in France and the Belgian declaration of indepen­
dence .
While there was considerable agreement in policy among 
the Eastern Powers the Western Powers experienced discord in 
their objectives. Palmerston, directing foreign affairs in 
England, genuinely supported the liberal movement in Europe 
although he did not always aid the liberals in their struggles 
against absolutist governments. Louis Philippe did not really 
sympathize with liberalism and in his own country presided 
over a change in government more symbolic than meaningful.^
^David H. Pinkey, "The Myth of the French Revolution 
of 1830" from David H. Pinkey and Theodore Rapp, eds,, A 
Festschrift For Frederick Artz (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univer­
sity Press, 1964), pp. 52-71.
The French government became more anti-liberal as the years 
progressed. This trend was visible not only in internal 
affairs but could also be seen in French relations with both 
Spain and Britain. So long as conservative forces controlled 
Madrid, the French government reluctantly provided some aid, 
but when a truly liberal government established itself in 
Madrid the French worked against it. The Western Powers, 
consequently, though appearing united were often at odds with 
each other.
When Palmerston became foreign secretary in 1830 he 
faced the continuing problem of Portugal to which was added 
the Carlist War in 1833. Palmerston during this time, 1830 
to 1833, came to be looked upon as the defender of the liberal 
cause in Europe. His jubilant response to the July Revolution, 
his objections to the Six Resolutions passed by the German 
Diet in 1832, his support of Belgian independence, and his 
break with the Eastern Courts over these points gave him some 
claim to be called the defender of liberalism. This interna­
tional role of defender of liberalism became a cornerstone of 
Palmerston's foreign policy which he pursued with more vigor 
than had Canning.? When the volatile situation developed in
^Jasper Ridley, Lord Palmerston (London; Constable, 
1970), p. 173.
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Iberia, Palmerston was anxious to preserve the area for 
liberalism.
Palmerston's adherence to liberal principles came late 
as did his interest in foreign affairs. He had not dabbled 
in foreign affairs until the late 1820's but then in a par­
liamentary speech he "introduced to the Commons an altogether 
new Palmerston."® Palmerston addressed Commons on the Portu­
guese issue which saw Don Miguel trying to usurp the throne 
of his niece Donna Maria, the legitimate ruler. He thoroughly 
opposed Don Miguel and his actions in Portugal. Although 
Palmerston repeatedly professed his adherence to liberal 
principles in 1829, it took time before he could implement 
foreign policies based upon these ideals. In 1829 he said,
"I consider the constitutional states to be the natural allies 
of this country."®
A year later he enthusiastically celebrated the July 
Revolution as he informed Lady Cowper, "we shall drink the 
cause of Liberalism all over the w o r l d . C o n t i n u i n g  this
®W. Baring Pemberton, Lord Palmerston (London; The 
Butchworth Press, 1954), p. 62.
®Ibid., p. 63.
^®Philip Guedalla, Palmerston, 1784-1865 (London: G. P.
Putncim’s Sons, 1927), p. 150.
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happy outburst he wrote, "This event is decisive in the as­
cendancy of Liberal Principles throughout Europe; the evil 
spirit has been put down and will be trodden underfoot. The 
reign of Metternich is over."^^ Webster writes that Palmer­
ston's, "aristocratic outlook and environment did not prevent 
him from holding a deep and obviously sincere belief in Lib­
eralism cherishing an ardent desire to see it spread through­
out the world.
Palmerston from 1830 on gave repeated assertions of 
his adherence to the liberal cause. In Parliament he stressed
his convictions when he praised liberalism and supported the
13principles of constitutionalism. John Hobhouse noted that 
Palmerston, "talked liberal just as well and as freely as if 
he had played the part all his life."^^ Despite the rather 
remarkable and sudden transformation Webster is strongly con­
vinced that Palmerston's, "acceptance of the new Liberalism
 ^Letter, Lord Palmerston to his brother-in-law Sullivan, 
1 August 1830, Bell, Lord Palmerston, I, 192; and Guedalla, 
Palmerston, p. 150.
^^Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 55.
13Ridley, Lord Palmerston, p. 101. 
l^ibid., p. 102.
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is obviously sincere," and, "was to determine much of his
policy during the next ten years.
Palmerston could not immediately implement a liberal
foreign policy in 1830 because of the dangerous and isolated
position he encountered in international relations. The
Belgian revolution brought Britain and France to the brink
of war as Palmerston worked to protect England from the
French occupation of strategically important Belgium and
Luxembourg. This revolution strained relations between the
three Eastern Powers and the Western Powers of Britain and
France also. Thus, Palmerston experienced isolation from
all the great powers.
War with France over Belgium had been a very real
possibility and it aroused Palmerston's suspicions of Louis
Philippe's plans. The foreign secretary said of the French
plans to obtain compensation,
I do not like all this [a French suggestion that 
they receive Luxembourg or parts of the Germanies]; 
it looks as if France was unchanged in her system 
of encroachments, and it diminishes the confidence 
in her sincerity and good faith which her conduct 
up to this time had inspired.
^^Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 81.
^^Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 7 January 
1831, Private, Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, The Life of Henry John 
Temple, Viscount Palmerston: With Selections from his Diaries
and Correspondence, 2 vols., (London: Richard Bentley, 1870),
II, 27-29.
13
Furthermore, Palmerston noted, "it is only on the supposition
that she [France] content herself with the finest territory
in Europe, and does not mean to open a new chapter in encroach-
17ments and conquest," that good relations can exist. French 
threats of aggrandizement annoyed Palmerston more than any 
other factor. Over the Belgian question he wrote, " [General] 
Sabastiani and [Marshal] Soult [of France] apparently want to 
pick a quarrel with all their neighbors, or to compel every-
1 Q
body to submit to their insolence and aggression."
No quick and easy solution to the Belgian question was 
found, but the Western Powers finally achieved Belgian inde­
pendence and neutrality over the opposition of the Eastern 
Powers. Palmerston used threats and coercion in an effort 
to defend British interests in Belgium from the Eastern Powers 
and from France. The French government, endeavoring to gain 
advantages for its citizens and possible territorial extension,
played a lone hand until the threat of war became too great to 
19be hazarded.
^^ Ibid.
l^Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 17 August 
1831, Ibid.. II, 108-110.
l^Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign 
Policy, p. 91.
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The situation in Portugal in the early 1830's presented 
an obstacle to Palmerston's implementation of a liberal foreign 
policy there. Don Miguel ruled Portugal as an absolutist and 
as a usurper. Britain's foreign secretary could not support 
Miguel, but he became alarmed when the French government sent 
a fleet to the Tagut. to protect its citizens in 1831 at the 
time when a French army occupied parts of Belgium. War seemed 
possible and Anglo-Portuguese treaties would have required 
Britain to protect Don Miguel against French aggression.
In 1832 Don Pedro landed in Portugal to support his 
daughter's claim to the throne, and he received the unofficial 
support of Palmerston. Palmerston had refused to help over­
throw Miguel because he opposed military intervention. How­
ever, he supported, "intermeddling in every way, and to every
extent, short of military force," which permitted the foreign
20secretary indirectly to help Pedro defeat Miguel. Opposing 
Miguel fitted into Palmerston's scheme of thwarting absolutism 
in Iberia, but he also was interested in preserving British 
trade, especially trade in port wine, and was interested in 
preventing an extension of French influence into Portugal.
20Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard's Parliamentary 
Debates, 2nd Series, XXI, 1643-60, subsequently cited as 
Hansard's.
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Problems in Spain in 1833 exacerbated the situation 
in Iberia and affected the Portuguese. A disputed succession 
in Spain caused the uncle, Don Carlos, to challenge the right 
of his niece, Donna Isabella, to the Spanish throne after 
her father, Ferdinand VII died. Don Carlos, already in 
Portugal at the camp of Don Miguel, refused to acknowledge 
Isabella and upon Ferdinand's death civil war broke out. The 
Biscayan-Basque provinces further complicated the civil war 
for the succession by beginning an insurrection aimed at 
preserving their fueros. The fueros were special privileges 
granted the Biscayan-Basque provinces which made them virtu­
ally independent of the Madrid government. The government 
of Isabella also became anxiously concerned about the Miguelite 
Wars still continuing in Portugal.
The situation remained obscured as the two pretenders
fought the female heirs to the thrones of their respective
countries. The contending parties fought not only for the
succession but for political principles. Both pretenders
favored absolutism and therefore found support from the
Eastern Powers. Palmerston sympathized with the young liberal
constitutional queens because he wanted to support liberalism
21and to defeat absolutism. Old treaties and commerce also
21 Ward and Gooch, British Foreign Policy, II, 186.
"Great Britain, naturally, favouring the constitutional side."
16
motivated the foreign secretary as did his intention of 
thwarting French influence in both states. France faced a 
serious problem because Louis Philippe wanted to end French 
isolation.
To implement his policies Palmerston in early 1834 
negotiated a treaty with Spain and Portugal which he subse­
quently permitted France to join as a contracting party. The 
Quadruple Treaty was a defense between two antagonists rather 
than a rapprochement. Palmerston planned to provide limited 
aid to the liberal governments of Iberia while controlling 
French activity in the area. His treaty also presented the 
facade of a united block of liberal constitutional states to 
the Eastern Powers. The treaty did momentarily mask the ten­
sions and rivalries existing between the British and French 
governments. Both governments stated repeatedly their support 
for the Anglo-French understanding that they insisted was real. 
But the treaty failed to resolve the Anglo-French difficulties 
that had developed.
Throughout the remainder of 1834 and 1835 a rapproche­
ment eluded the allies. Efforts by Palmerston to obtain an 
Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty in late 1834 provoked French 
suspicions of British policies. The French government refused 
to implement the terms of the Quadruple Treaty and preferred
17
to undermine the allied cause. Under Louis Philippe's guid­
ance French policy veered toward the East as he continued his 
efforts in favor of an understanding with the absolutist 
courts.
The vigorous and decisive Spanish struggle between 
Britain and France in 1836 became a conflict of principles 
between Palmerston and Count Mole, the chief minister of 
France. Mole helped to establish temporarily a pro-French 
ministry in Madrid and followed policies designed to secure 
the Spanish government to his own. By miscalculating the 
situation he and Cristina, the queen regent of Spain, pre­
cipitated a military revolt that subsequently saw French 
influence decline. Sir George Villiers, British minister in 
Madrid, then reconstructed his influence in the Spanish govern­
ment while Palmerston defended himself and his policies in 
Parliament.
Early in 1837 the discord between the British and French 
governments emerged publicly and Palmerston became more prag­
matic about his interests in Spain. Public opinion in England 
helped to determine Palmerston's reaction at this point. Issues 
such as free trade, aid to the Madrid government, French fear 
of a two-front war, imperial defense, and other differences 
kept the Western Powers at cross purposes. Palmerston pursued
18
British interests with increased vigor since Isabella's cause, 
though not victorious, appeared more secure.
The closing years of the Carlist War was a time of in­
creasing hostility between Britain, France, and Spain. Palmer­
ston berated both the French and Spanish governments because 
of developments in Spain and the Levant. The focal point of 
the struggle was the Mediterranean where France was active in 
the east, in Egypt, and in the west, at King's Islet, Port 
Mahon, Minorca. Cristina granted the King's Islet to France 
which alarmed the British foreign office because of the deteri­
orated condition of the royal navy and the Mohammed Ali con­
troversy. Other difficulties with the Spanish government 
such as debts, marriage rumors, and the refusal of a commer­
cial treaty annoyed Palmerston also.
The termination of the Carlist Wars in 1839 did not 
resolve all the problems existing among the treaty powers. 
Relations between Britain and France deteriorated even more 
although Anglo-Spanish conditions slowly improved. Palmerston 
witnessed the diminution of French influence in Spain which 
was replaced by a corresponding increase in pro-British senti­
ment in the Spanish government. By the time Palmerston left 
the foreign office in 1841 Anglo-Spanish relations were cordial 
and cooperative. On the other hand, Anglo-French relations
19
remained at a low point due not only to the recent Spanish 
civil wars but also because of the Mohammed Ali settlement.
CHAPTER II 
GENESIS OF THE QUADRUPLE TREATY
In 1833 and 1834 various European powers became in­
creasingly involved in the Carlist War in Spain. This war 
occurred because of a disputed succession in 1833. Not only 
was it a war of succession, but it quickly became a conflict 
of principles too. The forces of absolutism under Don Carlos 
battled against the more moderate principles that the young 
queen, Isabella, represented. The division in Spain coincided 
with the growing split among the major European states who 
lined up behind their respective Spanish champions.
Palmerston followed a policy from the outset that opposed 
absolutism as a form of government in Spain. At the time of 
Ferdinand VII's death in September 1833 he could not support 
either of the claimants to the throne because there was little 
difference in their policies. Neither Don Carlos nor Cristina 
advocated liberalism or free trade which Palmerston favored. 
Therefore, he refused to acknowledge the rights of either to
20
21
the Spanish throne. One thing he did do was express his 
opposition to French and Eastern interference in the affairs 
of Spain.
The French government immediately recognized Isabella 
and offered support to her chief minister. Dr. Francisco Zea 
Bermudez. Zea Bermudez’s conservative policies appealed to 
Louis Philippe who feared a liberal ascendancy in Spain. 
Nevertheless, French support for Zea Bermudez was qualified 
because Louis Philippe really preferred Don Carlos above all 
others.^ France was caught between the absolutism of the 
Eastern Powers and the liberalism of England which made it 
impossible for the French government to commit itself wholly 
to one faction or the other.
Unlike France the Eastern Courts had no qualms and they 
openly aided the absolutists whom Palmerston opposed. While 
these powers never recognized Don Carlos diplomatically, they 
gave him their unqualified moral support and some financial 
aid. Because of their geographic location they could not pro­
vide any military aid. The Eastern Powers also aided Don Carlos 
by trying to prevent a union between the two major liberal states
^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 1 
November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 242.
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of the west, Britain and France, through intimidating Louis 
Philippe.^
The Spanish succession crisis that led to the Carlist 
War revolved initially about the confused status of the Salic 
Law and the existence of two claimants to the throne. King 
Ferdinand VII of Spain in actions that obscured the issue 
restored and then revoked the Salic Law in the early 1830's 
after the birth of his daughter Isabella. In April 1833 he 
required, by decree, that the Spanish nation acknowledge his 
daughter's rights of inheritance in an oath to her. Don 
Carlos, already with Miguel in Portugal, refused. The 
National Cortes meeting on 20 June 1833 at Madrid complied 
with the weakening king’s order. Three months later Ferdi­
nand VII died and Isabella became queen with Cristina, her 
mother, queen regent.
To assuage fears and to cultivate friends for her 
daughter's cause Cristina produced a manifesto. The proclama­
tion was conservative and conciliatory in tone. It revealed 
that the regency would adhere to established practices and 
laws. Furthermore, the queen dowager said political innovation
^Philip E. Mosely, "Intervention and Nonintervention in 
Spain, 1838-39," Journal of Modern History, XIII (March 1941,) 
195-217.
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would be avoided. Despite these assurances Don Carlos coun­
tered with a statement of his own insisting that Ferdinand 
had died without a male heir so that the throne devolved 
upon himself- Several more rival proclamations followed as 
the contestants declared their positions.
Little difference on policy existed between Cristina 
and Carlos initially, but the country divided in its loyalties. 
The single most important issue was the succession and neither 
contender denied his rights. The Biscayen-Basque area favored 
Don Carlos. This part of the country opposed Cristina because 
their fueros were endangered. Their cause became united with 
that of Don Carlos. Most of the country remained apathetic 
or supported the queen.^
Foreign powers also divided on the issue of supporting 
Isabella or Don Carlos. The Eastern Powers refused to recog­
nize the queen. They withheld diplomatic recognition of Carlos, 
too, but they gave him moral and financial support. The French 
government immediately recognized Isabella as the queen of 
Spain. Palmerston chose to wait a short while to see which 
way the situation developed, but he spoke favorably of Isabella's
^Great Britain, Foreign Office, "Memorandum on the Politi­
cal Events in Spain, From August 1836, to January, 1837," F.O. 
146/180.
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succession saying it was important to the liberal cause and 
before 1833 closed he recognized her.
Palmerston chose to support Isabella in the Carlist 
War as he had chosen to support Donna Maria in the Miguelite 
War because he preferred liberalism and constitutionalism to 
absolutism. By supporting these two young queens he in no 
way guaranteed that British interests such as trade, defense, 
and influence would be maintained. He did know that these 
queens represented the liberal party in their respective 
countries. That being the case he not only aided them be­
cause of their association with liberalism, but also because 
he hoped to protect British interests. For the most part 
liberals and liberal governments more nearly agreed with 
Palmerston's policies than did absolutists.
The primary reason for Palmerston's reluctance to 
recognize the young Spanish queen immediately was her chief 
minister Dr. Francisco Zea Bermudez. Zea Bermudez was a 
reactionary who aided Don Miguel against Donna Maria in 
Portugal. Palmerston had attempted to prevent Spanish aid 
going to Miguel by sending Sir Stratford Canning on a special 
mission in 1832 to the court of Ferdinand VII to persuade him 
and his minister to cease helping the Portuguese pretender.
25
Both had refused.4 Zea Bermudez, as chief minister to Isa­
bella, wanted to continue aiding Miguel. He also followed 
other conservative policies such as the cultivation of the 
Eastern Courts and opposition to Carlos.^ Zea Bermudez 
further annoyed Palmerston when he suggested that the French 
representative to Spain, the Conde de Rayneval, be given the 
power to summon French troops into the country to crush Don 
Carlos if he returned from Portugal.&
Throughout 1833 Palmerston's dislike for Zea Bermudez 
had been growing and he worked to bring about his dismissal. 
"The English minister . . . from the first moment wanted the 
triumph of the liberals, understanding that he had to support 
them to defeat Don Carlos, and in this sense he worked openly 
against [Zea Bermudez] the President of the C o u n c i l . H e n r y
^Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 371.
^R. Carr, Spain, 1808-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1966), p. 156; and Sir Spencer Walpole, A History of 
England From the Conclusion of the Great War of 1815, 6 vols., 
(London: Longman's Green and Co., 1905), IV, 298.
^Francois Pierre Guillame Guizot, Mémoires Pour Servir 
_a L'Histoire de Mon Temps, 8 vols., (Paris: Michel Levy Freres,
1861), IV, 70; Bell, Palmerston, I, 145; and Webster, Foreign 
Policy of Palmerston, I, 381.
^Gines Vidal y Saura, ^  PolJtica Exterior de Espana 
Durante La Menor Edad de Isabel II (Madrid; Editorial Rues, 
Academia, 1929), p. 38.
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V. Addington, British minister to Madrid, was recalled by 
Palmerston because he sympathized too much with Zea Bermudez. 
George Villiers replaced Addington in August 1833. Palmerston 
continued his efforts to get Zea Bermudez dismissed and in 
Villiers he had a cooperative agent. Zea Bermudez uninten­
tionally helped Palmerston and Villiers bring about his re­
placement by alienating both liberals and conservatives with 
his policies. He attacked Carlos, which angered the conserva­
tives, and he refused to grant the political reforms that the 
liberals wanted. Palmerston insisted that Zea Bermudez, whom 
he thought was a French tool, should shift for himself and
g
he withdrew all British support from the man.
Palmerston tried to change the policies of Zea Bermudez 
even while working to obtain his dismissal. He hoped the in­
fluence of the Eastern Courts could be replaced by that of 
England and France with the former predominating. The foreign 
secretary also wanted Zea Bermudez's policies toward Don Miguel 
and with respect to Anglo-Spanish trade modified. In view of 
the worsening position facing Don Miguel and under the relent­
less urging of Villiers the President agreed with the growing 
inexpediency of supporting the Portuguese pretender. Finally,
®Carr, Spain, p. 155.
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in late October Zea Bermudez, in a major shift of policy, 
admitted the desirability of joint Anglo-Spanish mediation
9
in Portugal. Villiers also suggested that the unaccredited
representatives from the Eastern Courts should be expelled
from Spain for refusing to recognize the q u e e n . T h e  Zea
Bermudez government made a request for British aid but failed
to obtain it. The Spanish government hinted at some type of
joint action involving Britain, Spain, and Portugal in the
conflict between Don Pedro and Don Miguel. Palmerston would
not agree to the proposal because Zea Bermudez had made it.
He did offer British mediation to the protagonists but his
offer was declined.^ Zea Bermudez then turned to the French
and requested military aid but they declined fearing reper-
12
eussions from the East.
The Eastern States exerted their influence in both of 
the Iberian Courts as Palmerston knew only too well. They
Q
Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 
October 1833, Spain, F.O. 72/412, No. 16.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 30 
November 1833, Spain, F.O. 72/413, No. 31.
l^Major John Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchv 
(London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1912), p. 177; and Despatch,
Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 October 1833, Spain,
F.O. 72/412, No. 16.
19Guizot, Mémoires, IV, 70; and Bell, Palmerston, I, 145.
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were trying to secure absolutism in S p a i n . P a l m e r s t o n  told
Villiers the Eastern Courts were trying to maintain their
grasp on Zea Bermudez. Furthermore, the Eastern Powers
hinted that should France attack Spain they would attack
France. No binding commitment, in the form of a treaty,
14
existed covering this possibility. All of the Eastern 
Powers refused to recognize Isabella's rights to the throne 
and thereby indicated openly their hostility to her regime.
Meanwhile, in the late fall of 1833 Cristina reluctantly 
had begun courting the liberals to gain a broader base of 
support. She was an opportunist who saw the only hope for 
her daughter lay with the liberals. She introduced some 
liberals into the government and Palmerston extended recog­
nition to the young queen. Cristina also began talking of 
liberal political reform in the government and even the 
granting of a constitution was discussed. In January 1834 
she removed Zea Bermudez from office since he was estranged 
from everyone except the governments of Russia and France.
^^Despatch, Addington to Lord Palmerston, 3 June 1833, 
Spain, F.O. 72/409, No. 79.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 11 October 
1833, France, F.O. 146/145, No. 123, Secret; and Draft, Lord 
Palmerston to Villiers, 26 October 1833, Spain, F.O. 72/406, 
No. 79.
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The replacement of Zea Bermudez by Martinez de la Rosa 
pleased Palmerston. Rosa had served in the constitutional 
regime of 1822 and he supported liberal ideas similar to those 
of the British foreign secretary. The new President of the 
Council opposed Don Miguel and directed the use of Spanish 
forces against his followers. He also worked against Don 
Carlos. Moreover, Rosa began drafting a new constitution, 
the Royal Statute, similar to the French Charter of 1814.^^ 
Palmerston welcomed these changes in Spanish policies and 
thought Rosa was pro-British.^^
While Palmerston approved of the liberal Rosa regime 
the French government did not. Rayneval thought Rosa was
inefficient and along with other French officials he believed
17the president "patronne par l'Angleterre." Because of 
French actions and attitudes Rosa felt compelled to ask Louis 
Philippe to cease supporting Don Carlos. The Spanish army
^^Carr, Spain, p. 157.
^^Duc de Broglie, ed., Memoirs of the Prince de Talley­
rand, 5 vols., (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892), V, 210; 
Vidal y Saura, La Politica Exterior, p. 55; and Despatch, 
Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 13 August 1834, Spain, 
F.O. 72/425, No. 112.
^^Marquis de Noailles, Iæ  Comte Mole 1781-1855 ; Sa Vie- 
Ses Mémoires, 6 vols., (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Edourd
Champion, 1930), V, 195.
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had reported that the Sous-Prefect of Bayonne permitted 
Carlists to enter Spain and reinforce the rebels. Rosa ex­
plained that continued aid to Don Carlos could only prove 
harmful to France and might precipitate a major European
To settle the Carlist issue and prevent a major war
Rosa formally requested British aid but not French. ”M. de
la Rosa understood the necessity of counting on the help of
19England and on the acquiescence of France." Palmerston 
reacted with encouragement to the Spanish overtures. He 
wanted to remove the two pretenders and settle Iberia peace­
fully while insuring the area for the liberal cause. Palmer­
ston suggested a formal treaty involving Britain, Spain, and 
Portugal. The French government would ultimately be asked 
to adhere to the convention, although not as a contracting 
party. Rosa, reassured by Palmerston's response, empowered 
the Comte de Florida Blanca to negotiate a convention. M. de
Sarmiento, the Portuguese minister to London, also urged the
20
formulating of a treaty covering Iberian affairs.
^®Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 8 
March 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/421, Nos. 28 and 31.
^^Vidal y Saura, La Politica Exterior, p. 55.
ZOlbid.
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While Palmerston encouraged the liberalization of the 
Spanish government after Ferdinand's death he wanted to check 
French designs in Spain. Throughout the eighteen months pre­
ceding the conclusion of the Quadruple Treaty Palmerston 
repeatedly expressed distrust for the French government and 
its Spanish policies. Palmerston always considered the French 
a potential threat to England.
As early as 1829, Palmerston insisted that France posed
a more serious threat to European peace than either Russia
or Prussia which many of his contemporaries feared. As a
matter of fact, he linked France with Russia, and he feared
the potential consequences of an alliance between these two
powers. This combination of land and naval forces he feared
above all other diplomatic or military combinations because
of the threat it posed to Turkey, to India, and to European
peace. His concern about France grew in the early 1830's as
Anglo-French relations deteriorated over the Belgian and
21Portuguese problems.
Palmerston's policies toward Spain in 1833 made it 
evident that French influence over the Madrid government was
21
Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign 
Policy, p. 91; and Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 221.
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not acceptable. He wanted to keep France isolated and con­
tained within her present boundaries. It was for these reasons 
and for Britain's defense that England and France had come to 
the brink of war over the Belgian problem. The foreign sec­
retary warned the French not to intervene militarily in Spain.
He also refused to cooperate with the French government when 
it first recognized Isabella.
Internal disorders in neighboring countries had pro­
voked French intervention on several occasions and Palmerston 
knew full well a similar development might occur again. In 
1808 Napoleon had attempted to occupy the country. More re­
cently the French had sent troops into Spain in 1823 with the 
full support of the Eastern Powers to crush the liberal consti­
tutional government forced on Ferdinand VII. Palmerston while 
in office had witnessed French intervention in both Belgium 
and Portugal so he knew the potential for action in Spain 
existed. Palmerston's fear of military intervention by France 
gained reinforcement from the Portuguese, especially Don Pedro, 
the abdicated ruler of Portugal, who trembled at the thought
of his "natural enemy, France," invading his daughter's state
22to restore peace.
Lytton Strachey and Roger Fulford, The Greville Memoirs : 
1814-1860, 6 vols., (London: The Macmillan Co., 1938), II, 411.
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Palmerston's fear of military intervention by France 
grew in 1833 with the death of Ferdinand VII. France once 
again had established an Army of Observation along the Pyrenees 
to contain the Spanish disturbances. Because of family ties, 
old alliances, and trade the French government believed it 
had special rights in Spain, and this concept disturbed the 
government of Lord Grey, British prime minister. On 18 Sep­
tember 1833 Palmerston intimated to Grey that France intended
trying to extend its influence over Spain and he proposed
23
keeping an observant eye on Paris.
Other considerations contributed to Palmerston's sus­
picions about the policies of France in Iberia. Louis Philippe 
confessed to Lord Granville, British Ambassador to France, that 
he passionately favored the success of absolutism in Spain
where he preferred the Salic Law and Don Carlos to a liberal 
24monarchy. The Duke de Broglie, the French foreign minister.
^^Letter, Palmerston to Grey, 18 September 1833, Webster, 
Foreign Policy of Palmerston, II, 833.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 13 
September 1833, France, F.O. 27/467; Despatch, Lord Granville 
to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 1 November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, 
No. 242; Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 182; Ward and Gooch,
British Foreign Policy, II, 168; Edgar Holt, The Carlist Wars 
in Spain (London: Putnam and Co., 1967), p. 52; and Guizot,
Mémoires. IV, 57-74.
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refused to support the exclusion of Don Carlos from the
25throne even though he had recognized Isabella. In late 
August and early September 1833, Donna Maria, Queen of Portugal, 
visited Louis Philippe and received a very uncivil welcome 
which indicated the true sentiment of the French monarch toward 
the liberal constitutionalists.^^
More bad news ceime to Palmerston's attention as time 
passed. He found that there was a real desire on the part 
of some members of Louis Philippe's government and among high
ranking civilians to intervene in Spain on some pretext or
27other. But perhaps the most disturbing news of all for 
Palmerston came in December after the initial sporadic up­
risings of northeastern Spain had subsided. The Carlist 
chiefs who escaped the first round of action fled to France. 
Once there and safe from pursuit they remained unmolested
by the French and were permitted to return to Spain to renew
28
hostilities in 1834. Palmerston's warning to Grey that
25Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 253.
^^Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, II, 417.
^^Walpole, History of England, IV, 306. Thiers was one 
of those who sought French intervention in Spain.
^^The Times (London), 9 December 1833.
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France needed to be carefully watched obviously revealed his
awareness of the French position toward Spain. The foreign
secretary went so far as to warn the French not to intervene
militarily in Spain.
Louis Philippe, diplomatically isolated, could ill-
afford to antagonize any of the major powers over Spain. He
found himself sharply divided from the Eastern Powers because
of the nature of his government and his apparent alliance with
29
Britain over Belgium. Because of this estrangement Prince 
Talleyrand, French Ambassador to Britain, tried to obtain an 
Anglo-French defensive alliance in O c t o b e r . A  cool rebuff 
greeted his advances. Later Louis Philippe and de Broglie 
expressed their desire for such a treaty. Through such an 
alliance the French expected to close their vulnerable back 
door, the Pyrenees. The treaty would also have given France 
an ally against the Eastern Powers. The French had a fear of 
a major two-front war such as Napoleon had f o u g h t . T h u s ,  
while national interests and Louis Philippe's personal wishes
29Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 11 October 
1833, France, F.O. 146/145, No. 123, Secret; and Hall, Orleans 
Monarchv, p. 182.
^^Broglie, Talleyrand, V, 187; and Woodward, Age of 
Reform, p. 231.
^^Louis Blanc, The History of Ten Years, 1830-1840, 2 
vols., (London: Chapman and Hall, 1844-45), II, 216.
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indicated a French solution, practical considerations dic­
tated by isolation and fear of a two-front war drove the 
government of Paris reluctantly toward Palmerston who could 
solve both problems.
Considerable alarm over the Iberian situation existed 
within the government of Louis Philippe. The king said 
Britain and France should act together in Iberia and de 
Broglie went so far as to assure Palmerston that France
would not act without, "previously concerting the measure
32with England." And yet while such statements were issued 
and while France did recognize Isabella after Ferdinand's 
death, the real feelings of the French government differed
markedly. Louis Philippe recoiled from the thought of a
33
liberal ascendancy in Spain. Even while Zea Bermudez, an
ultra conservative kept power, de Broglie observed that France
had no commitment to aid Spain and reserved the right to act
34
in their own best interests. But the French also said they
32Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
16 September 1833, France, F.O. 27/467, No. 178; and Despatch, 
Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 18 October 1833, 
France, F.O. 27/467, No. 225.
3 3Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
1 November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 242.
^"^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 15 
November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 261.
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did not want to interfere militarily in Spain since that 
would prove embarrassing.^^ Granville agreed with these 
comments adding that an armed response to the situation would 
not be popular in either France or B r i t a i n . T h e  French 
government had already turned down a request for aid from Zea 
Bermudez because it feared Eastern responses.
Besides being interested in preserving liberalism in 
Spain and thwarting French activities there Palmerston wanted 
to encourage Anglo-Spanish commercial exchanges. The foreign 
secretary had opposed Zea Bermudez and had cautioned the French 
not to intervene in Spain. When Villiers took up his post in 
Madrid he received instructions to negotiate a commercial 
agreement with the Spanish government. Palmerston had expressed 
an interest in trade for some years.
As a close friend of William Huskisson, President of 
the Board of Trade, 1823-30, Palmerston had shared his liberal 
views on trade. In 1832 he attacked protective tariffs during 
a debate on silk duties while advocating their repeal. He 
insisted that liberal principles guide Britain's trade measures
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
18 November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 262.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 1 
November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 242.
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37and provide an example to other countries. According to
Webster Palmerston was and always remained "an advocate of
38freeing trade from restraint." The instructions Palmerston 
sent with villiers in September 1833 reflected his concern 
for commerce. He ordered the British representative to seek 
a liberal reciprocal commercial treaty which he described as 
being mutually beneficial. Palmerston also urged that the 
independent states of Latin America be recognized by the 
Spanish government. He thought recognition of these states 
would be advantageous to the world and for British trade.
At this point Palmerston offered a word of caution. He re­
peated Canning's earlier warning that Britain would consider 
attempts to reconquer the New World as an act of aggression
not to be tolerated. But he did not abandon Spain to the
39
reactionary states as Canning had.
Much of the concern revealed in these instructions re­
volved about essentially commercial problems. Commerce, how­
ever, was not Palmerston's primary concern in these early
^^Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, II, 411; and 
Guedalla, Palmerston, p. 177.
38Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 11.
39Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 9 September 1833, 
Spain, F.O. 72/406, No. 1; and Spain, F.O. 185/137, No. 2.
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months of Isabella's reign. This fact was obvious since the 
foreign secretary failed to stress its importance until after 
the Quadruple Treaty was signed. Apart from his original 
instructions on the matter there was little reference to 
commerce until over a year later.
Palmerston's efforts to support liberalism, to check 
French designs, and to encourage free trade in Spain were 
opposed every step of the way. None of this opposition de­
terred him from his Spanish policies. From the beginning of 
his tenure as foreign secretary in 1830 Palmerston was accused 
of wanting to use the principle of intervention to involve 
England in constant war.^^ The Tories suspected him and the 
Radicals distrusted him since he had only recently adopted 
the Whig party and the philosophy of liberalism as his own.
There was opposition to Palmerston even in the cabinet. 
Several of the traditional Whigs disagreed with him and later 
in the 1835 cabinet he was almost excluded. Only the fact of 
his ability and the unavailability of an alternate kept him 
from being refused the position of foreign secretary. Both 
of the Whig prime ministers of the thirties. Lords Grey and 
Melbourne, got along well with Palmerston. Indeed, they
40
Hansard's, 2nd Series, XXII, 139-141 and 559-664.
40
generally supported his policies. Usually the cabinet 
ministers in the 1830's, like Commons, concerned themselves 
more with domestic problems rather than foreign affairs, but 
both could be difficult on occasion.
As expected, the Tory party opposed Palmerston's poli­
cies throughout his tenure of office. Of the Belgian incident 
Lord Aberdeen said, "I look upon this quasi-war of our Govern­
ment against Holland, and our union with France for this pur­
pose, as the most stupidly impolitic, as well as one of the 
most wicked acts of which any state was ever g u i l t y . T h e  
Tories could only conceive of the French as enemies and the 
irony is that while Palmerston used them, he was extremely 
suspicious also. In 1833 Aberdeen feared the Iberian situation 
would result in the Peninsula becoming revolutionized by England 
and France. To him the only encouraging event of the year was 
the meeting at Miinchengratz between the members of the Neo- 
Holy Alliance. In Spain he believed Zea Bermudez meant safety
"^\febster. Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 26.
^^Letter, Lord Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, November 
1832, Parrey E. Jones, ed.. The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen 
and Princess Lieven, 1832-54, 2 vols., Camden Third Series, LX, 
(London: Butler and Tanner, Ltd., 1938), I, 8.
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from revolution and French dominance.
Complaints on Palmerston's Spsinish policies from the 
Tory opposition were evident in 1833 even before the suc­
cession question developed as a reality. The Tories expressed 
their inclination to support the cause of absolutism by saying 
they wanted to back Don Miguel in Portugal. The Whigs were
blamed when Don Pedro enlisted British subjects to combat 
44Don Miguel. The Tories generally opposed the idea of re­
pealing the Foreign Enlistment Act when it was debated. Earl 
Grey in the debate over the Foreign Enlistment Act supported 
the principle of repeal which would have aided Don Pedro. 
Similarly, John Murray, M.P., asked for repeal of the act in 
Commons on the grounds that it was unjust, unnecessary, and 
inexpedient. In the next session of parliament Murray again 
advocated repeal and obtained a second reading of the bill 
at which time there was a majority in favor of the measure.
One specific objection to repeal at this point involved the
45
question of British subjects fighting in foreign civil wars.
43The term Neo-Holy Alliance is used to designate the 
three powers of Miinchengratz, Russia, Prussia, and Austria 
rather than the Holy Alliance of 1815 which was much broader 
in representation.
44
Walpole, History of England, IV, 293.
45
Hansard's, 3rd Series, XX, 865 and 381; and XXII,
1368 ff.
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The opposition recalled that the Miguelite War witnessed such 
involvement and feared the potential use of Britons in Spain.
Opposition members of Parliament did not confine their 
distrust to Palmerston or the use of mercenaries in Iberia.
Lord Aberdeen became gravely concerned over Cristina's role 
as queen regent after Ferdinand's death. He believed the 
queen mother entirely untrustworthy and much preferred Zea 
Bermudez whom he candidly admitted was a bigot. Tory alarms 
sounded, however, as fear of French ascendancy appeared likely.
George Moir, a Tory writer, cautioned the government 
about French designs in Spain. He said Spain appeared to be 
another Portugal in the making where France had tried to es­
tablish control over the government. Potential marriage 
alliances alarmed him as much as the immediate effect of 
French action in Spain. Rather naively Moir suggested that 
Europe leave Spain alone so that the tranquility of the Con­
tinent might be assured when Don Carlos took his rightful place 
as king. France, in particular, he said, should be kept out
but, as with most Tories, while he wanted the French kept out
46
of Spain he offered no method of achieving this goal.
^^George Moir, "The Spanish Succession," Blackwood's 
Edinburgh Magazine, XXXIV (November 1833), 804-813.
43
The Times, much more sanguine than Moir, late in 1833 
reported the Spanish insurrectionists as leaderless and 
lacking direction. The newspaper warned against British 
involvement though it recognized the possibility of foreign 
intervention either by France or the Neo-Holy Alliance. A 
leading article declared Britain had no right to intervene 
but ought to prevent any other foreign action there. Again, 
there was no mention of how this policy could be implemented. 
The Times adopted these attitudes because it felt French 
policy had changed since 1823 and that while that government 
continued to believe it had special privileges in Spain it 
no longer thought in terms of occupying the country or dic­
tating a government for Madrid.
The Radicals were as upset with Palmerston as were the 
Tories. The foreign secretary had not gone far enough in im­
plementing a liberal foreign policy to suit them. They had 
wanted more aid for Don Pedro and Maria than England had pro­
vided. Palmerston's reluctance to issue a note of protest 
over the Six Resolutions in Germany did not gain him any 
Radical support. This group wanted an end to the Foreign
4?The Times (London), 9 October 1833.
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Enlistment Act so Britons could legally aid the liberal
48struggles in Europe without fear of punishment.
Almost the entire diplomatic corp, foreign and domestic, 
opposed Palmerston too. Lord Greville, a man intimate with 
statesmen of both parties, reported strong feelings against 
Palmerston personally and against his policies. Many people 
characterized the minister, however unjustly, as being indo­
lent, negligent, and insolent. Talleyrand was particularly 
upset at times for having to wait two hours or more to see 
Palmerston. Other foreign ambassadors had similar grievances 
and by 1834 several of them had taken leaves to escape from 
Britain's foreign secretary. Personal antipathy to Palmerston 
played a significant role in determining foreign policy. 
Talleyrand, for instance, feeling slighted and abused, in 
the fall of 1833 preferred an understanding with the Eastern 
Powers. Louis Philippe entertained the same notion.
Palmerston's own diplomatic corps frequently complained 
about his policies and his lack of communication with overseas 
posts. The foreign secretary displayed partiality in the case 
of Belgium which annoyed some, particularly Lord Lamb, his
^®Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 42-3; and 
Ridley, Lord Palmerston, pp. 154-5. Palmerston did eventually 
send a note of protest to the Diet in Germany.
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ambassador in Vienna. Greville said Lamb was "be-Metterniched" 
but in no fear of being removed from his post since Palmerston 
was in love with his sister. Lady Cowper.^^ Villiers criti­
cized his superior on several occasions from Madrid after 
receiving his post there from Palmerston. He felt British 
influence could be foremost in Spain but of his government's 
policy said sarcastically, "if all the rest of our foreign 
policy is managed like the Spanish branch, it must be a great 
satisfaction to our e n e m i e s . O n  an earlier occasion 
Villiers wrote bitterly saying, "it is very amusing to read 
the French newspapers, which, having no debates . . .  to fill 
their columns, have for the past three weeks been commenting 
upon the policy of the English government in Spain —  as if 
it had any."51
Although there were many areas of disagreement between 
Palmerston and his domestic opponents there were one or two
^^Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, I, 399 and 
425. Palmerston later married Lady Cov^er.
^^Letter, George Villiers to Edward Villiers, 13 February 
1836, Sir Herbert Maxwell, The Life and Letters of George Villiers, 
Fourth Earl of Clarendon, 2 vols., (London: Edward Arnold, 1913),
I, 106; and Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, III, 9 and
II.
^^Letter, George Villiers to Edward Villiers, 14 October 
1835, Ibid., p. 101.
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points of accord. The foreign secretary agreed with the 
idea of nonintervention and had spoken in favor of this 
policy for some time. The Tories objected to an alliance 
with France which they saw as the traditional Continental foe.
In 1833 the foreign secretary likewise disavowed an agreement 
with France when he turned down a defensive alliance proposed 
by Talleyrand. The Radicals, on the other hand, wanted to 
support liberalism in Spain and Palmerston agreed with them. 
Generally those points over which the Tories and Palmerston 
agreed the Radicals opposed. The support for liberalism 
that Palmerston and the Radicals accepted the Tories rejected. 
This situation made it difficult for Palmerston but he, never­
theless, pursued his own goals.
Like his domestic foes the Eastern Courts attacked 
Palmerston's personality and his policies but with them there 
were no areas of accord. The Eastern Courts tried to block 
action in Iberia, and they also worked to prevent an Anglo- 
French rapprochement at the same time. The Eastern Powers 
objected to Palmerston because of the doctrine of noninterven­
tion he espoused. Another reason for opposition to England 
was the, "offensive arrogance of the English cabinet," which 
was, "no doubt due to the personal character of Lord Palmerston,"
47
52but there were other reasons too. Metternich and his
allies seriously believed the Whig government would be forced
from office any day and therefore they refused to moderate
their views and accept Palmerston.Furthermore, the Austrian
Prince loathed revolution and liberalism which the western
54constitutional states represented. The opposition to con­
stitutional forces in Iberia by the Eastern Courts was such 
that by February 1834 they still had not recognized Isabella 
even though England and France both had acknowledged her 
some months before.
Palmerston began negotiations for the Quadruple Treaty 
despite the domestic and foreign opposition. To triumph over 
the absolute powers, Palmerston thought, would greatly strengthen 
the liberal spirit throughout Europe and might encourage Britain, 
France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and Greece to act as a power­
ful block to the Eastern Courts. Rosa's request for British
52Letter, Talleyrand to Due de Broglie, 11 February 
1833, Broglie, Talleyrand, V, 87 and 187.
53Letter, Palmerston to Temple, 15 July 1834, Bulwer, 
Life of Henry John Temple, II, 205; and Strachey and Fulford, 
Greville Memoirs, II, 416.
^^Walpole, History of England, IV, 299.
^^Hansard’s, 3rd Series, XXI, 101-102; Bulwer, Life of 
Henry John Temple, II, 168; and Webster, Foreign Policy of 
Palmerston, II, 168, III, 381.
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aid encouraged Palmerston who wanted to see the two preten­
ders removed from Iberia. The foreign secretary suggested 
a formal treaty involving Britain, Spain, and Portugal to 
which France would ultimately be asked to adhere, though not 
as a contracting party.
By March the suggestion for the treaty had been made, 
Spain and Portugal had both empowered their minister in 
London to conclude a convention, and the remainder of Europe 
knew nothing about the negotiations. Talleyrand, France, and 
all Europe did not discover the agreement until it had been 
written. The Eastern Courts had tried for the previous year 
to block British action in Iberia just as they had worked to 
prevent an Anglo-French rapprochement.^^ Talleyrand first 
became aware of the treaty on April 10, 1834, at which time 
he still maintained high hopes for an Anglo-French treaty.
Not until April 14 did he drop this idea in favor of France 
becoming a contracting party in the recently negotiated triple 
alliance.
^^Letter, Palmerston to Villiers, 11 January 1834, Webster, 
Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 390.
^^Pemberton, Lord Palmerston, p. 65.
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Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 22 November 1833, 
Spain, P.O. 185/137, No. 23.
49
Talleyrand had several reasons for insisting that
France be admitted as a contracting party in the treaty. He
wanted French inclusion in the treaty as a contracting party 
rather than as a consenting party only so as not to leave 
the impression of French subservience to England with the 
Eastern Courts. Talleyrand feared that, as a consenting 
party only, the isolation of France would be apparent to
all.59 The French also argued they had been contacted first
to provide aid to Spain, and, therefore, they had a right to 
be part of the a g r e e m e n t . B u t  Talleyrand's real concern 
for French involvement appeared in a letter he wrote to the 
Comte de Rigny, newly appointed French foreign minister, which 
said, "we must not allow England to take action alone with 
Spain."51
Palmerston surprised not only Talleyrand but his own 
cabinet. Most of his dealings with Miraflores and Sarmiento 
must have been secretive and since the cabinet was more con­
cerned with domestic matters anyway, they had no real knowledge
59Blanc, Ten Years, II, 286; and Ward and Gooch, British 
Foreign Policy, II, 188.
^^Guizot, Mémoires, IV, 88.
^^Letter, Rigny to Talleyrand, 17 April 1834, Broglie 
Talleyrand, V, 247.
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of the negotiations. Palmerston wrote that he carried the 
cabinet, "by a coup de main, taking them by surprise, and 
not leaving them time to make objections."^2 He wrote en­
thusiastically saying, "This treaty was a capitol hit, and 
all my own doing.
The Quadruple Treaty that Palmerston signed on 22 
April 1834 and which he was so proud of did many things. 
Article I required the governments of Maria and Isabella to 
use all the resources at their disposal to defeat the pre­
tenders. The second article called upon Spanish forces to 
enter Portugal to aid in defeating Miguel and Carlos who were 
together in that country. Isabella agreed to withdraw these 
forces as soon as Miguel left Portugal. Britain, in Article 
III, agreed to provide naval forces to aid in Miguel's defeat. 
Article IV said,
"If the co-operation of France should be deemed 
necessary by the High Contracting Parties, for 
the complete attainment of the objectives of the 
treaty. His Majesty the King of the French engages 
to do, in this respect, whatever might be settled 
by common consent between himself and his three 
August Allies."
^^Guedalla, Palmerston, p. 192.
G^better, Palmerston to William Temple, 12 May 1834, 
Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 186.
51
Articles V, VI, and VII provided for a general amnesty to 
the rebels, a suitable pension for Miguel and Carlos upon 
their retirement and for ratification of the treaty.
The Quadruple Treaty of April was designed to remove 
the pretenders from Portugal and their removal was expected 
to pacify all of Iberia. Perfunctory roles in this process 
were assigned to Britain and France. Naval aid that England 
was required to provide could hardly effect the outcome of 
the contest since Miguel's forces were all well inland.
France had only the most passive role to play which was pre­
cisely what Palmerston intended. Portugal required only 
minimal aid from her neighbor Spain. The treaty, rather than 
being an effective military alliance, was a moral and diplo­
matic tool emphasizing the isolation of Miguel.
Reactions to the news of the Quadruple Treaty were 
mixed but Palmerston was jubilant. In recounting the details 
of the agreement and French participation in the final treaty 
to William IV, Palmerston enunciated three basic ideas. In 
the first instance he argued that French acquiescence along
^^Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and Foreign 
State Papers, 1833-1834, XXII, "Treaty Between Great Britain, 
France, Spain, and Portugal for the Pacification of the 
Peninsula, Signed at London, 22nd April, 1834," (London: 
James Ridgeway and Sons, 1847), 132.
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with the other three powers had a greater moral effect. 
Secondly, the West presented a visible demonstration of 
unity to the Eastern Courts after their serious efforts to 
prevent such a treaty. Finally, and here he demonstrated 
his mistrust of France, he said it was advantageous to get 
a binding treaty with Louis Philippe to afford some measure 
of control over his insecure government. "Nothing ever 
did so well as the Quadruple Treaty," he concluded.
Some of the Whigs did not share Palmerston's enthu­
siasm for the treaty. Lord Brougham wrote Grey somewhat 
despondently, "I suppose we must now, in concert with Spain 
and with the concurrence of France, if not with her help, 
put down the anarchy in Iberia." Brougham hoped the treaty 
would not antagonize the Eastern Powers. Grey replied and 
concurred in his friend's sentiments.
The Tories disagreed strongly with the treaty. They 
had objected to Palmerston's recognition of Isabella II, his
^^Letter, Lord Palmerston to William IV, 12 April 1834, 
Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, II, 806-807.
^^Letter, Lord Palmerston to William Temple, 27 June 
1834, Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 197.
^^Letters, Brougham to Grey, 31 December 1833 and Grey 
to Brougham, 4 January 1834, Brougham, Henry Lord Brougham, 
III, 216-217.
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opposition to Zea Bermudez, and his desire to aid Portugal.
He was charged with deliberately fostering war in Spain and 
Sir Robert Peel insisted the Portuguese problem stemmed from 
ministerial actions. Palmerston denied these allegations.
Peel expressed his desire for tranquility in Iberia and 
stated the necessity of having good relations between England 
and F r a n c e . T h i s  last point conflicted with the opinions 
of several other Tories such as Aberdeen and the Duke of 
Wellington. Both of them reflected a deep antagonism toward 
an intimate policy of friendship with Louis Philippe's govern­
ment which they thought the treaty indicated. They repre­
sented the old Tory views which Palmerston did not deviate 
far from because he and the cabinet also maintained serious 
suspicions about the French. William Russell, minister to 
Portugal wrote, "I wish your cabinet were not so dreadfully 
suspicious and distrustful of the French.
Metternich, like most people, querulously complained 
about the treaty to everybody, but especially to the French.
G^Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXI, 101-102.
^^Letter, William Russell to Lord John Russell, 23 
August 1833, Rollo Russell, ed.. Early Correspondence of Lord 
John Russell, 1805-1840, 2 vols., (London: T. Fisher Unwin,
1913), II, 40.
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The Prince scornfully informed Louis Philippe's government 
that had it pursued French interests the Franco-Spanish 
family compact would have been renewed. Playing upon French 
doubts he further stated that Britain and France had no justi­
fication for interfering in Spain. Metternich vaguely sug­
gested a five-power agreement might have been the best solu­
tion to the p r o b l e m . H e  had envisioned a settlement entirely 
in favor of Don Miguel and Don Carlos. Such an accommodation 
Louis Philippe could easily have supported except that the 
Eastern Powers had shown little willingness to cultivate 
French friendship.
Despite the disapproval expressed by most people the 
dividends expected by Palmerston from signing the treaty 
were forthcoming. Rosa within days recalled the Spanish 
ministers to Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, thereby 
acknowledging the ascendancy of Britain and France. He 
justified his stand by saying some of the Eastern Powers had 
not yet extended recognition to I s a b e l l a . L a t e r  the Roths­
childs, the international bankers, offered his government 15
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 26 May 
1834, France, F.O. 27/484, No. 220.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 29 April 1834, 
Spain, F.O. 72/422, No. 52.
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million francs for Spain's immediate needs. Still more 
importantly the signing of the treaty effectively ended the 
resistance of Don Miguel. He and Don Carlos gave up the 
struggle in a matter of weeks and both agreed to leave the 
Peninsula. Miguel went to Italy while Carlos boarded an 
English naval vessel and travelled to England. Neither of 
the pretenders were satisfied with this turn of events nor 
were their backers.
Several members of Parliament were not satisfied with 
Palmerston's Spanish policies even though Iberia was tempor­
arily pacified. The Marquis of Londonderry sarcastically 
suggested the policy of nonintervention, so successful in 
driving Don Miguel and Don Carlos from their respective coun­
tries, would be resorted to in order to insure that neither
73
of them returned. The Earl of Winchelsea inquired about
allegations he had heard that the royal navy stopped vessels
with arms bound for Don Carlos. He deprecated the compact
which he described as forwarding French designs in Spain and 
74Portugal. Melbourne in the Lords, who favored Palmerston's
72Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 12 May 
1834, France, F.O. 27/484, No. 220. It was the London branch 
of the international Rothschilds that offered the loan.
73
Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXIV, 595.
^^Ibid., XXV, 465-466.
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policies, failed to respond to these charges except in vague 
terms and the attacks continued.
Londonderry repeatedly flayed the government over its 
foreign policies. Critically he examined their actions which 
he insisted had cost England the friendship of the Eastern 
Courts. Substituted in its place the Whigs erected an alli­
ance with their, "powerful allie Louis Philippe." Warning 
the government, he told Melbourne to keep a watchful eye on 
the July Monarch since Britain traditionally had tried to 
prevent a close Franco-Spanish alliance not encourage it. 
Wellington assailed the agreement saying he thought it thor­
oughly inconsistent with British interests and with a policy 
of nonintervention. Melbourne replied by reiterating Palmer­
ston's argument that the treaty limited and controlled inter­
vention which the Whigs believed justified the understanding.^^
In Parliament Palmerston, limited by his office, could 
not indicate his true sentiments concerning France. To have 
done so publicly would have revealed the complete isolation 
of the Whig government. Palmerston had found himself forced 
to reach some understanding with France because of Britain's 
isolation in foreign affairs. Louis Philippe's government
^^Ibid., pp. 942 ff.
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appeared to be the only one with which he could arrive at a 
modus operandi. Belgium had isolated both states from the 
Eastern Courts but also had created serious differences be­
tween them. Munchengratz further emphasized the East-West 
split though Tories like Aberdeen thought that conference en­
couraging. Iberia, under the guise of liberal-constitutionalism 
which both France and Britain professed to support, Palmerston 
thought could provide the common ground for an understanding. 
However, he retained grave suspicions about French designs 
and never formulated a defensive or military alliance with 
France. Palmerston knew that if the Eastern Powers attacked 
France, England would have to aid Louis Philippe for the sake 
of the balance of power. The Tories, ever mindful of their 
allies of the Napoleonic period, could not divorce themselves 
from the belief that only France distorted the balance of 
power.
Palmerston had grasped this point but failed to drop 
his old Tory views completely. The isolation of Britain and 
France, however, permitted these nations to move closer to­
gether. But differences in their respective policies on 
Greece, Belgium, and their struggle to control Iberia meant 
no entente cordiale could exist. Only one or two symbols of
58
a supposed understanding can be found. There were some verbal 
expressions of the "alliance," even from the crowned heads, 
and there was the Quadruple Treaty. Since Palmerston's view 
of the Quadruple Treaty was that it restricted French activity 
in Iberia and supported liberalism, it obviously cannot be 
maintained this understanding represented a cooperative alli­
ance. Nor can the verbal communications issued by Britain 
or France since their actions reveal contrary ideas.
Louis Philippe joined the Quadruple Treaty, indeed de­
manded to be a part of it, because of his fear of isolation 
and his suspicions about England. Munchengratz in 1833 re­
affirmed the Neo-Holy Alliance and the prospective triple 
alliance including Spain, Portugal, and Britain, left only 
one major power without allies, France. In this isolated 
role he feared the possibility of a two-front war.^^ 
Talleyrand's government detested the thought of unilateral 
British action in Iberia, which could end French influence 
and predominance there. At the same time France needed 
Britain, as the earlier desire for an Anglo-French defensive 
treaty makes plain, as an ally. Louis Philippe had to accept
^^Blanc, Ten Years, II, 216, 286.
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some kind of treaty with England under these circumstances
and since Palmerston offered only the Quadruple Treaty
France accepted it.
The mixed reaction to the Quadruple Treaty became
unimportant when Don Carlos suddenly returned to Spain.
Though under surveillance by the British government he fled
London using a feigned illness as a ruse to gain time. Quickly
passing through France he arrived in Navarre, a seedbed of
77Carlist opposition forces and anti-liberals. Orders for
arms and supplies came from the Carlists to be paid for with
78money allegedly provided by the Eastern Courts. A loan
subscription, authorized by Don Carlos, and managed by M.
79Jauge, a French banker, appeared in Paris. By the middle 
of July Don Carlos had caused a sensation and thoroughly 
alarmed the French government.
Did the Quadruple Treaty of April 22, 1834, cover the 
recent developments in Spain? Rigny was not sure since both 
of the pretenders had been expelled from Iberia which was the
^^Holt, The Carlist Wars, p. 58.
7ftDespatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 11 July 
1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 293.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 16 July
1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 299.
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stated purpose of the agreement. He declared that if the 
treaty did not cover Don Carlos's return to Spain, France 
would work toward this end, "in a way and to the degree which 
might be settled between the Spanish and French governments."®*^ 
Palmerston hoped to avoid this possibility, but Rigny tempered 
this statement by revealing his desire for a continuation of 
the Quadruple Treaty based in part upon French domestic con­
siderations. Many Frenchmen wanted a French army sent into 
Spain but Rigny did not ; he feared the potential repercus­
sions.®^ If the treaty remained in force, Rigny could say 
that he could only act in concert with the other powers.
This reasoning had the added advantage of protecting the 
king who did not want to invade Spain.
Both Rosa and Palmerston understood the treaty still 
to be in effect. The Spanish minister appealed to the govern­
ments of London and Paris for aid as members of the treaty.
He pointed out the war was one of ideologies, the liberals 
versus the absolutists. For the moment the foreign minister 
insisted he had no need for foreign troops but did ask that
80Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 21 July 
1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 304.
®l%bid.
61
82the flow of arms to the enemy be stopped. Palmerston
thought the treaty continued in effect though initially only
intended to cover the Portuguese problem. French attitudes
compelled Palmerston to adopt this outlook and led him to
suggest the four powers consider the new developments in the 
83Peninsula.
The allied response to the new dilemma included an 
agreement on additional treaty articles. In August the 
articles ratified by the states, defined more precisely the 
aid Spain might expect in resisting Don Carlos. Britain 
agreed to provide naval forces in a limited capacity and 
arms. France, refusing to offer troops, met Rosa's request 
to secure their common frontier and prevent supplies and
Q A
material going to the Carlists. By these terms French 
activities in Iberia remained limited and peripheral while 
Britain's role, a traditional one that relied upon sea power, 
involved a somewhat larger and more direct involvement. France, 
however, made use of her navy to hinder the flow of arms by
®^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 30 July 1834, 
Spain, F.O. 72/424, No. 100.
®^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 27 July 
1834, France, F.O. 27/499, No. 129.
^^British and Foreign State Papers, "Additional Articles 
to the Treaty of 22nd April, 1834," XXII, 138.
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sea into Carlist held Spanish ports.
The Quadruple Treaty produced a variety of responses 
among Europeans. Metternich and the Eastern Courts became 
annoyed, and they continued to provide support to Don Carlos. 
Britain and France appeared to be cooperating on behalf of 
liberal-constitutional ideals. They were not, however, be­
cause they were jealous of each other and competed for the 
control of Spain. Talleyrand adequately summed up the French 
point of view saying, "it is well known that ever since the 
Peace of Utrecht, England has always sought to oppose our 
[French]influence in Spain.
®^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 25 
July 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 307.
®^Broglie, Talleyrand, V, 209.
CHAPTER III
THE ILLUSION OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE SHATTERED
Several developments in British foreign policy in 
Spain occurred between the signing of the Quadruple Treaty 
and the end of 1835. At first the spirit of April 22nd 
seemed to continue, but this was illusory. Friction among 
the allies never disappeared though momentarily it declined. 
Palmerston and de Broglie expressed desires for cooperation 
at least verbally in the autumn of 1834. After the Duke of 
Wellington replaced Palmerston in the foreign office a changed 
attitude emanated from London. The Iron Duke felt the Spanish 
should muddle through on their own. Such a policy permitted 
the French to interfere in the Carlist War in a way detrimental 
to British interests. When Palmerston returned to office his 
task had been made much more difficult by Wellington's action. 
Britain's desire for a commercial treaty with Spain provoked 
and alarmed the French, too, adding yet another dimension to 
the struggle for dominance in Madrid.
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This struggle for dominance in the Iberian Peninsula 
remained the real issue no matter how clouded the picture be­
came. Constitutionalism and liberalism were part of the seri­
ous conflict engaged in by Palmerston and the Continental Powers. 
France, ostensibly the ally of Britain opposed that power as 
Louis Philippe sought better relations with the Eastern 
Courts.^ He received encouragement in this endeavor from 
Talleyrand and later Count Mole, French foreign minister in 
1836. De Broglie mouthed platitudes to Palmerston, but French 
action exposed the true sentiment of Louis Philippe's govern- 
ment. Despite repeated failures to obtain complete French 
cooperation, Palmerston continually pressured their government 
to comply with the treaty.
These efforts had some effect since France and Britain, 
motivated by mistrust and fear, briefly cooperated in the last 
months of Palmerston's tenure as foreign minister; and, further­
more, Rigny and Palmerston exchanged assurances that the Quad­
ruple Treaty continued in effect.^ And from Spain came word
^Bell, Palmerston, I, 210-211.
2
Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 398.
^Despatch, Arthur Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 4
August 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 2.
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that Rosa sincerely believed Don Carlos could be defeated by 
Spanish forces. This optimism was conditional. Rosa required 
Britain and France to insure that supplies destined for the
4
opposition never reached them; this was the rub.
Only in this one area could the French act to effect 
the outcome of the Spanish civil war with impunity. The 
Pyrenees border area adjacent to the territories held by Don 
Carlos and criss-crossed with tracks, quickly became a depot 
for the insurgents. Little that the British or Spanish govern­
ments did materially affected any clandestine operation en­
couraged by the French. The allies issued remonstrances but 
Louis Philippe easily rejected any suggestion that he failed 
to honor the treaty. Nevertheless, Rosa repeatedly asked the 
allies to prevent aid reaching his enemies' camp.
In vain Rosa asked the British government to halt the 
shipments of arms from London merchants to the Carlists. Fur­
thermore, the Spanish minister hinted at the desirability of 
intercepting at sea war material destined for the insurgents, 
but again met with disappointment. Palmerston, only too eager 
to render whatever service he could to Spain, found himself in
^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 30 July
1834, Spain, F.O. 72/424, No. 100.
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a dilemma. On the one hand the Quadruple Treaty bound him 
to provide naval and other aid to Spain, but on the other 
hand, international law prohibited Britain from stopping 
vessels bound for Iberia. Arthur Aston at Paris, substituting 
temporarily for Granville, pointed out the non-belligerents, 
both France and Britain, could create serious problems if 
they attempted to intercept vessels trading with Spain.^
Palmerston asked the appropriate authorities in London 
to define Britain's options in the arms trade and found him­
self severely limited. The Board of Trade, after due reflec­
tion, described an Order in Council prohibiting arms exports 
as "inconvenient and embarrassing" and declined to agree to 
one.^ Approximate figures of arms exports were also pro­
vided by the Board at this point and revealed that 850,000 
guns had been exported between 1831 and July 1834. The bulk 
of these weapons had gone to France, Britain's avowed ally.^
Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 4 August 
1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 2. Opposed to military inter­
vention Palmerston at first used this international law, which 
Britain traditionally had ignored, as reason enough not to get 
deeply involved in the military aspects of the Carlist Wars.
^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 27 
October 1834, Spain, F.O. 185/141, Part 1, No. 60.
^Ibid. This meant there was a considerable legal arms 
trade in England that might object to embargo or trade restric­
tions.
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News from other sources was equally discouraging and Palmer­
ston reported to Villiers that H. M. cruisers could not inter­
fere with neutrals since England was not a belligerent.® And, 
of course, the foreign minister had no intention of becoming 
a belligerent since that idea ran counter to his noninter­
vention concepts. Besides, as Palmerston pointed out, to 
acquiesce in Spain's request meant the necessity of getting
9
a Parliamentary act to that effect which he was loath to do.
Some cooperation in 1834 among the allies can be ob­
served despite the mutual suspicions. The British consul at 
Bayonne, J. V. Harvey, in July reported on measures taken by 
France to seal the Pyrenees border area to the flow of arms 
and men into S p a i n . T h e s e  measures taken by the French were 
not designed to aid the allied cause so much as they were ob­
viously meant to protect France. Rigny spoke of the danger 
to French tranquility in the southern departments if Don Carlos, 
in northeastern Spain, received aid. He cited French legiti­
mists who might be inflamed by the Apostolic or Don Carlos
Q
Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
26 August 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/419, No. 48.
9
Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 28 
October 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/416, No. 69.
^®Copy of Letter, J. V. Harvey, Consul at Bayonne to 
Lord Granville, Paris, 26 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 
321.
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faction to the detriment of Louis P h i l i p p e . F o r  this same
reason French forces, naval and land, provided some arms to
the Spanish royalist cause. The navy received orders to
12
intercept some neutral vessels carrying arms at sea.
Britain cooperated with France at this point at least to
the extent of providing warnings of arms shipments bound for 
13Spain by sea. Palmerston still keenly observed France, 
however, since Louis Philippe had an army collected along 
the Spanish border.
Rosa, requesting aid in July, reassured Palmerston that 
he needed no foreign troops, that he only contemplated the aid 
suggested by the Quadruple Treaty. Villiers pressed the point 
about foreign intervention as he tried to get Rosa to clarify 
his position on this issue. The Spaniard assured the minister 
that he utterly opposed the use of any foreign troops in Spain. 
Suspicions lingered and even when the Cortes received a state 
of the nation report from Rosa, pro-British in sentiment, it 
abated but little. On several occasions Rosa took time to
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 
23 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 310.
12Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 29 August 
1834, France, F.O. 27/487, No. 45.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
28 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/484, No. 315.
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reassure Palmerston that foreign troops would not be utilized 
and especially French troops would not be sought. This atti­
tude Villiers reported as being fairly consistent throughout
14the queen regent's cabinet.
Laboring under apprehensions with regard to French de­
signs in Spain, Palmerston also received disturbing news of 
the activities of the Eastern Powers. For months he had been 
aware of the hostility of these Powers toward Isabella and 
western cooperation. Now fresh reports of their efforts on 
behalf of Don Carlos surfaced. Agents in Holland shipped arms 
to Biscay. Other agents in Amsterdam tried to raise loans 
similar to those M. Jauge had tried to get in Paris and 
Metternich made efforts to borrow money for the same cause.
In conjunction with these movements ambassadorial activity 
increased. Count Pozzo di Borgo of Russia, Ambassador to France, 
hoped that there would be no foreign interference in Spain.
^^Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 7 
and 13 August 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/425, Nos. 106 and 112; and 
Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 30 July 1834, 
Spain, F.O. 72/424, No. 100.
^^Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 25 August 
1834, France, F.O. 27/487, No. 42; Draft, Lord Palmerston to 
Villiers, Foreign Office, 31 October 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/419, 
No. 71; and Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 413.
^^Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 22 August
1834, France, F.O. 27/487, No. 35.
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Britain maneuvered to obtain the same objective, non­
interference in Spain. But the French government caused 
anxiety because of pressure on Rigny from the holders of 
"rentes perpétuelles." These French bondholders asked for
intervention in Spain on their behalf, a request that the
17British bondholders later repeated to Palmerston. In 
November the British foreign minister discussed Spain with 
M. Barcourt, French Charge d ' Affaires, at which time he 
stressed the harmful effect British or French action in 
Iberia could have. Specifically, he thought a loss of free­
dom might result from interference and Barcourt concurred in 
this sentiment. Barcourt further said that his government
viewed the alliance as a moral force rather than a reference
18to financial aid or intervention.
To the extent that neither of the western allies wanted 
to see the Eastern Powers involved in Spain, they cooperated. 
The western allies had no other basis for an agreement because 
their goals were mutually exclusive. Palmerston, who refused 
a defensive Anglo-French treaty, acknowledged this joint
^^Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 12 September 
1834, France, F.O. 27/487, No. 72.
18Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 27 November 1834, France, F.O. 27/479, No. 4.
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opposition to the Eastern Courts in the early 1830's. No
solidarity existed between the two governments; and as soon
19as national interest developed, the two powers parted.
At home the British government found itself under fire 
from those disagreeing with the Spanish policies although The 
Times granted a temporary reprieve to await the results of 
the measures taken by Palmerston. Completely at odds with 
intervention, the paper exuded optimism that the alliance 
would work and the Spanish war would end quickly. When 
General Mina replaced General Rodil, the London paper glee­
fully told its readers any thought of French intervention had 
ended. Mina, a guerrilla leader against Napoleon, reportedly 
would become Carlist rather than admit the French into Spain 
again. Franco-Spanish relations had already cooled because 
Rayneval still favored Zea Bermudez despite his removal in 
January 1834. Britain temporarily gained favor with the 
Madrid government because of the alliance but also because
Palmerston made military supplies and services available to 
20
Isabella. While The Times conditionally tendered its support
19"The normal rivalry between Britain and France began 
again to be prominent all over Europe and overseas." Webster, 
Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 413.
^^The Times (London), 9, 18 September and 4 November,
1834.
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to Palmerston other organs attacked him.
Tory spokesmen slashed away at the foreign secretary 
and the policies he implemented after 1830. Fundamentally 
one basic difference in foreign policy existed between the 
Whigs and Tories though both parties agreed France remained 
the most suspect Continental Power. The point in question 
revolved around the issue of controlling French designs, 
real and imagined, in Europe. The Tories could not agree to 
an alliance with France for this purpose. They really pre­
ferred John Carteret's old approach of alliances with the
21Germanies to resist both French and Russian threats. In 
fact, some Tories saw only France as a potential threat to 
European peace and, therefore, supported a British under­
standing with the Eastern Courts. Palmerston long before 
indicated he thought France a major concern in foreign affairs. 
The treaty he concluded in 1834 reduced French freedom of 
action and recognized publicly that a difference existed be­
tween East and West. This difference Palmerston exploited in 
trying to prevent France from moving toward an agreement with
22
21John Carteret, Earl Granville, during George II's reign 
followed a foreign policy that placed great emphasis upon the 
Germanies and in particular upon Hanover.
22Bell, Palmerston, I, 77.
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one or more of the Eastern Courts. Balance of power had a
23place in lalmerston's scheme of things.
The opposition press accused the government of being 
deceived by France and of destroying the old alliance system. 
Britain and France overturned every second rate government 
within reach, they said, including Belgium, Spain, Portugal, 
and Switzerland. Germany, the indictment continued, had been 
thrown to Russia. This vitrolic statement pointed out how 
despotic France, led by Louis Philippe and desirous of an 
empire, had, with Britain's aid, secured the back door against 
attack with the alliance and, the article conjectured, probably 
would gain Spain and Portugal by marriages with the House of 
Orleans.
Of course, Palmerston did not see the situation this
way. A year earlier he expressed concern over the possibility
25of war with Russia. Since Britain and France had only just
23Palmerston spoke of the Quadruple Treaty as "a power­
ful counterpoise [balance] to the Holy Alliance." Letter, 
Palmerston to William Temple, 21 April 1834, Bulwer, Life of 
Henry John Temple, II, 780; also Webster, Foreign Policy of 
Palmerston, I, 397.
^^Archibald Alison, "Foreign Affairs," Blackwood's 
Edinburgh Magazine, XXXVI (October 1834), 507-525.
must be remembered that in 1833 the Munchengratz 
meeting took place and the Russo-Turkish treaty of Unkiar- 
Skelessi was signed.
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avoided an armed clash over Belgium it behooved him to keep 
these powers separated. The Quadruple Treaty did just that 
and by late 1834 he felt secure enough on this point of 
leaving the foreign office in November to say, "Spain is 
safe." Presumably he meant safe from the Tories, but France 
was another question.
When Palmerston left office in December 1834, to be 
replaced by the Duke of Wellington, France had a golden oppor­
tunity. Almost a year earlier Wellington had been described 
as being disinclined to continue an intimate French alliance.
He disapproved of Palmerston's foreign policy generally, but 
particularly with regard to Spain. Once in office though, 
the Iron Duke found himself as closely controlled by the 
Quadruple Treaty as the French. The foreign minister could 
not, in his brief tenure in office, reverse the policies of 
his predecessor. He took Britain's treaty obligations seriously 
and though objecting to the agreement he, nevertheless, ful­
filled its stipulations as best he could without committing 
England too deeply.
Wellington expressed his belief that the treaty referred 
to moral influence rather more than to a s s i s t a n c e . R i g n y
^^Draft, Duke of Wellington to Villiers, Foreign Office, 
16 January 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150, No. 2.
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took this stand months earlier, but with the French govern­
ment now inclined more toward the Eastern Courts Wellington's 
relative inaction opened the door for French aid to Carlos.
Rosa continued cool toward France and told Wellington of his
27refusal to ask Louis Philippe for help.
In February Wellington asked France to protest over
the murdering of war prisoners in Spain and still later asked
Louis Philippe's government to cooperate on finding a lasting
28
solution to this problem. In this seemingly innocent and
humanitarian gesture Wellington had a secret plan to inform
Don Carlos of the hopelessness of his cause. The foreign
secretary, to end the war, intended to offer the pretender
29asylum in either Britain or France. In due time Lord Eliot, 
named by William IV as a special envoy, left England for the 
headquarters of Don Carlos. In late March, the French began 
a series of objections and delaying tactics. Louis Philippe 
first insisted that he would be unable to cooperate because 
the Madrid government had not specifically requested French
^^Despatch, Villiers to the Duke of Wellington, Madrid, 
11 February 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/440, No. 21.
Draft, Duke of Wellington to Aston, Foreign Office,
20 February 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 10.
^^Draft, Duke of Wellington to Lord Cowley, Foreign 
Office, March 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 4, Secret and 
Confidential.
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mediation. Nothing daunted Wellington who sent Eliot to 
Bayonne hoping that the French would send a counterpart for 
the intended discussions with Carlos.
The Eliot Mission, under Wellington's guidance, with 
its twofold objective aimed at a peaceful solution to the 
contest. However, the Radicals disapproved of Eliot's ven­
ture to Don Carlos' headquarters. Thomas Buncombe, M.P., 
suspicious of the Eliot Mission, asked Lord Mahon of the 
Tory government if Britain now supported the pretentions of 
Don Carlos. Mahon replied in the negative. Ever since the 
Wellington government obtained office liberals had been 
worried about their Spanish policies. The Carlists reportedly 
expressed gratification that Wellington had become the foreign 
secretary. Spanish liberals on the other hand, thought of the 
Duke as a generalissimo of the Neo-Holy Alliance.
The French continued obstinate in refusing to make the 
Eliot Mission a joint venture. Spain had not requested French 
participation in the anticipated talks between Carlos and an 
English representative. Even as late as 13 April 1835, Louis
^^Draft, Duke of Wellington to Lord Cowley, Foreign
Office, 2 April 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 9.
^^Hansard's, 3rd Se 
(London) 22 December 1834.
rd's, ries, XXVII, 837; and The Times
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Philippe’s government still had not been contacted by the
32Spanish ambassador on the Eliot Mission. In fact, when 
finally approached by the Spanish, the government in Paris 
felt quite slighted since they received merely a copy of the
original draft submitted to the foreign office requesting
33British aid. Louis Philippe failed to receive an original 
request for this type of aid because Rosa remained pro-British 
and obviously did not want the French involved. Wellington 
suggested a Frenchman accompany Eliot not because he desired 
Parisian involvement, but the Iron Duke meant to live up to 
the Quadruple Treaty and this required French participation. 
Though the British foreign secretary disapproved of the 
treaty, he could neither reverse policy nor could he disregard 
the agreement.
Wellington did everything he could to comply with a 
strict interpretation of the treaty. At times he became 
callous or perhaps derisive, observing that the rebels con­
trolled only thirty square leagues and were cut off from
32Despatch, Lord Cowley to the Duke of Wellington, Paris,
13 April 1835, France, F.O. 27/501, No. 19. Webster suggests 
that the French did not want to intervene in Spain at this 
point but clearly Rosa refused to give Louis Philippe any ex­
cuse for intervention in Spain in early 1835. Webster, Foreign 
Policy of Palmerston, I, 427.
^^Draft, Duke of Wellington to Lord Cowley, Foreign Office, 
April 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 9.
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supplies by sea and land. On the other hand, he pointed out 
that Isabella had all the resources of Spain at her disposal. 
Requests for foreign intervention annoyed Wellington most 
under these circumstances. But neither his opposition to 
the treaty, nor his hostility toward those desiring inter­
vention prevented him from providing military supplies.
General Alava of the queen's army, on asking for war materials, 
received prompt assurances he would get them. Indeed, Well­
ington took immediate steps toward this end. His only ques­
tion being how and when would the supplies be paid for by 
the Spanish government. By the end of the first week in 
April material valued at eighty thousand pounds had been
34
supplied, but an end to the war appeared nowhere in sight.
Knowledgeable people in the early days of April had a 
growing conviction that the Carlist Wars were going to be long. 
Eliot's mission had been attempted to reduce the horrors of 
the conflict but no negotiations directed toward terminating 
the war had occurred. Palmerston and Louis Philippe agreed 
on the bleak prospects for a quick termination of the war.^^
^^Drafts, Duke of Wellington to Villiers, Foreign Office, 
5, 10 March and 7 April 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150, Nos. 15, 17 
and 28.
^^Despatches, Lord Cowley to the Duke of Wellington,
Paris, 10 and 13 April 1835, France, F.O. 27/501, Nos. 16 and
19.
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Wellington felt this way, too, while in office but believed
36
Cristina was capable of muddling through.
Rosa told Villiers of his conviction that foreign troops
would not be asked to intervene yet by May 1835 the situation
looked surprisingly different. Dramatic shifts in Spanish
affairs, though startling, were not uncommon. In May and June
there unfolded a serious reappraisal of the Spanish situation
which ultimately led to the use of foreign soldiers and marines
in the queen's cause. Rosa had a complete change of heart on
intervention and began soliciting additional allied help. His
appeal to England, France, and Portugal, based upon the spirit,
though not the letter of the Quadruple Treaty, he revealed to
37
Villiers on 20 May 1835.
Don Carlos in the twelve months following the allied 
signing of the treaty had improved his position with arms, 
supplies, money, and operations against the queen. To meet 
this growing threat Rosa pressed for and received arms from
^^Draft, Duke of Wellington to Villiers, Foreign Office, 
6 March 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/439, No. 15. Rosa shared this 
view in February 1835, The Times (London), 4 February 1835, 
also 14 February 1835.
o n
Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 May 
1835, Spain, F.O. 72/442, No. 83. The Times reported that as 
late as 23 April 1835, Rosa still remained firm against inter­
vention.
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Britain. The largest army ever under a single command in 
Spain operated against Don Carlos for the queen. This army, 
created since the death of Ferdinand, became demoralized in 
the spring of 1835 because of reverses in the field. In de­
fense of his government Rosa cited the French intervention
under Napoleon when 6,000 guerillas tied down 30,000 seasoned 
38troops.
The change which affected Rosa reflected a corresponding 
change of opinion among the general public in Spain. The young 
queen's cause looked hopeless as Don Carlos received aid of 
all types from outside Spain. Even Spain's ally, France, 
failed the Rosa government by permitting Carlist agents to 
operate out of Bayonne. A steady stream of provisions and 
supplies reached the rebels from France despite the alleged 
watch kept by the Army of Observation for such activity.
The Spanish government knew of these activities as did the
38lbid.
^^Despatch, J. V. Harvey to Lord Palmerston, Bayonne, 
29 May 1835, France, F.O. 146/161, No. 6. "England accused 
France of favoring and tolerating the arms shipments ordered 
by the army of Don Carlos." Vidal y Saura, La Polîtica 
Exterior, p. 139. The Times reported large quantities of 
supplies going to Carlos saying, "in the search of Carlist 
combustibles . . . every species of absurdity, under the 
cloak of a strict surveillance is constantly occurring." 7 
January 1835, 9 March 1835, 6 April 1835.
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public. Rosa, his government, and his generals, had, accord­
ing to Villiers, made every effort to contain and defeat the 
insurrection and having failed now believed that intervention 
from outside would be their only savior. Isabella's govern­
ment became quite alarmed in May as it realized the position
40
it found itself in.
The alarm and concern of the Spanish minister infected 
Villiers who relayed numerous dispatches to Wellington and 
Palmerston. So alarmed did the British minister become that 
he urged repeatedly that Britain intervene. He insisted on 
support for Rosa because he feared the effects a change in 
ministers would have upon the war effort. What he did not 
say, but what he really objected to, was the replacement of 
Rosa by a pro-French ministry. Villiers doubted that anyone 
in Spain would object under the circumstances, if French troops 
entered the country as they had in 1823.^^ Such an event would 
virtually end any British influence in Spain. The best guar­
antee that French influence would not emerge dominant in the 
councils of the Madrid government was timely assistance from 
Britain.
^^Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 
May 1835 and Aranjuez, 7 June 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/442, Nos. 
83 and 90; and The Times (London) 25 May 1835.
41gpain, F.O. 72/442, No. 90.
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Wellington and Palmerston on. receiving these communica­
tions from Villiers took an astonishingly similar line. Formal 
requests for aid had not been made by Spain and would have been 
turned down had the request arrived in May. Wellington, on 
the point of leaving office, refused to give his countenance 
to any projected use of foreign troops in Spain; and Palmerston 
concurred with these sentiments as he returned to the foreign 
office. Both men, to bolster their stand, cited the stipula­
tions of the treaty which made no mention of Britain being re-
42quired to supply troops. The drafts to Villiers, and hence 
to the Spanish government, must have been written after 
Wellington and Palmerston consulted together. While not 
identically worded, the communications were alike in sentiment 
and reflected the policy and wishes of Wellington far more 
than the desires of Palmerston. There was one new point raised 
in these drafts which concerned the feasibility of recruiting 
the Biscayan followers from Don Carlos. The foreign office 
argued that it might be arranged for the Madrid government to
“^^Draft, Duke of Wellington to Villiers, Foreign Office,
22 May 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/439, No. 1; and Draft, Lord Palmerston 
to Villiers, Foreign Office, 22 May 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150,
No. 1. Palmerston was on shaky ground in his party and had 
almost been refused a cabinet seat. This fact perhaps helps 
to explain why Palmerston's response to Villiers was at first 
so cautious.
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entice the Biscayans away from Don Carlos by resolving the
difficulties surrounding their fueros. Nobody, however,
could separate the problem of the fueros from the Carlist
cause at this juncture. Palmerston, soon after returning to
43
office, recognized this stumbling block.
Other issues clouded the problem in late May and June. 
Villiers continued his stream of notes to the foreign office 
convinced that intervention had become vital. Aside from 
the purely military considerations motivating the minister 
two other related problems alarmed him. He anticipated an 
increasing boldness by Carlists and Democrats as the queen's 
government weakened. He concluded that the queen might be 
deposed, or what was worse, the French might intervene fearing 
the spread of revolutionary sentiments into their southern 
departments. In either contingency Villiers saw Britain ousted 
from the councils of Madrid. Citing Rosa's desires for aid 
and Count Toreno's concurrence along with the wishes of the 
army and the public, the energetic minister emphasized the 
need for action. Furthermore, he said that Spain experienced 
some agitation because a few Spaniards thought France unlikely
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 
14 August 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150, No. 21; and The Times 
(London), 25 June 1835.
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44to honor the Quadruple Treaty,
Indeed, the French, who had been permitting supplies 
to cross their border into Spain, expressed deep anxiety 
about the Spanish request for military assistance. De Broglie, 
who had returned to the foreign office, concocted several 
reasons to explain his reluctance to become seriously involved. 
Initially, he delayed his reply to the request for aid until 
he learned of Palmerston's response. In the meantime Louis 
Philippe's government explained that it feared a large scale 
Napoleonic involvement because of relations with the East.
De Broglie predicted that Holland would create difficulties 
if French troops crossed the Pyrenees. The French minister 
saw pitfalls everywhere when someone suggested intervention, 
and he said that even to acknowledge the Spanish request would 
publicize the weakness of the queen's government and make 
matters worse. Not even a formal request in early June induced 
him to provide more aid for Spain than the treaty stipulated.
Rosa, though not yet formally requesting military assist­
ance in May, had indicated he intended to do so. The slightest
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Aranjuez, 2 
June 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/442, No. 88.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 
1 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 5.
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suggestion of this request set diplomatic wheels turning. 
Britain reiterated its nonintervention policy and recommended 
France do the same. Palmerston also advised Louis Philippe's 
government, in strong terms, to execute the provisions of the 
treaty. Rosa intended asking for troops from Britain, France, 
and Portugal if there appeared to be a good chance of the aid 
being g r a n t e d . I n  view of the initial responses to the 
hinted need for aid the formal solicitation did not material­
ize immediately. Rosa resigned June 8 still not having re-
47quested aid to be replaced by Count Toreno.
Rapid changes occurred in the early days of June, 1835, 
not only in Spain but in London and Paris. Suddenly foreigners 
were available for military service in Spain in spite of all 
the recent assurances and warnings about the use of such 
troops. But the type of action envisioned by Palmerston left 
him able to say Britain was not intervening militarily in 
Spain. Britons, mostly Irishmen, received permission to en­
list in the queen of Spain's army as part of the British 
Auxiliary Legion, B.A.L. Only the name and the personnel
^^Letter, Lord Palmerston to Count Sabastiani, Foreign 
Office, 5 June 1835, France, F.O. 146/161, copy.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Aranjuez, 8
June 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/442, No. 91.
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were British. The unit had never been part of the British
army and having a legion form up and train in Spain differed
significantly from sending the Coldstream Guards or the Black
Watch to aid Isabella. The latter definitely would have been
British military intervention while the former begged the
question. Successive Spanish governments were to pay the
legion and the Spanish army controlled its activities. This
control gave rise to bitter recriminations as the Spaniards
treated the legion as one of their own and failed to supply
it with the necessities, including pay. Palmerston later
repeatedly assailed the government of Madrid in vain attempts
48to get proper supplies and treatment for the legionnaires.
Palmerston resorted to this method of aiding Isabella 
because de Broglie, though convinced France should not interfere.
48Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 
11 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 8. Some Britons felt the 
law against foreign enlistments ran counter to the rights of 
Englishmen. They argued that manufacturers, entrepreneurs, and 
skilled workers could all sell their skills or wares wherever 
they chose without fear of legal loss of citizenship. These 
people viewed soldiers as professionals who ought to enjoy the 
same rights and, therefore, they had tried on a couple of pre­
vious occasions to get the Foreign Enlistment Act repealed.
Their parliamentary efforts at repeal had been first made 
prior to the signing of the Quadruple Treaty. In June 1835 
an Order in Council suspended the act for a period of two years. 
The suspension of the act was a subterfuge used to militarily 
aid Isabella. Half-pay officers received encouragement to 
enlist and obtained reassurance that their half-pay would be 
continued while serving the queen.
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had nevertheless considered using the French Foreign Legion 
in S p a i n . L o u i s  Philippe, presiding over his Council, de­
cided against sending a regular army as requested by Spain 
and countered by offering the legion de Broglie had spoken 
about.
Count Toreno exhibited much bitterness toward Louis 
Philippe and the French Ambassador to Madrid, the Conde de 
Rayneval, whom Toreno accused of duplicity. Spain's foreign 
minister told Villiers the French ambassador led him to be­
lieve one thing while the queen regent received information 
to the contrary. Toreno, quite peeved, offered explanations 
of the French government's alleged insincerity. He believed 
Louis Philippe, refusing to send an army into Spain as he re­
quested, would blame his nonintervention upon England. The 
treaty bound France to act with Britain, but that power had 
just told Louis Philippe not to intervene. De Broglie used a 
similar line of reasoning in the summer of 1834.^^ Moreover, 
Toreno thought the French refused aid at this juncture so the
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
5 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 7.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 8 
June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 12. This legion also 
formed up and trained in Spain.
^^See above page 60.
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confusion in Spain would spread. Once the anarchy spread, so 
the Spanish minister mused, Louis Philippe intended to inter­
vene singlehandedly to defend France upon terms he dictated. 
Villiers discounted this explanation and told Palmerston he
doubted that Rayneval had been optimistic about French aid 
52for the queen.
France offered the use of the Foreign Legion to Spain, 
but at no time did that government exhibit a real desire to 
cooperate beyond this low-keyed o f f e r . W h e n  Palmerston 
asked de Broglie to station the Army of Observation closer 
to the Pyrenees border to improve surveillance, the French 
refused to cooperate. They rejected a similar request from 
T o r e n o . A t  this time the Carlists had expanded the area 
they controlled to include the entire Pyrenees border which 
doubtlessly facilitated the acquisition of supplies from France 
by the rebels. Isabella's government, though it had by now 
formally requested both British and French aid, remained
52Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 22 
June 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/442, Separate and Secret.
^^Despatches, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
8 and 17 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, Nos. 12 and 22.
^^Lraft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 11 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/437, No. 9; and Despatch, 
Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 25 June 1835, France, 
F.O. 27/502, No. 33.
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suspicious of de Broglie's ministry and not until 25 June 1835,
55did Toreno accept the offer of the Foreign Legion. Except 
for the decision to permit the legions to operate in Spain 
and the fulfilling of the provisions of the treaty, neither 
Britain nor France provided additional military aid as re­
quested.
The state of affairs in Spain, rumors of French activi­
ties and the Order in Council suspending the Foreign Enlistment 
Act prompted a bitter June debate on Spanish affairs in Parlia­
ment. Lord Londonderry opened the attack against the ministry 
by inquiring whether or not royal navy ships had gone to Spain 
and who paid for them. Lord Melbourne responded vaguely with 
the articles of the Quadruple Treaty while assuring the House 
of Lords he would inquire into the subject. The following 
day Melbourne told the Lords the Spanish government intended 
to defray the cost though the British government would not for 
the time being press for payment. Anticipating hostile remon­
strances upon divulging this information to the Tories Melbourne 
revealed that this repayment policy originated with Wellington.
55Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 
25 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 33.
^^Annual Register, 1835, LKXVII, 444.
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Royal navy vessels first patrolled the Spanish coast in Aug­
ust 1834, but the question had remained dormant in Parliament
57
until deeper involvement appeared likely.
Developments in Spain with the French responses as 
chronicled and editorialized in The Times reflected a growing 
British concern for Iberia. At first, in late May, the London 
paper examined the Additional Articles to the treaty and wrote 
that the French could not send auxiliary forces into Spain.
A week later the same paper suggested a marriage to resolve 
the problems, but doubted that this solution would be accept­
able because Don Carlos was a bigot. Reversing itself on 10 
June, The Times thought French abstention from intervention 
unlikely. Maintaining its often stated position the paper 
reiterated its disapproval of English intervention, but like 
several contemporaries it could provide no viable alternate.
Surprisingly enough The Times did not oppose the sus­
pension of the Foreign Enlistment Act. In fact, the tone of 
the paper in reporting the composition of the B.A.L. and its 
officers was quite laudatory. Once the men saw action a 
regular feature of the paper involved reporting the exploits 
of the legion. The London paper on several occasions in the
^^Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXVIII, 338.
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ensuing year became almost jingoist in describing British 
engagements.
Meanwhile, the government continued under sharp attack 
in Parliament. The House of Lords, largely Tory in composi­
tion, strenuously attacked Melbourne. Wellington, Aberdeen 
and Londonderry all voiced suspicion and resentment of the 
government. Aberdeen sarcastically declared, "This is a new 
kind of intervention, . . . which is not to be called war." 
Furthermore, he thought this latest episode a disgrace, all 
the more so, because he believed in a closer understanding 
with the Eastern P o w e r s . L o r d  Mahon echoed these sentiments 
in the Commons insisting the government's policies were ruinous 
and its B.A.L. poorly commanded and constructed. Though mount­
ing a frontal attack upon the latest development in policy 
Mahon did not attack the Quadruple Treaty or the principals 
upon which it rested. Primarily he objected to the halfway 
measures used by Palmerston that meant neither war nor peace, 
a sentiment shared by several associates. In August London­
derry renewed the attack again saying, "there was scarcely one
^®Letter, Lord Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, 16 June 
1835, Jones, Early Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen, I, 31.
^^Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXVIII, 1133 ff.; and The Times 
(London), 25 June 1835.
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branch of their [the government's] foreign policy which was 
not liable to the heaviest censure." Melbourne replied, "it 
was in the interests of England that Spain should be strong—  
that Spain should be united— that Spain should be prosperous 
— and, above all, that Spain should be independent of all 
foreign nations."
While the debate raged in the House of Lords nobody 
there intended to try to topple the government because of its 
Spanish policies. The Tory's attempted to embarrass Melbourne 
and to otherwise persuade, cajole or modify those policies, 
but nobody wanted a constitutional crisis. For this reason 
the Lords, while submitting their questions, generally re­
mained quiet. A government censure they overruled as being 
a tactic likely to provoke Commons. The Tories knew they 
could pass any measure in the Lords, but they felt quite cer­
tain the government would not alter its course one bit. It is 
interesting to observe the unlimited power the Tories had in 
the Lords and compare it to the extremely limited power the 
Lords had in influencing the government in this instance.
G°ibid., XXX, 980-986.
^^Letter, Lord Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, 30 July 1835, 
Jones, Early Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen, I, 35.
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Cressett Pekham and Sir Robert Peel both argued against 
the government’s Spanish policies in general and against inter­
ference in particular. Pekhcim insisted interfering in civil 
wars established a dangerous precedent that might be turned 
against England in the future if such a war occurred in Britain. 
Pekham's recollection of British history must have been non­
existent. Peel's objections aimed at something higher since 
he postulated that all weak powers would be at the mercy of 
any strong power if interference as a principle was upheld.
Palmerston defended his actions in Commons. He denied 
that any similarity between French activities in 1823 and his 
own with regard to the B.A.L. existed. The Quadruple Treaty, 
he argued, should be maintained to insure Isabella's success. 
British interests, largely unspecified, were used to bolster 
his position. Precedents for a legion, which some foes said 
did not exist, Palmerston dismissed out of hand saying twenty 
precedents could not insure victory if his assessments were 
wrong. Later the foreign minister referred to Elizabethans 
fighting in Holland as precedent enough for his own policies. 
Finally, in a direct response to Peel's charges Palmerston
^^Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXVIII, 914, 
G^ibid.. p. 1158.
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candidly replied:
"In the first place, the present interfer­
ence (for he took it to be generally allowed 
that it was in principle an interference) was 
founded on a treaty arising out of an acknowl­
edgement of the right of a sovereign, decided 
by the legitimate authorities of the country 
over which she ruled."64
Donald Southgate in The Most English Minister, The 
Politics of Palmerston, gleefully seized upon this statement 
to prove that "There was no pretense of neutrality or non­
intervention on Palmerston's part in this war. Such a
statement is quite rash. Palmerston never thought of neu­
trality as a viable policy for England and certainly not in 
the 1830's. He opposed the Eastern Powers much of the time, 
his Belgian policies were not those of a neutral and the 
Quadruple Treaty obviously was not. As for intervention, 
Palmerston unalterably opposed it. Southgate uses the word 
intervention, not Palmerston, who uses the term interference. 
This difference is not merely semantics for as Palmerston said 
of intervention,
"one Nation has no right to control, by force of 
arms the will of another Nation in the choice of
64
Ibid., p. 1162.
G^Donald Southgate, The Most English Minister, The 
Policies and Politics of Palmerston (London: Macmillan and
Co., 1966), p. 101.
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its government or r u l e r . " B u t  if by inter­
ference is meant intermeddling, and intermeddling 
in every way, and to every extent, short of actual 
military force; then I must affirm, that there is 
nothing in such interference, which the laws of 
nations may not in certain cases permit."67
Palmerston received some support in these debates fol­
lowing the creation of the B.A.L. Daniel O'Connell said 
England's interests demanded support for liberal institutions 
since the Holy Alliance was not dead. Henry Bulwer accosted 
Peel verbally pointing out that when all France welcomed 
Napoleon from Elba Peel had supported British intervention 
to remove him. Bulwer first alluded to Elizabethan interfer­
ences which Palmerston usually got credit for.^® Debate in 
Parliament and in the press continued and few people expressed 
satisfaction with the measures taken by the government.
On the international scene considerable dissatisfaction 
continued. France and Britain remained suspicious of each 
other's Iberian involvement. De Broglie demanded to know if 
the British Auxiliary Legion received payment from London. 
Palmerston reassured him such was not the case although the
^^William Cargill, The Foreign Affairs of Great Britain 
Administered by the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount 
Palmerston (London: John Reid and Co., 1841), p. 101.
^^Bell, Palmerston, I, 82.
^^Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXVIII, 1168.
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half-pay officers continued to get their regular allotment
while serving in Spain. Once assured on this point de Broglie
69placed the French Foreign Legion under Spanish command.
Responses to the news of the foreign legions and their 
use in Spain varied. Metternich, representing the Eastern 
Courts, objected strenuously to this new development. The 
Prussians appeared equally annoyed. Neither power would have 
objected more vociferously even if France had sent an army in­
to Spain. The Eastern Powers did not object to intervention, 
but resented interference for the wrong cause, Isabella's.^®
Don Carlos also protested loudly as could be expected. He 
issued a royal decree stating that any foreigner captured 
while in the service of the queen would be shot immediately.^^ 
This decree negated the Eliot convention concluded a year 
earlier though that agreement had never been honored in practice, 
Palmerston insisted on protesting against this latest 
decree issued by Don Carlos and asked the French government
6 QDespatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
29 June 1835, France, P.O. 27/502, No. 42.
^®Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
3 July 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 50.
^^Despatch, J. V. Harvey to Lord Granville, Bayonne, 11 
July 1835, France, F.O. 27/503, No. 49; and Annual Register, 
1835. LXXVII, 446.
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to join him. At first Louis Philippe was inclined to agree
but after reconsidering the matter decided not to. Except
for de Broglie, the entire French cabinet opposed making any
threat against Don Carlos they could not back up with action.
Not for the first time was de Broglie out of step with Louis
Philippe and his associates. A month after this refusal, and
probably knowing full well that Palmerston would refuse, de
Broglie suggested the joint mediation of the two countries to
7 2settle the problem of Spain. At least once before he had 
inquired about Britain's disposition toward the Spanish ques­
tion in such a way as to illicit a negative response from 
P a l m e r s t o n . L o u i s  Philippe had no intention now or at any 
time of cooperating in establishing a liberal regime in Spain. 
"England and France became rivals rather than allies in the 
complicated struggle that arose in Spain.
Palmerston, as anticipated, refused to consider joint 
Anglo-French mediation. The foreign minister saw insurmountable
7 2Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 17 
July 1835, France, F.O. 27/503, No. 69; Draft, Lord Palmerston 
to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 11 August 1835, France, F.O. 
27/498, No. 40; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign 
Office, 14 August 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150, No. 21.
73Blanc, Ten Years, II, 368.
^^Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 415. Louis 
Philippe had admitted in 1833 that he opposed a liberal regime 
in Spain.
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obstacles blocking a settlement though the timing was auspi­
cious. In July Don Carlos's most capable officer. General 
Zumalacarregui, lost his life at Bilbao. The effect of this 
loss had several repercussions in Spain. General Moreno, 
another Carlist general, replaced Zumalacarregui, but his 
appointment aroused the jealousy of his brother officers. In 
addition, the defeat at Bilbao meant the loss of certain monies 
raised for the cause in Holland.Mediation  remained impossi­
ble because of the irreconcilable differences between Carlos 
and Isabella. The Biscayans and others fighting for Carlos 
could not be detached from their leader even though their 
real objective in fighting remained the reinstating of their 
fueros. The two goals had become inseparable making it nec­
essary that Isabella's government defeat both.^^ Refusal to 
cooperate, as de Broglie requested, contributed to a further 
serious deterioration of Anglo-French relations concerning 
Spain.
From 1833 to the summer of 1835, while there had been 
considerable mutual suspicion with no entente cordiale, the
Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 10 July 
1835, Spain, F.O. 72/443, No. 108. See p. 149.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign
Office, 11 August 1835, France, F.O. 146/162, No. 40.
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governments at St. James and at the Tuilleries had been able 
to act together out of necessity to preserve a front of cor­
diality. By September, 1835, the veneer, at least in Spain, 
called cooperation, had worn thin. Palmerston, still bent 
on providing all aid short of military intervention, continued 
his support of the Spanish government.
Villiers had esconced himself in Madrid as an important 
adviser to the Toreno ministry. When, in September, Toreno 
left office he asked Villiers’ advice on Spanish affairs as 
did Juan Mendizabal, who replaced Toreno. Even the queen 
regent requested Villiers' opinion on the Spanish situation. 
The minister told Isabella's mother he thought she should sus­
tain the moderates rather than throw herself to the army for
support though he really preferred Mendizabal to all other 
77candidates. Mendizabal, a Jewish financier and radical,
meant to conduct the war against Don Carlos with vigor but
was unable to because of the dissatisfaction and strife among
78the queen's generals and government.
77Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 
September 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/444, No. 145. Indicative of 
Villiers' influence at Madrid was the signing of a Slave 
Treaty between Britain and Spain in July 1835. The Times 
(London), 14 July 1835.
78E. Christiansen, The Origins of Military Power in 
Spain, 1800-1854 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967),
p. 53.
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Further harm occurred when France failed to adequately 
maintain the blockade along the Pyrenees border. Britain re­
layed Spanish requests that supplies for Carlos be stopped and 
Palmerston originated his own requests based upon consular 
reports of French laxity in this matter. De Broglie responded 
by saying the area had large numbers of trails and the chief 
occupation of the region, smuggling, made it extraordinarily 
difficult to stop the traffic. Repeated notices of French 
reluctance to close the border passed across Palmerston's 
desk. When a report of 600 horses passing over the border in 
broad daylight came to the foreign minister's attention, he 
urged Granville to protest in the strongest terms and suggested 
such an occurrence could only happen with the connivance of 
French o f ficials.Reports  of this nature increased in the 
last months of 1835 after Mendizabal assumed power. The Spanish 
prime minister did not relax his government's efforts to end 
the war, on the contrary, new troop levies and revenues were 
sought.GO
79Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 18 August 1835, France, F.O. 27/498, No. 48. "The 
English government, always opposed with all its power supposed 
increases in French influence in the Peninsula." Vidal y Saura, 
La Politica Exterior, p. 102; and The Times (London), 16 July 
1835.
80Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 26 
October 1835, No. 170, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48539, 
Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXI.
101
The French, courting the Eastern Powers and somewhat 
alarmed by the thought of a liberal ascendancy in Spain, opened 
their borders even more to the Carlists. De Broglie sent word 
to Rayneval of the procedure he should follow in case of a 
radical or violent change in the regency. The French appar­
ently anticipated such a change while Palmerston explicitely
81stated his belief that there would not be a change at Madrid. 
Other indications of the fears Louis Philippe felt about the 
Spanish disorders can be observed. Reinforcements for the 
Army of Observation arrived in the Pyrenees border areas, but 
still the French government refused to commit regular forces
O O
to Spain. Estimates of the number of troops required for
a successful French military intervention ran as high as
83
200,000 which meant no action would be taken. Despite the 
uneasiness of the French government and the reinforcing of 
the Pyrenees area, Mendizabal continued to press for a closing 
of the border.
Q  1
Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 4 September 1835, France, F.O. 145/152, No. 55. Louis 
Philippe at this time engaged in a secret correspondence with 
the Austrians as part of his personal diplomacy. Vidal y Saura, 
La Politica Exterior, p. 102.
®^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
8 September 1835, France, F.O. 27/504, No. 150.
QO
Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
25 September 1835, France, F.O. 27/504, No. 154.
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Louis Philippe in September 1835 quite obviously op­
posed the government of Mendizabal and Palmerston's policies 
in Spain. Though the French, at least outwardly, had main­
tained cordial relations and had attempted to affect coopera­
tion with the allies, they were never sincere. Their pretenses 
dropped late in the summer of 1835 as openly they aided the 
Carlists by permitting an unchecked flow of material into his 
camp. Reports reaching Villiers from spies in the Carlist 
headquarters indicated the French aided and abetted the rebels
by assuring Carlos of their neutrality. The same source also
84described the arrears of pay made good in French coinage. 
Acrimonious charges aimed at the French by the Spanish con­
tinued to fly. Catalonian officials said French naval offi­
cers, ostensibly aiding Spain, encouraged opposition to the 
Madrid government. The officers agitated against Mendizabal 
and persuaded some Catalonians to do likewise. Other Cata­
lonian reports emphasized the lack of French vigilance along 
the border and suggested the first additional article of the
Q A
Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 
September 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/444, No. 149, Secret and Con­
fidential. The Times suggested that had Palmerston favored 
French intervention for Isabella it would have been declined 
by that government. Furthermore, the paper said non-execution 
of the Quadruple Treaty was a moral shock to the alliance 
between England and France. The Times (London), 25 August 1835.
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treaty had yet to be e n f o r c e d . E v e n  more significantly the 
Spanish described the southern departments of France as a 
haven for escaping Carlists. Mendizabal's government alleged 
that Carlist forces pressed by royalist forces on several oc­
casions crossed into France to evade capture or battle. These 
same forces later returned to Spain to harass the royalists.
86De Broglie, of course, denied all the charges made by Madrid.
Granville repeatedly relayed the urgent Spanish requests 
that France increase its vigilance along the border. De Broglie 
said the reported arms shipments were grossly exaggerated by
87Madrid since the Carlists manufactured some of their own arms.
De Broglie disclaimed many of the allegations expressed by 
Mendizabal and in particular denied the Spanish charge that 
Carlists had crossed the border to escape royalists only to 
re-cross it once the danger subsided. He insisted insurgents, 
disarmed and detained in various fortresses, failed to return
®^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 2 
October 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/444, No. 155.
®^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
12 October 1835, France, F.O. 27/505, No. 194; Draft, Lord 
Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 31 October 1835, Spain, 
F.O. 185/150, No. 31; and Annual Register, 1835, LXXVII, 460.
87Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
9 October 1835, France, F.O. 27/505, No. 185.
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88to the scene of fighting. Consul Harvey at Bayonne made 
no mention of Carlists or Carlist sympathizers being rounded 
up and detained anywhere along the Pyrenees border. His re­
ports supported the Spanish views rather than the French.
The Spanish reiterated their complaints even going so far, 
because of their exasperation, as to ask their ally if it had 
or had not fulfilled the first additional article.®^ More­
over, Madrid requested a commission of inquiry to determine 
whether or not the arms crossed the borders and to determine 
if France honored its treaty commitment.
Throughout the remainder of the year Mendizabal objected 
strenuously and vociferously about the passage of arms and 
material. The Duke de Frias, Spanish minister to France, asked 
for the removal of Carlist sympathizers found in close prox­
imity to the Pyrenees border. Following his orders Frias peti­
tioned de Broglie to have French authorities refuse to honor 
passports signed by Don Carlos. Palmerston lent his support
®®Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 3 
November 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/151, No. 33.
®^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 14 October 1835, France, F.O. 146/163, No. 80.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 14 October 1835, France, F.O. 27/498, No. 80. Nothing 
came of this request for a commission of inquiry.
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to the Spanish e n t r e a t i e s . O u t  of these efforts came not 
cooperation, but an incident involving Harvey. First of all 
de Broglie frustrated the Spanish by refusing their requests 
to remove Carlists and not to recognize Don Carlos' passports. 
Louis Philippe's government then turned on Harvey and accused 
him of signing a Carlist passport. The French Prefect of 
Bayonne had first signed the passport, a fact Harvey quickly 
pointed out, though no charges faced him. In the Consul's 
estimation the government had laid a trap for him because 
over the past several months he had become a nuisance by re­
porting to Granville and Palmerston the movement of supplies 
92to Spain. Eventually the situation cleared up but relations 
that had never been entirely friendly and cooperative continued 
to deteriorate. Louis Blanc in The History of Ten Years says 
of the early 1830's, "These views [of Anglo-French cooperation] 
were deficient in soundness and accuracy in more than one point; 
. . . the alliance between France and England could not be 
based upon any community of interests.
91Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 27 November 1835, France, F.O. 146/163, No. 114; and 
Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office,
23 November 1835, France, F.O. 27/498, No. 114.
92Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign
Office, 1 December 1835, France, F.O. 146/163, No. 118.
Blanc, Ten Years, II, 365.
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Similarly there could not be a community of interest 
between the government of France and the liberal government 
of Spain. Under Rosa the Spanish government declined to ask 
for French mediation with Carlos when they solicited such aid 
from Palmerston. Their suspicions of Louis Philippe's govern­
ment lingered and with the passage of time gained reinforce­
ment. Finally in December 1835 Mendizabal's government offered 
proofs of French infidelity. The Captain General of Catalonia, 
Mina, presented documented instances of French aid to the 
Carlists which included a number of letters covering the 
period May through July 1 8 3 5 . Despite the proofs of French 
complicity they remained intransigent at the close of 1835.
While the members of the Quadruple Treaty could not 
agree on joint action neither could the Eastern Courts. Nicholas, 
tsar of Russia, wanted to provide moral support and monetary 
aid to Carlos. He hoped the governments of Vienna and Berlin 
would join him. All the Eastern Courts realized the impossi­
bility of providing military aid to the rebels.
Austria denounced the Quadruple Treaty and attempted to 
persuade France that opposition to Don Carlos would be detri­
mental. Metternich did not offer Louis Philippe an understanding
94Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 3
December 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/151, No. 47.
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with the Eastern Courts. He struggled to prevent the Anglo-
French alliance and failing this afterwards worked to detach
Louis Philippe from the new agreement. The Congresses of
Munchengratz and Toplitz and the hostility of the Eastern
Courts which effectively isolated France, however, had left
Louis Philippe little choice.
Metternich several times expressed surprise that Louis
Philippe overlooked the extreme danger from Isabella's Spain.
France, in Metternich's terms, faced exposure to democratic
95principles emanating from there. This type of barrage 
directed against a receptive French monarch had a telling 
effect which resulted in declining cooperation with the 
Quadruple Allies. The lack of French involvement in the 
Eliot Mission indicated a mood of opposition, but this in 
itself had no adverse effect. Opening the borders to the 
Carlists did materially affect the rebellion. Thus, in 1835 
Louis Philippe and the Eastern Powers moved closer together 
in their views on the Spanish situation.
Britain, on the other hand, found itself more isolated 
from the rest of Europe in its Spanish endeavors yet closer to 
the Mendizabal government. Palmerston had long desired a
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
19 November 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/151, No. 40.
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commercial agreement with Spain to replace earlier treaties 
he believed had become obsolete. Indicative of the close re­
lations existing between the governments of London and Madrid 
was the agreement obtained by Villiers. Palmerston had pressed 
his minister from the moment of his appointment on this matter. 
Not until November of 1834, over a year after arriving in 
Madrid, did Villiers consider the time propitious for commer­
cial negotiations. He said, by way of explanation, that dur­
ing this earlier period the several ministers of finance had 
supported Spain's prohibitive tariff system. Late in 1834 
Count Toreno entered the ministry of finance and Villiers 
felt encouraged to broach the subject of a commercial agree­
ment. Specifically, Villiers questioned both Rosa and Toreno 
about the feasibility and desirability of lowering Spanish 
tariffs. The English minister lucidly demonstrated that the
existing tariff system stimulated contraband trade rather
96than encouraging legitimate enterprises. The Spanish stalled 
for time and Villiers made little headway in his quest though
96Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 2 
November 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/427, No. 169. Villiers said 
codfish had a duty of over 100 per cent with the result that 
one vessel legally entered Cadiz to unload while four ships 
entered Gibralter and put their cargoes in the contraband trade. 
The Times, in October, reported preferential rates given to 
French commerce engaged in Spanish trade by a royal ordinance 
issued at Madrid. The Times (London), 13 October 1835.
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the Spanish experienced difficulties acquiring funds and re­
sorted to extreme measures. In this regard and with political 
considerations in mind, the Jesuit order fell victim to a
government order to close. The property confiscated from the
97Society the government applied to the national debt. Shortly 
after this event Villiers once again pressed vigorously for 
an Anglo-Spanish treaty.
Catalonia had broken out in revolt against Isabella's 
government and Villiers, upset by repeated delays in commer­
cial negotiations, seized upon the opportunity this presented. 
In the past Cristina, mindful of the serious situation she 
faced, feared provoking industrial Catalonia into rebellion 
by concluding a treaty with England potentially harmful to the 
manufacturers of that province. With the province in revolt, 
Villiers insisted Catalonia no longer had a claim for special 
consideration and Toreno agreed. Capitalizing on the situa­
tion, Villiers forcefully argued that France could make no 
special claims either since, "France would be without any just 
ground for complaint, because the concessions made to England 
would be in return for assistance which had been solicited
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 10
July 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/443, No. 106.
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98from France, and refused." Again, Toreno agreed saying 
that if the British government gave effective aid in ending 
the civil war Britain might "dictate the rates of duty at
which the manufactures of England should be admitted into
99the Ports of Spain." The minister of finance thought public 
opinion supported these views and, "was daily becoming more 
eager for [an] alliance with England, and [was] finally [pre­
pared] to shake-off the influence of France.
Proceeding from this new position Villiers in the next 
several weeks pushed hard for a new treaty. Palmerston encour­
aged the minister to call Mendizabal*s attention to correcting 
the s i t u a t i o n . S u d d e n l y  and dramatically Villiers got a 
commercial treaty which he negotiated and signed himself with 
a provision that it could not bind the British government until 
approved in London. Then, in an action that must have left 
Villiers thunderstruck, Palmerston turned down the agreement.
He cited two reasons for refusing the treaty. In the first 
place Spain asked for aid, a loan, to fight the civil war and
98Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 31 July 
1835, Spain, F.O. 72/443, No. 141.
S^ibid. 10°Ibid.
^^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
29 September 1835, F.O. 185/150, No. 26.
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Palmerston said this appeared like the Quadruple Treaty and
had the same objective. Secondly, he asserted that Britain
did not desire special privileges in trade but only reciprocity
and moderation. Politically he objected because the treaty
involved only two of the four allies, and he felt this fact
would not escape the Eastern Powers who would then assume the
102Quadruple Treaty lacked unity, which it did.
The treaty climaxed a year of political, commercial, 
and diplomatic activity on the part of the British foreign 
office and its agents. It had been a year of frustration 
and suspicion among the three primary allies of the Quadruple 
Treaty. The problem presented by Don Carlos grew infinitely 
worse in 1836 and not the least of the unrest developed from 
the commercial treaty Villiers negotiated and Palmerston re­
jected. Nevertheless, Jeronimo Becker y Gonzales quotes Javier 
de Burgos saying, "The intervention of the minister Villiers 
in the composition of Mendizabal's Ministry had given English 
politics an exclusive influence in the [Madrid] cabinet.
102Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
21 December 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/439, No. 50; F.O. 185/151,
No. 49, Secret; and France, F.O. 146/163, Secret.
Jeronimo Becker y Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones 
exteriores de espana durante el siglo XIX, 1800-1839, 3 vols., 
(Madrid: Establecimiento Tipografico de Jaime Rates, 1924), I,
702.
CHAPTER IV 
THE FRENCH BID FOR SPAIN, 1836
Alarmed and annoyed at the apparent ascendancy of 
British influence in Madrid, the French made a serious bid 
for Spain in 1836. Louis Philippe's government, cleverly 
outmaneuvered in 1834 by Palmerston and bested again in 1835 
when Villiers managed to extract a commercial treaty from 
Toreno, intended to retrieve its position in Spain. To this 
end the French government undermined Mendizabal and the 
regency with the apparent intention of later stepping in to 
rescue the situation. Unforeseen events changed the picture 
though and further damaged French plans. Palmerston continued 
to oppose Don Carlos and tried to counter the drive for French 
ascendancy in Spain.
The French, at first unaware of the Anglo-Spanish com­
mercial negotiations, learned of Villiers dealings probably 
from the queen regent. Angered at the negotiations the French 
threatened the destruction, insofar as possible of Spanish
112
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industry if the treaty became ratified. Mendizabal, in view 
of Palmerston's annulment of the treaty negotiated by Villiers, 
early in January 1836, extended an invitation to France to 
accept an identical treaty. The failure of Louis Philippe's 
government to act on the offer resulted in a temporary sus­
pension of further discussions on this volatile topic.^
The Spanish minister next sought financial aid in 
another way. An alternate method of obtaining financial aid 
had been proposed in December 1835 by Palmerston. Then the 
foreign minister had reflected that perhaps Spain should 
solicit a loan from Britain and France simultaneously. Such 
a suggestion is startling coming from a man who repeatedly
refused to agree to this approach in the past and would refuse
2
it in the future. Villiers reported that after considering 
the alternatives Mendizabal might ask for a guaranteed loan 
from his allies. Such a loan the Spanish minister thought to 
repay by pledging customs funds so the entire matter might
3
appear as an advance on expected customs duties.
^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 2 January 1836, 
Spain, F.O. 72/457, No. 1.
2
Ridley, Lord Palmerston, pp. 202-203; Draft, Lord 
Palmerston to Villiers, 4 April 1836, Spain, P.O. 185/156,
No. 21; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 13 November 
1836, Spain, F.O. 72/456, No. 112.
^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 2 January 1836,
Spain, F.O. 72/457, No. 1.
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Throughout the affair Mendizabal tried to salvage the 
Anglo-Spanish treaty. He explained that the treaty had not 
envisioned political ends but had been expected to provide 
immediate financial relief at a critical juncture and a 
lowering of tariffs to Britain's advantage. In assessing 
the situation Mendizabal said that on three occasions, in 
1808, in 1814, and in 1820, Britain lost the chance to estab­
lish British influence in Spain. Obviously he believed London 
had just missed a fourth opportunity.^
In 1835 Palmerston had managed to establish British in­
fluence at Madrid but to keep it required constant attention. 
Two developments between them reversed the scene by May 15, 
1836, when the pro-French Francisco de Isturitz replaced the 
resigned Mendizabal. Palmerston's refusal to accept the 
commercial treaty and his subsequent refusal of financial aid 
to Spain in a guaranteed loan was one factor. The British 
refusal to provide a loan stemmed from the firm conviction 
held by Palmerston that Parliament would insist on Spanish 
relaxation of its commercial policies.^ The second factor
^Ibid,
^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 12 March 1835,
Spain, F.O. 72/458, No. 59.
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detrimental to British interests in Spain involved the re­
placement of de Broglie by Adolph Thiers as the President 
of the Council and foreign minister.® De Broglie's downfall, 
according to Hall, led to reduced harmony between London and 
Paris.^ Thiers turned toward the Eastern Courts and gradually
p
began to detach France from England. Louis Philippe, ever 
since the autumn of 1833, had been inclined the same way, but 
circumstances had prevented him from fulfilling his desires.^ 
Villiers, unaware of the effects of the refusal of fi­
nancial aid and of the impending change in the French govern­
ment, continued quite optimistically in Madrid. To Mendizabal 
he gave innumerable suggestions for restoring Spain's finances, 
reforming the clergy, and on many other facets of government. 
The British minister believed himself well ensconced in the 
confidences of Mendizabal. He even felt hopeful that he could
^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 18 Febru­
ary 1836, France, F.O. 27/520, No. 71.
^Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 225.
®Blanc, Ten Years, II, 407. Probably by this time 
he had already decided, along with Louis Philippe, that an 
Orleanist should marry a German princess. The Times (London),
2 May 1836.
^Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 182; and The Times (London), 
25 August 1835.
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reconcile the Spanish minister with Isturitz, who, however, 
in late March would not join the government as Villiers 
u r g e d . H e  indicted Mendizabal saying the government found 
itself in a serious predicament.^^
Mendizabal acknowledged some difficulties concerning 
finances and prosecution of the war. But he, too, generally 
remained optimistic and thought a royal victory concluding 
the war could be achieved by the end of the summer. This
design he hoped to achieve without the intervention of foreign
12troops provided money could be obtained.
Cristina, the queen regent, eventually foiled Mendizabal's 
plans. As the Anglo-Spanish commercial negotiations proceeded 
in November and December 1835, she leaked the information to 
the F r e n c h . S h e  had no deep affection for Mendizabal who 
conducted the negotiations. Early in 1836 the queen's dis­
pleasure with Mendizabal surfaced again and even more alarming 
Cristina, in passing, referred to French intervention in Spain.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 2 June 1836, Spain,
F.O. 185/156, No. 44.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 22 March 1836, 
Spain, F.O. 72/458, No. 67.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 12 March 1836, 
Spain, F.O. 72/458, No. 59.
^^Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 92.
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Mendizabal, pro-British, stood in sharp contrast to the queen 
regent. Cristina, a capricious, self-willed woman with an 
active private life that scandalized many, appeared increas­
ingly to favor the French in the spring of 1836.^^
The French, whether clandestinely directing affairs 
behind the scenes or not, took advantage of the queen regent's 
frame of mind at this point. They had definitely come to 
oppose Mendizabal who owed his position to the British. The 
French government wanted him removed since he conceded the 
commercial treaty to Palmerston and accepted British sugges­
tions. Thiers reportedly suspected Villiers of using his 
influence to exclude the French from any part in the Spanish 
a f f a i r s . V i l l i e r s  wrote to his brother Edward in February 
1836 saying little effort would be required to completely 
predominate in Spain if the foreign office backed him.^^ 
William Russell late in 1835 exuberantly described Britain's 
international role, including the position in Spain, when he 
said, "don't let us spoil our noble position, for England 
never stood so high. She has but to dictate her will to the
l^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 30 January 
1836, Spain, F.O. 72/457, No. 25.
^^Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 110.
IGlbid., 106.
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w o r l d . L o u i s  Philippe's government could only respond by 
attempting to reverse Britain's role in Spain.
When Thiers entered his office in February, he quickly 
assured Granville there would be no change in French foreign 
policies. But the British minister felt compelled to state 
Britain's opposition to a European concert to settle outstand­
ing international problems indicating at least a hint of change
18in French policy in that regard. Thiers had undergone a 
change of mind concerning French intervention in Spain which 
in 1835 he ardently supported, but by the spring of 1836 he 
opposed.
Thiers reversed his policy toward Spain as can be seen 
in his refusal to cooperate with Palmerston there. In March 
Palmerston urged that the Army of Observation occupy certain 
Spanish border territories and extend its operations to cover 
the border coastline where war materials from England and 
Holland came ashore for the Carlists. Louis Philippe resisted 
the appeal, and Thiers refused to introduce the suggestion
^^Russell, Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 
II, 146.
18Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
26 February 1836, France, F.O. 27/520, No. 81.
^^Blanc, Ten Years, II, 410.
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20into the council. This matter of introducing a French army
into Spain remained an important consideration until the end
of summer when it became resolved. In Spain the public gen-
21erally rejected the idea as did Mendizabal. Cristina had 
hinted at the possibility in January and Isturitz, assuming
22the lead in the Moderado party, favored French intervention.
France accelerated the implementation of its Spanish 
policies which angered Mendizabal. Having already permitted 
large amounts of supplies to reach Don Carlos by the end of 
1835, even more material went to him. In April 1835, Mendizabal 
discussed this problem with Rayneval and Villiers. He raised 
objections against the French. The minister objected strenu­
ously to the relaxation of trade restrictions between the 
southern departments of France and territory controlled by 
the Carlists. By opening up this intercourse in supplies the 
French nullified the blockade they had agreed to in the Quadruple 
Treaty. In answer to this charge Rayneval weakly replied that
20Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 14 March 1836, France, F.O. 27/516, No. 38; and 
Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 18 March 
1836, France, F.O. 27/520, No. 112.
21
Annual Register, 1836, LXXVIII, 362.
^^Ibid., also, Evelyn Ashley, The Life and Correspondence 
of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, 2 vols., (London: 
Richard Bentley and Sons, 1879), I, 336; and Vidal y Saura, La 
Politica Exterior, p. 158.
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military supplies still got stopped at the border thereby 
continuing the blockade. To the Spanish the most effective 
aid France could provide the Carlists at the moment, and the 
most damaging to the royal cause, was the supply of food, 
since the rebels were reported starving.
Rayneval continued his explanation of French policy by 
stressing the necessity of placating the southern departments 
which suffered economically because of the blockade and 
needed relief. Mendizabal offered to buy supplies from the 
affected area for the Spanish army if the controls were re­
established again. He met with no immediate response and 
charged the French government with not upholding the Quadruple 
Treaty. Seizing this opportunity Mendizabal gave vent to 
several other complaints. But in the same breath he stated 
that Britain had fulfilled its treaty obligations to the 
letter.
Quite obviously the French by this time made little 
secret of their feelings toward the Spanish government. The 
queen regent, Villiers reported, also had turned decidedly 
against her own minister. She would not give public support
p
■'Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 17 
April 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/458, No. 91. Actually, the southern 
departments enjoyed a minor boom because of their trade with 
Don Carlos.
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to him despite Villiers insistence that she s h o u l d . T h e r e  
appears to have been an understanding between the French, the 
queen regent, and Isturitz to oppose and remove Mendizabal.
"The French king considered Mendizabal as 
his personal enemy, and did not conceal his belief 
that Spain was given up [lost] to anarchy and to 
the demagogues that sustained the interests of 
England . . . .  Isturitz was encouraged by the 
French ambassador who, although not as influential 
among the moderates as was Villiers among the pro­
gressives, had succeeded in persuading many of 
them and a good number of Spanish Grandes, that 
the desired French intervention would be a reality 
as soon as Mendizabal fell . . . .^^
In May Mendizabal submitted his resignation which the
regent did not at first accept. The minister's desire to
replace two royalist generals, Cordova and Quesada, angered
the queen regent and subsequently she accepted his résigna-
tion. Villiers, believing it would prove harmful to change
ministries, proposed to Rayneval that together they should so
inform Cristina. While the French ambassador agreed a change
might be harmful he declined to issue a joint statement to
27the queen regent with Villiers. Remaining consistent to
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 17 April 
1836, Spain, F.O. 72/458, No. 93; and Ashley, Life and Corre­
spondence, I, 336.
25Vidal y Saura, la Politica Exterior, pp. 154-58.
^^Annual Register, 1836, LXXVIII, 362.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 May
1836, Spain, F.O. 72/459, No. 121.
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French policy Rayneval would not support Mendizabal. France 
felt confident Isturitz would be much more amenable and co­
operative.
On May 15 the queen regent accepted Mendizabal's resig-
28nation and named Isturitz President of the Council of Ministers.
Officers of the British Legion alleged that the change resulted
from French influence which they believed would further increase.
Thiers insisted his government had not opposed the previous 
29ministry. Isturitz enjoyed only the support provided by
the regent. In the Cortes he found only hostility, and he 
told Villiers that should his proposed government loan fail 
he intended to resign. Was this a warning to Villiers? Within 
a week, on May 22, the new president tendered his resignation 
after the liberals passed a resolution of opposition in the 
Cortes. A recommendation accompanied Isturitz's resignation 
letter in which he advised the queen regent to dissolve the 
Cortes. He believed that the revolutionary party (liberals) 
was growing stronger each day, and on the following day the
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 May 
1836, Spain, F.O, 72/459, No. 123; Despatch, Lord Granville to 
Lord Palmerston, Paris, 20 May 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 
195; and Carr, Spain, p. 177.
29Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
30 May 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 211.
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Cortes received orders to dissolve.^0
No single action could have been more detrimental to
the welfare of Spain. Not only had French influence replaced
that of Britain, which disappointed Palmerston, but the Spanish
government for the next several months, the queen regent said,
would be, "ordained provisionally and on the proposals of my
31responsible advisors." This decree made control or influ­
ence over the "responsible advisors" doubly important. Since 
Isturitz retained the royal favor and exhibited pro-French 
tendencies British influence appeared to have ended. Villiers, 
unlike his customary self, abstained from interfering in the 
selection of new Spanish ministers. Palmerston approved of
this line of action, but May had been a catastrophic month
32for British policy. France appeared supreme in the councils 
of the Cristina government.
Affairs in Spain during the spring of 1836 fared no 
better on the battle field than they had in politics. General
^^Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 17, 
22, and 23 May 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/459, Nos. 128, 132, and 
133. The liberals generally enjoyed the support of Villiers 
and Britain.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 23 May 
1836, Spain, F.O. 72/459, No. 134.
O p
Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
2 June 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/456, No. 44.
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George de Lacy Evans, commander of the British Auxiliary 
Legion, in early May won a victory at San Sebastian, his 
first since Bilbao a year earlier. Lord John Hay, commanding 
the British naval forces stationed in Spanish waters, had 
aided the royalists with his ships as ordered by the Admiralty. 
Marines went ashore to garrison some vital points on the coast,
but they fought no real battles before mid-year. Spanish forces
3 3had less success than the British forces. If the situation 
looked unfavorable to British desires in May, it deteriorated 
as the summer passed both in Spain and at home.
Palmerston experienced little relief from the domestic 
opposition concerning his Spanish policies. During the last 
quarter of 1835 he had faced rancorous charges which resumed 
with the opening of Parliament in 1836. The royal address to 
Parliament provoked Londonderry to speak against Spanish poli­
cies. He insisted that all the information the government 
possessed on war materials supplied to Isabella be laid before 
the House. Similarly, in Commons, the foreign minister re­
ceived warnings about the French alliance when Grove Price,
M.P., said, "it was not to be imagined . . . that an alliance 
between France and England could be reckoned upon as being stable
^^Holt, Carlist Wars, pp. 124 ff.
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or permanent." Arthur Trevor, M.P., commented, "that if ever 
there was an instance of unprovoked and improper interference 
with a foreign power by Ministers professing neutrality, it 
was to be found in the conduct of the British towards Spain.
Later in the same session other Tories challenged Spanish 
policies. Donald Maclean, M.P., meditated aloud about the 
drastically altered policy which permitted British interven­
tion in Spain. Peel accused Palmerston of so broadening the 
idea of intervention that Britain might act on the internal 
conditions of a country at any time. He said Palmerston pred­
icated his Spanish involvement on defending free institutions 
and thus acquired a treaty that led to a deeper commitment by 
the government. Reviewing the situation Peel said involve­
ment began by grants of arms followed by permission to Britons 
to enlist for Isabella. He concluded by saying that there 
never was a country in less danger from foreign aggression.
The question might be asked whether or not that freedom from 
foreign aggression was because of or in spite of the Quadruple 
Treaty.
Palmerston found himself severely restricted in his 
responses to the accusations. Because of this he confined his
'^^ Hansard* s, 3rd Series, XXXI, 116 and 1008; and The 
Times (London), 6 February 1836.
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remarks to illustrating how divided the opposition ranks 
appeared in their choice of solution to the problem. Further­
more, he could not publicly state that he suspected the French 
of double-dealing in Spain though privately he might have felt 
that way. The reason was that Britain remained diplomatically 
isolated, and he still feared a Franco-Russian rapprochement.  ^
The Times led among those vehemently attacking Palmerston 
and his foreign policy in general. Calling him the "Lord Fanny 
of Diplomacy . . . cajoling France with an airy compliment, 
and menacing Russia with a perfumed cane," the paper mounted 
a campaign of opposition in February 1836. Sparing no efforts 
the paper reproached "Lord Fanny” for trying to extricate him­
self from his blundering Spanish policy by employing the B.A.L. 
Simultaneously, he was impeached in the press for self-delusion 
concerning French activities. A letter to the editor, signed 
"Anti-Metternich", accused him of leading every revolutionary 
scheme in Europe. Referring to the uncertainty of Spain's 
future Palmerston said "the fogs were impartial." The Times 
gleefully seized upon this comment and said, "Fogs have always 
been partial to his Lordship, and never was he more mist-ified
35ibid.
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than on Friday evening last."^^
Critics of Palmerston assailed him in and out of Parlia­
ment not only because they opposed interference, but because 
of missed diplomatic opportunities elsewhere, because of Evan's 
men, because a quick and lasting solution to the war appeared 
improbable, and because of a deep-seated distrust of France. 
Russia they characterized as being ambitious and grasping, 
bent on seizing India. France, no better than Russia, the 
Tories believed had already committed herself to the tsar.
While the opposition disliked Evans, they deplored his depen­
dence upon the Spanish crown for his supplies, a state of
37affairs they blamed on Palmerston. Aberdeen, thoroughly
disgusted with the Spanish problem, wanted supplies stopped
38
and the B.A.L. removed from Spain. A letter to Palmerston
signed "Diplomaticus" described the situation another way.
It pointed out that thanks to Palmerston Britain could not,
39
"go forward with honour nor retreat without disgrace."
^^The Times (London), 22 and 29 February 1836, 12 March 
1836; and Bell, Lord Palmerston, I, 209.
37Archibald Alison, "Foreign Results of Democratic 
Ascendancy in France and England," Blackwood* s Edinburgh 
Magazine, XXXIX (May 1836), 655-668; and The Times (London),
15 March 1836.
^^Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXXII, 387.
39
The Times (London), 14 April 1836.
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While the opposition maintained and even intensified
its attacks upon Palmerston and the government, the foreign
secretary seemed to continue in his delusion. He said French
policy would not change with the coming of Thiers despite his
pro-alliance stand since Louis Philippe really controlled
foreign affairs. He predicted Princess Lieven and Talleyrand,
40
both working against the treaty, would fail in their efforts. 
Yet, in only a few short months Palmerston resentfully accused 
France of causing unnecessary trouble in Spain and of follow­
ing policies unhealthy for Louis Philippe.
But, "Not the least striking feature of the situation 
was that Palmerston, only too ready to condemn the French for
their infidelity to the alliance from the first, persisted in
41his efforts to hold them to it until the very end." This 
thinking is erroneous because Palmerston did not try to pre­
serve the alliance; no alliance existed, only a treaty. He used 
the Quadruple Treaty to overthrow French influence in Spain 
and substitute that of Britain. For example, the foreign
^^Letter, Lord Palmerston to William Temple, 5 March 
1836, Ashley, Life and Correspondence, I, 323; and Letter, 
Princess Lieven to Lady Cowper, 22 May 1836, Lord Sudley, The 
Lieven— Palmerston Correspondence, 1828-1852 (London: John
Murray, 1943), p. 128.
^^Bell, Palmerston, I, 217.
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secretary asked Thiers to order its cordon sanitaire advanced 
to the frontier in M a r c h . H e  knew full well Louis Philippe 
would do nothing. Palmerston calculated that Louis' inaction 
would annoy the Spanish government. To emphasize poignantly 
the degree of difference between British and French policies 
the English minister then offered additional naval aid along 
the northern coast of Spain. Such aid aimed to prevent the 
Carlists from capturing several ports and to help the royal­
ists recapture any coastal place held by the rebels.^3 
Fernandez de Pinedo Alava expressed confusion as he wrote,
"The same England that in June 1835 thought that Spanish 
means alone were sufficient to defeat the Carlists, began to 
find them insufficient in March 1836."^^
An adequate explanation for Palmerston's apparent about 
face is not difficult to discern and should not have mystified 
anyone. The minister's policy was consistent; he continued 
trying to eliminate French influence in Spain. In 1835 when
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 14 March 1836, France, F.O. 146/171, No. 38.
43lbid.
44pando Fernandez de Pifiedo Alava, Memoria Para Escribir 
La Historia Contemporanea de los Siete Primeros Anos del 
Reinado de Isabella II, 2 vols., (Madrid; Imprenta de la 
Viuda de Calero, 1843), I, 200.
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the French government found itself pressured by money inter­
ests wanting intervention, and Thiers enthusiastically desired 
the same thing, Palmerston cautioned de Broglie not to send 
an army to Spain. French policy changed by 1836 so Palmerston 
encouraged the French to intervene realizing they would not.
Both times France lost to Britain's ably directed Spanish 
policies.
In the spring the French made a surprising comeback 
not fully anticipated by Palmerston. Mendizabal's ministry 
attested to the advantage Britain gained on the earlier oc­
casions. Likewise, his removal from office reflected momen­
tary French ascendancy. Palmerston, trying to salvage some­
thing from the state of affairs in Spain and to gain time, 
assured Thiers Britain would lend support to the Isturitz 
government. Furthermore, he emphasized the need for Anglo- 
French cooperation. But privately Palmerston told Villiers
45the dismissal of Mendizabal could only harm the queen's cause.
Deterioration continued. Villiers wrote,
"I am again under the painful necessity of report­
ing to your Lordship the disastrous state of affairs 
which prevails in this country. The ministry of 
M. Isturitz has been an uninterrupted series of
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
2 June 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/456, No. 46.
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misfortunes, and since the death of Ferdinand 
the Queen's throne has never been in so much 
peril as at the present moment. "
A junta formed at Malaga and others were anticipated at 
Zaragoza and Cordoba. Carlists reportedly broke free in 
A r a g o n . O n  top of this news came word of fresh allied in­
fidelity. A report reached Madrid that a French brig carry­
ing arms to Don Carlos lay stranded on the Portuguese coast. 
Another report alleged that a French naval Captain interfered 
with royalist operations against a force of Carlists in the 
port of Pasajes.
Thiers dismissed the Pasajes incident as a trivial 
matter not worthy of consideration and displayed his anger 
toward his allies. A growing lack of cooperation developed 
between France and Britain. Thiers directed his anger at the 
Spanish also. He became annoyed with Isturitz and with General 
Cordova whom he had previously described as, "the only hope of
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 31 July 
1836, Spain, F.O. 72/460, No. 188. The juntas were revolutionary 
local town governments created spontaneously as conditions in 
Spain deteriorated which prevented the Madrid government from 
exercising control over the distressed areas.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
31 May 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/456, No. 42; and Despatch, Lord 
Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 10 June 1836, France,
F.O. 27/522, No. 230.
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salvation of the Queen's cause." Pressure from the Eastern 
Courts and suspicions about his allies prompted some of Thiers 
outbursts. The French minister resorted to the suggestion 
that a European congress or a marriage might best solve the 
Carlist problem. He made personal attacks on Granville whom 
he described as being ill-disposed toward himself. Thiers 
cited examples of Britain's lack of cooperation in Spain in-
AO
eluding comments made by British citizens. This last com­
ment might have been in response to French dislike of Villiers, 
The whole tenor of the conversation appeared as a prelude to 
a further break with Britain over Spain. This idea was sub­
stantiated by another Granville despatch declaring General 
Harispe, in command of the French Pyrenees border troops, 
lacked instructions to help Spain more. Such a negative
attitude, the ambassador stated, resulted because of Eastern 
50pressures.
Palmerston expressed complete surprise at Thiers' sug­
gestion of a marriage between Isabella and Don Carlos' eldest
A O
Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 
6 June 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 221.
'^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 
13 June 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 234.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
17 June 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 243.
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son. He denied emphatically that such a union could resolve 
the dilemma since the struggle involved not personalities 
but the principles of liberalism and absolutism. Particularly 
galling was Palmerston's knowledge that, "from the commence­
ment of the civil war in Spain the three Eastern Courts (and 
especially that of Vienna) have entertained the notion of 
putting an end to the contest by a m a r r i a g e . O b v i o u s l y  
Palmerston disliked this French move toward the Eastern Powers, 
and he pointed out the dangers inherent in supporting a mar­
riage that would result in Spanish absolutism. Switching sides,
he told Louis Philippe's government, would not diminish the
52need for active French intervention in Spain.
Clearly French policy in May and June moved decidedly 
against Britain and Spain. As Granville informed Palmerston, 
Thiers looked East more each day. In Spain Louis Philippe pur­
sued a dual cause as he permitted supplies to go to Don Carlos 
yet at the same time convinced Isturitz and friends additional 
French aid appeared imminent. Thiers went so far as to begin 
forming a second legion at Pau and intended to reinforce the
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign
Office, 8 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/517, No. 109.
S^ibid.
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legion already in S p a i n . A r o u n d  this aspect of French
policy the isolated Spanish ministry rallied. General Alava,
Spanish Ambassador to France, requested additional French aid
54in keeping with the avowed goals of Madrid.
Another apparent attempt by Louis Philippe to harm 
Britain's role in Spain occurred in June. Thiers, speaking 
in Paris, discussed the use of British forces occupying cer­
tain strategic points along the Spanish coast. He alleged 
that ports under British control would be, if requested, 
turned over to French forces. This revelation caused a sen­
sation in Madrid. Palmerston quickly ordered a denial of 
Thiers' remarks saying Britain had no agreement to give up 
the ports in question then added that there were no ports to 
give up in the first p l a c e . A p p a r e n t l y  Thiers needed to 
silence domestic critics fearful of British forces near the 
French border and to drive a deeper wedge between the govern­
ments in London and Madrid.
^^Fernandez de Pinedo Alava, Siete Primeros Anos, I, 
248; and The Times (London), 17 March 1836.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 27 
August 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/460, No. 205.
^^Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 
20 June 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/156, No. 53 and France, F.O. 
146/172, No. 53. Thiers' statement must have referred to 
Palmerston's request of March that the Army of Observation 
occupy certain strategic points in Spain.
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Conditions in Spain worsened in July because of the 
lack of a strong government, the lack of a Cortes, and the 
lack of military action by the royalist generals. As the 
situation deteriorated the government of Louis Philippe con­
sidered reinforcing the legion. Thiers represented the force 
behind this change, but he also proposed the marriage between 
Isabella and Don Carlos' eldest son again. Other points of 
this proposal made to Mettemich included a regency with 
Cristina and Don Carlos, an amnesty for all, and finally, a 
guarantee by the great powers.
The Sergeants' Revolt at San lldefonso against Cristina 
interfered with French plans and proved too liberal for Louis 
Philippe. On August 12 the regiment of Provisional Guards at 
San lldefonso mutinied. Encouraged by members of the National 
Guard and with their pay three months in arrears the leaders 
of the movement forced adoption of the Constitution of 1812. 
Villiers and Bois le Comte, special French envoy to Cristina, 
tried to see the queen regent to give her any aid they could. 
It is ironic that during this crucial period Rayneval, who had
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 12 
August 1836, France, F.O. 146/173, No. 32, Confidential. These 
proposals are evidence of Thiers move to cultivate the East, 
particularly Austria, as France tried to produce a Spanish 
solution compatible with Louis Philippe's interest and a 
marriage for the Duke of Orleans.
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earlier urged French intervention, remained seriously ill in 
bed and le Comte offered the aid Isturitz had been seeking 
since May. At this point, when French influence could 
have reached new heights, the revolution broke out which 
resulted in the adoption of the constitution that scared 
Louis Philippe away from Spain. Thus, the best efforts of 
France carefully nurtured over the last several months came 
to naught.
Villiers advised the queen regent, when finally he 
obtained an audience with her on the 13th, to accept the fait 
accompli concerning the constitution. Bois le Comte con­
curred with this view, but the immediate danger to Isabella 
and Cristina remained. General Mendez Vigo, minister of war, 
recently arrived from Madrid, urged Cristina to return to 
Madrid which Villiers predicted the mutineers would not permit, 
As anticipated, the resolution of Vigo aroused the anger and 
suspicions of the San lldefonso regiment placing the court in 
a precarious situation. Once again summoned to the queen 
regent Villiers reiterated his belief that the constitution 
had to be adopted. Following the interview the queen regent
"Memorandum on the Political Events in Spain; From 
August, 1836, to January, 1837," F.O. 146/180. The revolt is 
labeled in various ways such as the Sergeants' Revolt, the 
La Granja revolt and the revolt of San lldefonso.
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sent word she cind her daughters would proceed to Madrid to
swear to the constitution. Furthermore, she dismissed her
ministers and called upon Jose Maria Calatrava to form a new 
58government. The British minister played a significant role 
in persuading Cristina to accept a change in government such 
as this. Calatrava, a personal friend of Mendizabal's, be­
longed to the Progressive party which both Palmerston and 
Villiers favored. Later he brought Mendizabal into the govern­
ment as minister of finance.
Madrid, hearing of the revolt at San lldefonso under­
went several disturbances before and after the court returned. 
The National Guard took an active role in the tumults even 
going so far as to murder General Quesada whom Mendizabal 
months before had tried to relieve of his command. By August 
21 the queen had returned to Madrid and Villiers had an inter­
view with her and afterward with Calatrava. He urged both of 
them not to condone a counter-revolution nor listen to advice 
counseling that line of action. Boise le Comte repeated
59
Villiers sentiments in his audience with the queen regent.
SGjbid.
59
Ibid. Isabella returned to Madrid with her mother on 
August 17. Mendizabal's efforts to remove Quesada in May, 1836, 
resulted in his dismissal from office and cleared the way for 
Isturitz.
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The government announced plans for the convoking of a Cortes 
on October 24 and at the same time acknowledged the consti­
tution. Cristina informed the country that the constitution 
would be reformed and in concluding her statement referred to 
Spain's glorious resistance to Napoleon's invasion. One can­
not help speculating if this remark was intended as an oblique 
reference to the recent defeat France suffered during the 
Sergeants' Revolt when the Spanish ministry had been changed. 
Palmerston blamed events there on the discontent produced by 
the lack of a Cortes, money, and an effective government after 
Mendizabal resigned from o f f i c e . F o r  three months the coun­
try had existed without a government that vigorously conducted 
the war. The revolt initiated several changes in Spain and 
in Spanish relations with other powers. Calatrava replaced 
Isturitz and called Mendizabal back into office as his finance 
m i n i s t e r . T h i s  change was only one of several that the La 
Granja experience forced. It is significant because once again 
the more liberal group supported by Palmerston, the Progressives, 
returned to power and created a new constitution. Britain
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Ignasio Jobot, Spanish Charge 
d' Affaires, Foreign Office, 22 August 1835, France, F.O. 146/173, 
No. 40.
^^Carr, Spain, p. 178.
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gained since its influence with the new government replaced 
that of France.
Palmerston's influence had waned during the summer 
months when Isturitz and Cristina directed affairs. Britain, 
still enjoying considerable influence in the majority party 
which was then out of power, did not cooperate as fully with 
Cristina as previously. Villiers assumed a hands-off policy 
but at the same time kept in contact with the queen regent 
and during the August 12 La Granja revolt offered advice to 
her.
Quite obviously Louis Philippe reversed the estimation 
he had of a conservative Spanish success in the queen regent's 
government after receiving word of the revolt. Bois le Comte, 
just prior to the unexpected turn of events in August, jour­
neyed to Spain on a special mission. His mission, undertaken 
with Louis Philippe's full knowledge, involved a French offer 
to reinforce the legion, add a second legion, and develop a 
base at Pau for allied use. Moreover, the legion would have 
been commanded by a French general of distinction. One of the 
peculiarities of this affair revolved about Thiers' use of a 
special envoy to convey the news rather than the ambassador.
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62Rayneval. Following the San lldefonso revolt Louis Philippe
dropped his offer of aid completely and Thiers left office.
In the words of Vidal y Saura, "The first effect that the La
Granja pronouncement produced in foreign affairs, was the
changed criterion of Louis Philippe, that caused the fall of
T h i e r s . T h i s  French crisis, provoked by Spanish politics,
64
had great repercussions in all the European chancelleries."
Palmerston disagreed with Louis Philippe's assessment 
of the La Granja revolt and its meaning. The British minister 
reacted strongly against the French accusing the monarch of 
favoring Carlism, refusing to intervene and aid the constitu­
tional government, and of deserting Spain in its hour of need.^^ 
Villiers relayed information to London describing hostile French 
actions in Spain which included alleged orders to agents from 
Paris to cause disruptions in S p a i n . P a l m e r s t o n  bitterly 
remarked.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 21 
August 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/460, No. 202. Louis Philippe re­
luctantly agreed to the le Comte mission.
Vidal y Saura, ^  Politica Exterior, p. 176.
^^Ibid., p. 177; and Fernandez Pinedo de Alava, Siete 
Primeros Anos, p. 249.
G^lbid., p. 178.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 14
September 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/461, No. 231.
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"I said that we took in good part the assurance 
from Count Mole, trhiers replacement], that the 
alliance between England and France would remain 
unshaken, but that it was useless to attempt to 
conceal from ourselves that for months past that 
alliance, as far as the affairs of Spain are con­
cerned, has been merely nominal . . . ."G?
Thiers had ordered the legion's advance halted giving added 
meaning to Palmerston's words.
The Spanish government expressed the hope that Britain 
and France would not refuse additional aid because of the 
adoption of the constitution. Again Palmerston blamed the 
French for the situation in Spain citing the refusal of Louis 
Philippe's government to provide troops in May and June. He 
accused the queen regent of contributing to the dilemma be­
cause of her dismissal of Mendizabal and the Cortes months 
earlier. Britain refused to comply with Spain's request for 
more aid justifying the stand by citing the apathetic ways of 
the queen regent's government and French prolongation of the 
war.^^ Palmerston had become quite annoyed over the turn of
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
8 September 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/156, No. 77.
68Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 19 August 
1836, France, F.O. 27/524, No. 47.
^^Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
22 August, 8 and 12 September 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/156, Nos. 
75, 77, and 78; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign 
Office, 12 September 1836, No. 78, British Museum, Add. M.S. 
48537, Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXI.
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events in Spain in recent months. From a position of great 
influence at Madrid in March 1836 Britain lost favor while 
Isturitz held office. Slowly, after the La Granja revolt, 
Villiers reconstructed British influence, but neither he nor 
any other British subject could check the growing hostility 
of the French court.
Probably the most significant change resulting from the 
Sergeants' Revolt involved the dismissal of Thiers and his 
replacement by Mole. Under Mole* French policy became decidedly 
more opposed to the Spanish government. Aston, reporting from 
Paris, relayed news of hundreds of carts full of supplies ob­
served by an English officer leisurely proceeding to Spain with 
no attempt made by French authorities to stop them.^^ Mole 
indicated he had given strict orders to prevent supplies reach­
ing Don Carlos. Mole said only one point of difference existed
between himself and Palmerston and that involved the use of
71French troops in Spain which he would not permit. While 
mouthing platitudes and pious expressions of cooperation like 
this Mole" ordered the base at Pau broken up and legion
^^Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 30 August 
1836, France, F.O. 27/517, No. 46.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
21 September 1836, France, F.O. 27/525, No. 279.
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reinforcements sent to A f r i c a . I n  Spain alleged French 
agents undermined the government. Specifically these agents, 
according to reports, hoped to have the Northern Provinces 
and Catalonia declare their independence. Following inde­
pendence France expected to dominate the area. The Spanish,
73said Villiers, gave great credence to the scheme.
Palmerston continued receiving information of French 
duplicity which prompted his angry denunciation of Louis 
Philippe's policies. In a long draft to Villiers and Granville 
dated September 29, 1836, Palmerston cataloged his grievances 
against French policy in Spain. He accused the French of 
failing to honor the Quadruple Treaty, saying, "But it is 
notorious to all the world that, from the day when the treaty 
was signed down to the present hour, this engagement [to stop 
supplies] taken by France has remained a dead letter." The 
moral effect of this had been as important as the aid supplied 
said Palmerston. He then alluded to Mendizabal's resignation 
and indicated that many people believed the, "unfriendly 
feelings entertained toward that minister by the Government
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 
23 September 1836, France, F.O. 27/525, No. 283.
73Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign
Office, 29 September 1836, France, F.O. 146/174, No. 138.
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of France toppled him.
In the same document Palmerston suggested that if 
Britain and France actively supported the present government 
of Madrid the disturbances there would be quelled quickly.
The foreign secretary then warned of the possible consequences 
if France failed to provide assistance to Madrid. If Don Carlos 
succeeded, he said, there would be placed on the Spanish throne 
a monarch hostile to Louis Philippe. Equally serious for 
France would be the establishment of a republican government 
in Spain which led Palmerston to conclude that the best possi­
ble solution still remained Isabella and a liberal ministry.
A republic, he conjectured, might force the Eastern Powers to 
intervene or force France into the predicament of 1823. Taking 
heed of recent reports Palmerston cautioned against creating 
independent states near the Pyrenees border who, "seek [ing] 
support from more powerful neighbors, might place themselves 
under the protection of F r a n c e . O p p o s i t i o n  to such a plan, 
he predicted, would come from all the major powers. Finally 
concluding his exposition and warning the foreign secretary
^^Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign
Office, 29 September 1836, France, F.O. 27/518, No. 138 and
F.O. 146/174, No. 177.
75ibid.
14 F
reiterated his belief that only the cause of Isabella would
secure peace in Europe.
Anglo-French-Spanish relations did not improve after
this draft from Palmerston. Calatrava bitterly denounced
France only two weeks later. He said,
"no means, however unworthy, were spared by France 
to create disorder here [in Spain], and weaken the 
Queen's cause . . .  it is impossible to quote a 
single act on the part of the French Government 
which is not favorable to our enemies.
Palmerston lodged yet another complaint against the unchecked
flow of goods into Spain. Accompanying the usual complaints
was a new one which charged the French with permitting foreign
agents known to be aiding Carlos to communicate with the rebel
leader from Bayonne. Palmerston pointed out that this line
77of action was incompatible with the treaty France had signed.
A few weeks later the agents of Sardinia, Austria, and Prussia
78received recall notices from their governments.
M. Latour Maubourg, newly appointed French Ambassador 
to Spain, in October candidly admitted a changed policy toward
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 13 
October 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/462, No. 253.
^^Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 11 and 28 October 1836, France, F.O. 27/518, Nos. 152 
and 167.
7 0
Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
28 November 1836, France, F.O. 27/526, No. 376.
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Calatrava. He explained that San lldefonso had changed every­
thing. Louis Philippe feared the possibility of infecting 
French troops with republican sentiments. Molé' said that 
since a previous French government had offered troops and 
not himself, he had no obligation to honor the commitment. 
Strange reasoning this, because its logical application meant 
France had no obligations save only those entered into under 
Mole's direction. The ministers might have changed, but the 
same monarch reigned and directed French foreign policy.
Maubourg*s lame explanations make curious reading and made 
a very poor impression in Madrid.^0
In contrast to France, Britain, when asked to provide 
more muskets for the royalists, readily complied. Fifty thou­
sand weapons were dispatched immediately with a like number 
due for later d elivery .P al merston also aided Calatrava by 
complaining of French activities. On the other hand, Palmerston 
insisted on payment for arms already received. He also refused
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 
6 October 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/157, No. 88; and Despatch, 
Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 17 October 1836, 
France, F.O. 27/525, No. 309.
^^Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 
October 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/462, Nos. 261 and 262.
®^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
6 October 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/157, No. 85.
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a loan Mendizabal suggested might be redeemed by the customs 
returns of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philipines. Further­
more, Palmerston warned the Spanish government not to resort 
to anarchy which could only result in Britain leaving the 
Quadruple Treaty and Spain to their foe. Palmerston complained 
of the mistreatment of the British Auxiliary Legion and in­
sisted that Spain pay its debts to British bondholders.®^
While complaining to the Spanish Palmerston encouraged 
Villiers to begin negotiations for a commercial treaty with 
Spain. Late in November Villiers renewed talks concerning an 
Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty. The Spanish ministers ap­
peared receptive and to allay French charges of subversion 
Maubourg received intelligence of the negotiations from 
Villiers. Britain's minister invited the French to partici­
pate in the discussions. Maubourg replied to the invitation 
by saying only this topic could produce friction between England 
and France. Having made the gesture of friendship, and comply­
ing strictly with the Quadruple Treaty, Villiers proceeded to 
negotiate. He assured the Spanish that France, having refused
Q  O
■^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 23 
October 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/462, No. 263; Ridley, Palmerston, 
pp. 202-203; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign 
Office, 31 October 1836, No. 93, British Museum, Add. M.S. 
48537, Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXI.
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to join the talks, relinquished all rights to complain.
83Palmerston applauded the action taken by Villiers.
Granville found Mole incensed over the commercial nego­
tiations. Mole" said he would do everything to defeat such an 
agreement, and he openly threatened relations with Britain and 
with Spain. Should Villiers succeed. Mole" said, "the cordi­
ality and intimate political relations now subsisting between
the British and French governments might thereby be seriously 
84effected." Palmerston responded to the surprising utterances
of Mole late in December with a statement of his own. Goaded
by Mole's attitude he said,
"attempts on the part of the French government, 
either directly or indirectly, to check the 
extension of commercial intercourse of Great 
Britain with other countries, will be considered 
hostile to the British Government, and to the 
British Nation."85
83Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 26 
November 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/453, No. 306; and Draft, Lord 
Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 15 December 1836, 
Spain, F.O. 72/456, No. 126. Earlier Mol^ said the topic of 
French intervention was the only area of difference between 
English and French policies. The most sensitive issue, how­
ever, remained the idea of an Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty.
Q A
Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
5 December 1836, France, F.O. 27/527, No. 386.
®^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign
Office, 27 December 1836, France, F.O. 146/176, No. 247.
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Just a year earlier the governments of Britain and France 
expressed similar sentiments when Villiers successfully nego­
tiated a treaty. At this late date in 1836 no treaty mate­
rialized, but Anglo-French relations suffered yet another 
blow. Anglo-Spanish relations, however, attained new heights 
by the close of the year with, "Villiers returning to be the 
arbiter of the [Spanish] Cabinet, as he had been before 
Isturitz came. This English preponderance was sufficient 
to disgust Louis Philippe."®^
The same disgust for Britain appeared in the Eastern 
Courts who lent their support to Don Carlos. Such support 
from the East appeared either as loans to Carlos or as indi­
vidual mercenaries in his employ. Early in the year 40 million 
florins in a loan from Austria had allegedly been agreed to at 
Toplitz. Loans and moral support for Don Carlos generally 
coincided with military successes enjoyed by the rebels. But 
it proved quite impossible for any of the Eastern Courts to 
provide systematic military help. Eastern pressure on France
had a greater effect upon the fortunes of Carlos than anything
87else except money.
®^Vidal y Saura, la Polftica Exterior, p. 195.
®^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 
28 January 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/156, No. 5. This pressure 
resulted in supplies flowing to Carlos with no interference 
from French authorities.
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Metternich, not overly sympathetic to Carlos, yet a 
supporter of absolutism, impressed upon Louis Philippe the 
necessity of following France's own best interests. Louis 
Philippe, seeking a closer understanding with Vienna since 
the autumn of 1833, quite naturally gave some consideration 
to Metternich's words. For this reason Palmerston again 
found himself divided from his ally, France. Not only did 
a competition for control of Spain exist among the great 
powers, but France was the center of a second dual. A mani­
festation of French desire to cooperate more closely with the 
Eastern Powers can be observed in Thiers' proposal for Isabella's 
marriage to Don Carlos' eldest son. This solution, among others, 
had earlier been suggested by Metternich, but on every occasion 
it was suggested Palmerston opposed it.
Resorting to alarmist techniques, Metternich revealed 
to France an agreement between Spain and Austria guaranteeing 
succession. The document, called the Pragmatic of Philip V, 
in a reciprocal contract signed by Philip V and Maria Teresa 
assured both nations of their legitimist succession. Austria, 
of course, believed Carlos the rightful heir in Spain and the 
sole person capable of preventing anarchy there. The Austrian 
hinted that only Carlos's failure to ask for aid had prevented 
action. Metternich also advised Louis Philippe of the probable
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effect on France should a French invasion be permitted and
cited the 1808-1813 period for his argument against inter- 
88vention.
Following the La Granja revolt Eastern opposition to 
Isabella and the principles she stood for became more obvious. 
The Charges d* Affaires of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and 
Sardinia all demanded their passports. Calatrava directed 
his agents at these courts to demand their papers too. All 
relations with Isabella's government thus ended. But these 
same Eastern Powers, who had never recognized Isabella, after 
recalling the Charges sent agents to Bayonne to carry on 
correspondence with Don Carlos' camp. Palmerston objected to 
this use of French territory from which the agents communi­
cated with Carlos. Ultimately these foreign agents left as
demanded, but only after repeated British and Spanish requests
89that they vacate Bayonne.
As the year ended Isabella's position appeared worse 
than it had for some time. Carlos' general, Gomez, had led
go
Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 19 
August 1836, France, F.O. 146/173, No. 37.
^^Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 
September and 1 October 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/461, Nos. 243 and 
249; and Despatches, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 
3 October and 4, 7 November 1836, France, F.O. 27/526, Nos. 
331, 339, and 342.
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a small army the length and breadth of Spain and returned to 
defensive positions with loot, supplies, and recruits. Dip­
lomatic relations between Madrid and the Eastern Powers ceased 
to exist and relations with France were shakey. Only Britain 
appeared friendly and Villiers' council continued quite im­
portant. Even so, the English government resorted to threats 
against the royalist government as Palmerston strove to protect 
British interests. These threats reflected Palmerston's sup­
port of British interests, but they also indicated public 
pressure against his policies in Spain.
While Palmerston battled against French and Eastern 
attempts to predominate in the court of Madrid, he also found 
himself surrounded by domestic opponents. Some political foes 
even accused him of war-mongering. Political reactions to 
the Spanish policy had been quite vocal ever since 1833 and 
foes took particular delight in the failures of Evans and set­
backs to Palmerston. Palmerston faced the most severe criticism 
to date of his Spanish policies late in the Parliamentary ses­
sion of 1836. Not only did the Tories subject his Spanish 
designs to close scrutiny they denounced all of his activities. 
Alarmists predicted Russia and Prussia waited for an opportune 
moment to take India. France, on the sidelines, waited to 
join a crusade for freedom of the seas said Alison. To combat
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this catastrophic deterioration of British prestige this
sage advisor advocated an expanded navy and curtailment of
the policy of aiding revolutionary Europe. Ironically,
the government had asked for naval increases months earlier,
91but they had been castigated for it.
Under fire in both houses, Palmerston fought a delaying 
action as the session drew to a close. Questioned ■whether or 
not Lord Hay, in a conflict between Isabella's supporters and 
constitutionalists, would side with the Queen, Palmerston said 
the naval commander would be n e u t r a l . G r o v e  Price, M.P., 
spoke against the newly adopted Constitution of 1812 with its 
universal suffrage and other liberal measures. The "Secretary 
for Foreign Accidents," as The Times dubbed Palmerston, was 
rebuked particularly severely after the La Granja revolt.
In a perverted view of the Quadruple Treaty Talleyrand re­
ceived credit for the treaty. According to the paper in 
September 1836 that treaty, like the treaty concerning Greece, 
burst apart as the contracting parties, alienated by Palmerston, 
left the alliances. England became friendless in a hostile
^^Archibald Alison, "What is our External Policy and 
Condition?" Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, XL, (June 1836), 
780-792.
91The Times (London) , 6 February 1836.
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Europe. Furthermore, The Times charged, the treaty, "for
the time served the necessities of Louis Philippe's posi- 
93tion." The Tories and their spokesmen thoroughly resented 
the policies Palmerston pursued, and they overlooked no ex­
pedient, even name calling, in their opposition to Palmerston.
Thomas Attwood, radical M.P., advanced one of the most 
intelligent, although admittedly biased viewpoints, of the 
Spanish dilemma. Comparing his parties' position to that of 
the Spanish liberals he noted how the Whigs and Tories com­
bined, like the forces of Don Carlos and Queen Isabella, to 
defeat any truly liberal policies being introduced in parlia­
ment. In his words, "As the country [Spain] was now situated, 
it would not do for the Queen's Government to put down the 
Carlists altogether, they were necessary to keep the liberal 
party in check." Palmerston lamely commented that Britain
had not selected the queen but merely supported the Spanish 
94choice. The Radicals had only just given their support to 
the foreign office a few months earlier when Palmerston sus­
pended the Foreign Enlistment Act by Order in Council. Already
^^Ibid., 19 September 1836.
^^Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXXV, 947. Attwood made these 
remarks just prior to the La Granja revolt.
155
they experienced disillusionment though they did not abandon 
the government on this issue.
The foreign secretary defended himself as best he could 
and on occasion spoke eloquently. Rarely speaking in his own 
defense he did so the 6th of August after being taunted by 
Maclean and Attwood for a couple of days. He stated his be­
lief that the Quadruple Treaty gave Britain the right to act 
as it had and that with no declaration of war England was not 
one of the principles. Contradicting opposition statements 
that Britain's moral influence in the world was low, he cited 
the mediatory role his government played between those of 
Paris and Washington. In this explosive and delicate con­
frontation over debts Palmerston helped keep negotiations 
going. The French had at one point feared a Russo-American 
defensive treaty.
Palmerston could not detail his true sentiments con­
cerning foreign intervention in Spain. At times he appeared 
to have deluded himself and some of his agents sincerely be­
lieved their chief out of touch with the situation. Nothing 
was further from the truth. Neither France nor England wanted 
to act in Spain as the agent of the other in ending the war.
The Times (London), 4 December 1835.
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At the same time neither power desired the unilateral inter­
vention of the other which might have resulted in the domi­
nation of Spain by that power. Palmerston's best excuse for 
armed assistance by indirect means and for political inter­
ference in Spain was suspicion of F r a n c e . T h i s  reason he 
could not use publicly since to do so would acknowledge 
British isolation. So long as the illusion of an Anglo- 
French alliance existed the Eastern Powers were not entirely 
free to act. The treaty had the added advantage of keeping 
Russia and France from concluding an understanding. No matter 
how viewed the Quadruple Treaty reduced the risk of confron­
tation even though it was resented in England and elsewhere.
Villiers recognized the situation after La Granja for 
what it was. Accusing the French of having always acted with
bad faith he said, "we shall have broken with France, and of
Q7course be left alone." Palmerston recognized this fact
also and had known it for some time. Detailing past events 
the foreign minister said, "The French last year grew jealous 
of our influence in Portugal, Spain, and Greece . . . they
^^Lloyd C. Sanders, Life of Viscount Palmerston (London: 
W. H. Allen and Co., 1888), p. 62.
^^Letter, George Villiers to Mrs. Lister (Theresa 
Villiers), 14 September 1836, Maxwell, Life and Letters, I,
129.
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turned out Mendizabal, and gave the power to Isturitz and 
Cordova. But what a little and narrow-minded policy and 
view of European affairs that must have been."98 He ordered 
Aston at Paris to indicate to the French that he viewed France 
as having backed out of the Quadruple Treaty. "The French 
Government no doubt think that when matters have gone to a 
certain length in Spain France will be called upon to re-enact 
the drama of 1823."^^ "Lord Fanny" described Louis Philippe's 
territorial ambitions as similar to those of Louis XIV espe­
cially with regard to the northern Spanish provinces.
A great difference of opinion existed over Spanish 
affairs between the governments of London and Paris. While 
the split between the two governments increased in 1835 there 
had always been a gulf separating them. The Quadruple Treaty 
in 1834 had papered over the cracks, but the activities of 
1836 tore the fabric apart. Still no lasting solution to 
the problem emerged and the contest between Palmerston and 
Molë" for supremacy in Spain continued through 1837-1838.
98Letter, Palmerston to Aston, 19 August 1836, Ashley, 
Life and Correspondence, p. 336.
^^Letter, Palmerston to Granville, 20 September 1836, 
Ibid., p. 337.
^^^Letter, Palmerston to Temple, 1 November 1836, Ibid.,
p. 327.
CHAPTER V
MOLÉ VERSUS PALMERSTON 
1837-1838
Palmerston's Spanish policies beginning in 1837 be­
came pragmatic as he faced continued attacks from opponents 
on all sides. The most striking feature of his policies in 
1837 and 1838 was his public rebuke of the French which was 
followed some time later by a threat to Spain that he would 
renounce the Quadruple Treaty. One of the principal reasons 
for this change of policy was his continued belief and hope 
for an Anglo-Spanish commercial accord. This projected accord 
remained a serious obstacle to good relations among the allies 
but it was not the only difficulty. A new problem that de­
veloped during this period involved the leasing of King’s 
Islet, Minorca, to the French which further poisoned Anglo- 
French relations. By the end of this period these two allies 
were poles apart although they had never been close during the 
1830's.
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Palmerston experienced no respite from his domestic 
opponents, who, early in the new year of 1837, cautioned him 
not to be present at the opening of Parliament and denounced 
his Spanish policies. In contrast, Louis Philippe opened the 
Chambers in Paris amid loud cheers when he reiterated his 
policy of nonintervention in Spain.^ Palmerston excluded 
any mention of France in the king's speech opening Parliament. 
Public pressure over the last several months concerning the 
Spanish policies and French laxity in fulfilling the terms 
of the treaty undoubtedly influenced Palmerston's silence 
on the Anglo-French treaty. Other matters had annoyed the 
foreign minister too.
Villiers once again undertook the task of securing a 
commercial treaty with Spain. Palmerston encouraged this en­
deavor, but Mole objected insisting the state of affairs in 
Spain would not permit tariff revision. Mole intended to 
protect French interests which the status quo served better 
than any free-trade instrument Britain might create. In case 
his protestations against an accord failed, the French minister 
claimed the right to his inclusion in the treaty on a most
^The Times (London), January 3, 1837.
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p
favored nation basis. On the other hand, French agents 
actively promoted Louis Philippe's program of high tariffs, 
conservative government, possible marriages, and perhaps 
aggrandizement.
Here in a microcosm was the struggle between England 
and France, liberal and conservative. Though the immediate 
issue was trade the crux of the difficulty remained which 
foreign power would predominate at Madrid, and which political 
persuasion would dominate there, liberal or autocratic. France 
unequivocably opposed British supremacy in Spain, but if the 
British interfered then the French expected to share the 
fruits of British involvement. Conversely, if Britain's 
policies toward Spain created problems France refused to 
accept responsibility.
Commercial relations with Spain had long been a bone 
of contention between England, France, and Spain. Nothing 
Palmerston attempted aroused Mole's opposition quicker than 
his efforts to reduce tariffs and open the Spanish coastal 
trade to British vessels. The French minister categorically 
refused to consider modifications of Franco-Spanish agreements.
^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 2 
January 1837, France, F.O. 27/538, No. 2; and Despatch, Villiers 
to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 4 January 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/477, 
No. 2.
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France, experiencing considerable economic stress, opposed 
any agreement that reduced French trade with Spain. Earlier 
French concern for the difficulties in the southern depart­
ments had led to a relaxation of their border patrols. The 
Spanish ministers had objected and had charged the French with 
failing to honor the additional articles of the Quadruple Treaty. 
Now, as then, Molë" tried to block the treaty efforts of Villiers 
by saying the time was not propitious for such transactions.^
The French would never think the time was right for an Anglo- 
Spanish agreement of this type.
Villiers continued with his negotiations since he had 
carefully prepared the groundwork by inviting the French to 
participate in the deliberations. Mendizabal dragged his 
feet although he supported tariff reductions favorable to 
Britain. The British minister, expressing Palmerston's point 
of view, insisted upon the right to most favored nation status. 
He argued that although England befriended Spain, France en­
joyed superior commercial privileges. Mendizabal continued 
to be recalcitrant and the exasperated Villiers threatened 
him, pointing out that he owed his position largely to the
^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 4 
January 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/477, No. 3; and Despatch, Lord 
Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 6 January 1837, France, 
F.O. 27/538, No. 7.
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efforts of Britain. The English minister had interceded with 
the queen regent and Calatrava on Mendizabal's behalf. Men­
dizabal at the time had enjoyed a reputation as a liberal
4
with decidedly pro-British sentiments.
For his activities in trying to obtain an Anglo-Spanish 
commercial treaty Villiers was branded a commercial agent.
The author of this Philippic was William Russell, brother of 
John Russell, the leader of Commons. William also wrote with 
invective against the "horde of Blackguards" fighting the 
Biscayens, the B.A.L., and insisted the British army was dis­
honored in Spain.5 Many Tories such as Aberdeen, Wellington, 
and Peel agreed with Russell on all three counts and, of 
course, blamed Palmerston. They condemned every aspect of 
Palmerston's Spanish policies.
The foreign minister was to blame and if Villiers ap­
peared to contemporaries as a commercial agent this reflected 
Palmerston's strong desire for the commercial accord. He 
consistently pursued the liberalization of Spanish tariffs
^Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 4 and 
14 January 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/477, Nos. 3 and 19. See page 
133. Villiers' threat did help keep the negotiations alive 
for a time.
^Letter, William Russell to John Russell, 4 January 
1837, Russell, Early Correspondence, II, 191.
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but on a reciprocal basis and without favoritism showed 
toward England. Palmerston encouraged Spain to broaden and 
liberalize trade policies with all nations. To this end 
Villiers received orders to protest against exclusive com­
mercial privileges granted Spain by Mexico.^ Later Palmerston 
urged the Spanish government to conclude a commercial treaty
n
with the Porte as Britain had already done. He expressed 
great concern over Spain's commercial relations and Villiers 
spent much time trying to obtain the agreement.
Differences with France intruded upon these commercial 
deliberations from time to time. Very early in January 1837 
Anglo-French relations became quite strained. Louis Philippe 
in addressing the Chamber made no mention of Britain either 
as an ally in Spain or as a recent mediator between France
Q
and the United States. At Mold's insistence the speech also 
failed to include a declaration of French hostility toward
^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 23 
March 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/162, No. 32; Guedalla, Palmerston,
p. 186.
^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
13 December 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/169, No. 136.
^Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 2 January
1837, Bulwer, Viscount Palmerston, II, 242.
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Don Carlos despite opposition demands for such a statement.® 
Palmerston speculated that the French would not aid Spain by 
sending troops or money. Working from this assumption he 
advised Madrid to refrain from soliciting French aid. He 
personally had asked Mole"' s government for French naval coop­
eration in Spanish waters but had been r e f u s e d . F r a n c e  
responded negatively to the Spanish question as a result of 
the aftermath of La Granja.
Reports of marriage proposals between Isabella and the 
Due de Bordeaux, Louis Philippe's son, circulated in January 
also. Villiers received word that the rumors were erroneous. 
However, as a precaution Villiers told Cristina Britain would 
not be indifferent to a French Prince on the Spanish throne.^ 
This rumor continued Spanish marriage difficulties between 
Britain and France that dragged on for a decade.
Over a year later Cristina proposed to England that 
a British consort be found for Isabella. Failing this the
^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
6 January 1837, France, F.O. 27/538, No. 8.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
6 January 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/162, No. 2; and Despatch, Lord 
Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 6 January 1837, France, 
F.O. 27/538, No. 7.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
6 January 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/475, No. 14.
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queen regent next expressed a desire for a German prince 
acceptable to English tastes. Villiers pointed out that 
France would reject both of these proposals and Louis Philippe 
would not accept an Austrian archduke. Palmerston offered to 
consult with the French on the marriage although he expected
12nothing but objections from them, and he was not disappointed. 
Cristina nevertheless proceeded with her scheme to find her 
eight-year-old daughter a husband. With this in mind Zea 
Bermudez, living in exile, was empowered by the government 
to approach Austria on the subject of a marriage. Palmerston 
wanted nothing to do with an Austro-Spanish marriage which he 
viewed as harmful to Spain and detrimental to the liberal 
institutions he preferred there. Calatrava and the queen 
regent felt certain the proposed marriage would save Spain.
The marriage rumors of early 1837 added to the uncer­
tainty and suspicion the foreign office had for France. Already
l^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 17 
November 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/509, No. 296, Secret; and Draft, 
Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 30 November 1838, 
Spain, F.O. 72/500, No. 319, Secret.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 
December 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/509, No. 301; and Despatch, 
Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 December 1838, Spain, 
F.O. 72/510, No. 319, Secret. Cristina never was a liberal 
and in fact a conservative government was always her objective. 
An Austrian consort might have meant a conservative regime in 
Spain.
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piqued by Louis Philippe's speech in the Chambers, pressed by
the Tories at home, and annoyed by other rumors, Palmerston
for the first time publicly rebuked his French ally. The
medium the foreign minister choose was William IV's address
to Parliament. In foreign affairs the speech made no mention
of France or an Anglo-French alliance. The French were shocked
and alarmed by this disavowel of the alliance. They wanted
the facade of an alliance without the substance because of
their diplomatic isolation in Europe. Greville, then visiting
in Paris, revealed his surprise at the no-mention policy and
pointed out that in recent weeks the French had attempted to
placate Britain. He cited the speeches made in the Chambers
favorable to England and the fact that the members of the
Chambers had voted money for additional border officials along 
14the Pyrenees.
The French did not feel more agreeable toward Palmerston 
or his Spanish policies. True, there had been some sentiment
l^Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, III, 343. 
Palmerston's rebuke of the French appeared indirect although 
the French did not interpret it that way nor did the British 
cabinet. The no-mention policy was fully intended as a public 
chastisement and Paris took it as such. Louis Philippe had 
made no mention of the so-called Anglo-French alliance when 
he opened the Chambers either. Webster, Foreign Policy of 
Palmerston, I, 452.
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for the British alliance and the border officials, but not 
from Mole"'s government. The border guards, all too ineffec­
tive in the past because the government closed its eyes, did 
not, even with their numbers augmented, represent a change of 
heart at Paris. Material still flowed to Carlos. Ministerial 
speeches, reflecting Molë^ s attitudes, did not soften, and 
Mole* accused the former ministers of bad conduct. Thiers, 
occasionally favoring cooperation with England, was specifi­
cally singled out to be chastized. The Duke of Naoilles de­
clared that previous policies toward Spain had been derogatory 
to French honor and interests. He further accused England of 
having taken advantage of the interruption of French trade 
with Spain. The Duke then intimated that the ports of San 
Sebastian and Pasajes would become new Gibraltars threatening 
France. The Marquis de Boissy d'Anglas joined this chorus 
of opposition to England saying the alliance was illusory. 
Nothing but distrust for Lord Palmerston and his policies 
emanated from Paris.
Distrust and suspicion of Palmerston in Parliament was 
also rampant although a military victory at Bilbao temporarily
^^The Times (London), 13 January 1837; 17 January 1837; 
and 23 January 1837.
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relieved the Melbourne cabinet of some opposition pressure. 
Parliamentary debate on Spanish affairs occurred first in 
March when Viscount Mahon called for Commons to assert itself 
in controlling foreign affairs. He calculated the cost of 
the war to Britain as being half a million in sterling and 
informed the House that serious commercial grievances existed. 
France and the United States, he insisted, had greater influ­
ence and better commercial relations with Spain than England, 
which he deplored. Mahon attacked the foreign minister at 
his most vulnerable point by saying Britain received nothing 
in return for a large expenditure of men, material, and money. 
Palmerston denied these allegations saying commerce had im­
proved as had British influence at Madrid.
Palmerston nevertheless registered a modified attitude 
toward Spain and France in 1837-1838. Having seen Isabella 
defended during the critical years 1833-36 the foreign minister 
made greater efforts to resolve Anglo-Spanish problems. He 
continued trying to curb French influence while working on the
l^Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXXVII, 223 ff.; and Strachey 
and Fulford, Greville Memoirs. Ill, 332. Palmerston said,
"if affairs had gone ill in Spain . . . the Tories would have 
laid hold of it . . . ." Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord 
Granville, 3 February 1837, Bulwer, Viscount Palmerston, II, 
244. Lord Mahon also spoke of Parliament's abdication of 
control of foreign affairs, a trend he insisted on reversing. 
Annual Register, 1837, LXXIX, 188.
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problems of debts, marriages, and commerce. The debt ques­
tion, finances for the war, and commerce, were all inextri­
cably bound together in Palmerston's mind. Consequently,
Spain's empty treasury became a focal point in the continuing 
struggle at Madrid.
To fill the treasury Palmerston encouraged tariff re­
vision which the French consistently opposed. The foreign 
minister argued that the payment of a low tariff on an in­
creased volume of trade meant greater returns than non-payment 
of excessively high tariffs. France opposed revision having 
experienced a loss of influence at Madrid, and clung tenaciously 
to the commercial advantages she enjoyed. Mol^ grasped this 
last vestige of French preference in Spain to preserve some 
semblance of superiority at Madrid and to alleviate the eco­
nomic miseries experienced by his nation.
Successive Spanish governments tried to link relaxation 
of tariffs with a guaranteed loan which they hoped would fill 
their treasury. Palmerston refused to agree to this idea as 
he had in the past because he knew it would be impossible to 
obtain parliamentary support. The foreign minister also ar­
gued that lower Spanish tariffs which improved Spain's com­
mercial posture probably would induce private capital to
170
provide loans for Madrid.Mole"opposed a guaranteed loan
and declared that tariff changes could easily lead to a
18declaration of independence by Catalonia. When M. Aguardo
attempted to secure a large loan in Paris backed by the reve-
19nues of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines he failed.
Mendizabal had by this time accepted the majority 
opinion of the cabinet which favored a treaty with England. 
The Spanish cabinet and Cortes insisted on a loan guaranteed 
by England or France. Obviously Madrid really did not want 
tariff adjustments, but a loan.
Disturbances in Catalonia occurring in early spring 
again delayed consideration of the commercial treaty as did, 
"the more than ordinary hostile attitude by France towards 
Spain." By the end of July the Spanish government realizing 
it could not get a loan, dropped the commercial negotiations. 
Catering to British sensibilities Calatrava said even if
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
1 June 1837, Spain, P.O. 185/152, No. 68.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
2 January 1837, France, P.O. 27/538, No. 2.
l^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 8 April 
1837, Spain, P.O. 72/479, No. 85; and Despatch, Lord Granville 
to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 1 May 1837, France, P.O. 27/541,
No. 155. Mole blocked Aguardo's efforts to obtain a French 
guarantee that if Spain defaulted France would intervene.
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Britain had received some privileges France would have been 
denied them.
These assurances did nothing to placate the growing
public hostility to British involvement in the Carlist Wars.
Sir Henry Hardinge opened a three-day debate in Commons in
April by petitioning that the Order in Council suspending
the Foreign Enlistment Act not be renewed. Sir Stratford
Canning seconded the motion and detailed his opposition to
the B.A.L. The debate followed news of the decisive defeat
Evans suffered in late March at Hernani. Only on the third
day of debate did Palmerston reply to his tormentors. In one
of his most able speeches of the 1830's the foreign minister
21
repudiated opposition claims point by point.
In his defense Palmerston pointed out that nobody had 
challenged the legality of the Order in Council in Parliament.
Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 
May 1837, Spain, P.O. 72/479, No. 118, 3 June 1837, Spain, 
P.O. 72/480, No. 137, 1 July 1837, Spain, P.O. 72/581, No.
172, and 29 July 1837, Spain, P.O. 72/482, No. 203.
^^Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXXVII, 83 ff. and XXXVIII,
1 ff. Palmerston concluded saying, "Spain has been connected 
with various countries, at one time with Austria, and at 
another with Prance; the object was, in future, that there 
should be neither an Austrian Spain nor a French Spain, but 
a Spain which should be Spanish." Annual Register, 1837, 
LXXIX, 195. Aberdeen said the government vowed to resign 
if defeated on its Spanish policy. Letter, Lord Aberdeen to 
Princess Lieven, 19 April 1837, Jones, Correspondence, I, 65; 
and Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 449.
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Opponents of the measure had repeated all the old arguments
but particularly galling to them was Palmerston's efforts on
behalf of Isabella that meant neither war nor peace. Despite
the abrasive attacks by the opposition the Order in Council
was renewed in June 1837 for one year. The B.A.L., however,
broken and poorly supported, ended its days at the close of
1837. The royal marines aiding the Isabella cause stayed
22at their post until 1840 after the peace ended the war.
By the close of 1837 the principal reason for British 
quasi-military involvement in Spain, French intervention, no 
longer existed. The French, thanks to the Quadruple Treaty, 
had failed to gain predominance in the Spanish government. 
Nevertheless, the Anglo-French struggle continued but on a 
different level. Militarily the French could not intervene, 
but they could try to obtain concessions from the Spanish 
government. Palmerston throughout the remainder of the 1830's 
fought these efforts by Louis Philippe, sometimes successfully, 
sometimes not. The French tried to maintain their commercial 
pre-eminence with Spain which included tariff breaks, lower 
port charges, and participation in the coastal trade. Mole,
^^Holt, Carlist Wars, pp. 162-163.
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fighting a war in Algiers, also negotiated for, and received, 
a coaling station at Port Mahon, Minorca.
The striking thing ahout British foreign policy in 
Spain in 1837 was its comparative failure when compared to 
that of France in terms of immediate gains. Villiers' much 
sought after commercial treaty failed to materialize. One 
advantage gained for Britons in Spain involved their exclusion 
from a special forced loan, but it should be added that French 
subjects had long enjoyed that p ri vileg e. Cr istina defaulted 
on obligations to pay British bondholders which resulted in
24
more pressure on Palmerston to end his involvement in Spain.
The foreign office looked askance at the leasing of the Port 
Mcihon base to France. Similarly, Britain viewed with concern
the rumors that General Clausel of France intended to inter-
25vene in Spain for Isabella with 20,000 troops.
The year 1837 marked a rapidly widening gulf between 
Britain and France in Spain and elsewhere. Differences in
23Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
14 December 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, No. 158; and Ridley,
Lord Palmerston, 203.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
4 May 1837, No. 43, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48537, Palmerston 
Letter-Books, Vol. CXXI.
^^Becker y Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones. I, 731.
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policies in Turkey, Greece, and Egypt became more noticeable. 
Portugal became another center of the Anglo-French struggle.
Palmerston accused Mole"of opposing British efforts in the
26capitals of all of these areas. The primary reason for 
this hostility remained the jealousy France had of the com­
mercial prosperity generally enjoyed by Britain. France
feared liberal trade policies which Palmerston and the Board
27of Trade wanted established. French suspicions meant op­
position to the Calatrava government in Spain despite the
fact that Louis Philippe finally agreed that Don Carlos'
28cause was hopeless.
Calatrava became angered by French activities in Spain 
detrimental to his government. France refused aid, a loan, 
and additional troops as did Britain, but pursued other
Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
5 October 1837, France, F.O. 27/543, No. 306. He accused 
France of making and unmaking Spanish ministers as well as 
suggesting that Paris desired the prolongation of the war. 
Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 19 October 
1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, No. 139.
27Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 10 October 1837, France, F.O. 27/537, No. 261; and 
Letter, Sir Herbert Taylor to Lord Melbourne, Brighton, 2 
January 1837, Lloyd C. Sanders, ed.. Lord Melbourne's Papers 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1889), p. 358.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
13 January 1837, France, F.O. 27/538, Confidential.
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objectives construed as hostile in Madrid. Enemy agents 
operated out of Bayonne and supplies still crossed to Don 
Carlos. Friction between the French consul at Barcelona and 
the governor of the area had the makings of a serious rift. 
Latour Maubourg, the French ambassador to Madrid, speculated 
that the incident might produce a rupture. Maubourg made no 
effort to resolve the problem and Calatrava acidly commented 
that, "Maubourg has never had a word of sympathy for our
9 0
reverses, or of satisfaction at our success."  ^ Franco- 
Spanish relations deteriorated. Count Compazano, Spanish 
Ambassador to France, hoped to obtain a French loan but in­
stead caused a considerable row with Mole. Maubourg, after 
a brief trip to Paris, returned to Madrid where Villiers and 
Calatrava alleged he attempted to manufacture a still wider 
split between France and Spain.
Despite this threat Villiers became more sanguine about 
Spanish affairs in general and even revived his hopes for a 
commercial treaty. However, he cautioned the queen regent 
that Louis Philippe might well continue to promote confusion
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 
May 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/479, No. 117.
^*^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 12
August 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/482, No. 224.
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and unrest, particularly in Catalonia. Palmerston assured 
Cristina that, "the obligation of the Quadruple Treaty will 
restrain within certain limits the deviation, of the French 
policy."31 Even Granville, normally somewhat apologetic for 
the French, said little cooperation could he expected from 
France so long as Mole directed the goverrmnent. He told 
Palmerston he saw no possibility of a concert between England 
and France on Spain.
Palmerston became more diplomatically isolated and 
threatened at the end of 1837 than he had heen in the last 
several years. Virtually all of Britain"s treaties with the 
major powers, some dating back to the Congress of Vienna, 
ceased to exist. Former allies, such as France and Russia, 
had tacitly withdrawn from their previous commitments leaving 
Britain befriended only by the likes of Spain, Portugal, and 
Greece. Moreover, the former allies had all embarked upon 
naval programs the result of which became apparent in the 
last days of December. The aggressive nature of the former
3^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 29 
July 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/482, No. 201; and Draft, Lord 
Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 22 August 1837, Spain, 
F.O. 185/163, No. 104.
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris,
10 July and 7 August 1837, France, F.O. 27/542, Nos. 244 and
275.
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allies manifested itself in their expansion into new lands
33and interference in Spain.
The Eastern Powers and their satellites renewed their 
activities in Spain in the summer of 1837 as Don Carlos made 
plans to capture Madrid. Sardinia sent ships of war to the 
Spanish coast with arms for Carlos. The Sardinian govern­
ment also advanced financial support to the pretender. Agents 
representing the Eastern Courts encouraged this operation 
against Madrid, and they expected a popular revolt to occur 
in favor of Carlos. The Eastern Powers also favored Carlos 
with some financial assistance, but they withheld diplomatic 
recognition pending the outcome of the siege of Madrid.
While there remained scant military aid the Eastern 
Courts could give Carlos, he received their diplomatic patron­
age. Mettemich, aiding Don Carlos diplomatically, cautioned 
Louis Philippe about starting a European war over Spain. "This 
menace of a European conflagration, truly a sword of Damocles 
that Metternich always held over the head of Louis Philippe;
^^The Times (London), 23 November, 25, 29 December 1837
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foicign 
Office, 3 January 1837, France, F.O. 146/180, No. 1; Despatch, 
Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 6 May 1837, Spain, F.O. 
72/479, No. 108; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 
Foreign Office, France, F.O. 27/536, No. 248.
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was not in our judgment, anything more than a sophistry of 
the astute chancellor in order to intimidate the French 
m o n a r c h ."35 Metternich never went any further in his deal­
ings with Louis Philippe, and he never offered the French 
king an alliance which would have been eagerly grasped by 
France. But his efforts on behalf of Carlos did help momen­
tarily.
When Don Carlos failed to capture Madrid, the Eastern 
Powers lost faith in him. After 1837 they repeatedly refused 
the requests by Carlos for additional aid. Even the best 
Carlist agents sent to Vienna could not rebuild the relations 
that had existed before the failure at Madrid. Metternich 
and his allies, however, continued to give verbal support to 
Carlos. The watershed of the Carlist War was this attempted 
capture of the Spanish capital and with its failure came the 
failure of the pretender's cause although it took until 1839 
to drive him from the battle field.
The most immediate effect of the failure of Carlos was 
to produce a deeper rift between Britain and France in August 
1837. Although Carlos failed to capture the capital his
35vidal y Saura, La Polltica Exterior, p. 178; and 
Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 12 
May 1837, France, F.O. 146/182, No. 144, Confidential.
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activities provided Cristina with an excuse to dismiss 
Calatrava and M e n d i z a b a l . T h e  queen regent appointed the 
more conservative and pro-French Eusebio Bardaji as head of 
the government. Villiers accused Mole of engineering this 
ministerial shuffle. Mole's joy on receiving the news of 
Calatrava's fall knew no bounds. The French minister in 
July had expressed a fear that France might become contami­
nated by the radicalism he associated with Calatrava. Never­
theless, Mole denied emphatically any French complicity in
•57
the recent change.
France benefitted most from the recent change in the 
Madrid government and received the lease on King's Islet, Port 
Mahon, Minorca, which was yet another blow to Anglo-French re­
lations. The Port Mahon news led Palmerston to protest over 
the danger to which the Anglo-French alliance was exposed. 
France gave immediate assurances that King's Islet was a 
coaling station only. Like the earlier rumors of French
^^Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 207. Cristina always felt 
ideologically closer to Louis Philippe than to Palmerston since 
she was not a liberal.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 26 
August 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/482, No. 241; Draft, Lord Palmerston 
to Villiers, Foreign Office, 13 July 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, 
No. 90; and Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 4 Septem­
ber 1837, France, F.O. 27/543, No. 13.
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designs to stir up Catalonia with the intention of later 
incorporating it into France the Port Mahon affair fell far 
short of reassuring Palmerston that all was well.
Port Mahon signaled the further deterioration of Anglo- 
French relations and the significant increases in French naval 
activity failed to alleviate suspicions. For a considerable 
time past the agents of Britain and France had found them­
selves at odds in several diplomatic posts. Nowhere was this 
more true than in Iberia, particularly in Spain where Villiers 
long had been suspect in French eyes. Maubourg, the French 
agent, and Rayneval before him, had both in turn been suspected 
by Villiers of partisan interference in Spain. Palmerston up 
to the end of 1836 had nevertheless tried to maintain the 
illusion of French cooperation because of the solidarity of 
the Eastern Courts. Since then he had been much less active
in that regard after the blatant French rejection of the
38alliance following La Granja.
Port Mahon and Spanish ministerial changes coupled with 
a new drive for money in Spain provoked Palmerston into threat­
ening an end to the Quadruple Treaty. Like his public rebuke
38Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
16 November 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, No. 158; and Webster,
Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 447.
181
to France early in 1837 this chastizement of Isabella’s
government marked a serious departure from previous policies.
The specific issue at hand was the forced loan that Spain
levied against Spaniards and Englishmen but from which the
French were exempt. Palmerston was able finally to obtain
exemption from this forced loan for British subjects. But
Mole” and Maubourg protested about the language Palmerston
used and said Villiers was jealous of French preference,
meaning, of course, Palmerston was jealous. They were right
on that point. Mole also claimed he had no desire for special
concessions, nor did he, since France already enoyed special
privileges. To calm ruffled feelings he professed support
39
for the Whig ministry which he did not mean.
Mole uttered these pious expressions of friendship after
it had become obvious to all that the so-called Anglo-French
alliance, which had never really existed, had ceased to have
any meaning. Palmerston said that although France had signed
40
the treaty in 1834 it had remained a dead letter. He had 
remarked before how Mole spoke to Granville on matters of no
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 
14 December 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, No. 181.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign
Office, 29 September 1836, France, F.O. 27/518, No. 138.
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consequence, but refused to discuss any question involving 
serious Anglo-French i n t e r e s t s . T h i s  situation again rein­
forced the feeling that there was no effort being made by 
the French to support an Anglo-French entente. The Times
interpreted these attitudes as a deliberate French effort
42to end the alliance.
Following the Port Mahon disagreement there came yet 
another ministerial change. Count Ofalia, a moderado, re­
placed Bardaji in early 1838 since he had proved to be utterly 
incapable of running the state. Toreno and Maubourg persuaded 
Ofalia to enter office. Ofalia felt optimistic about French 
aid for his government and he enjoyed the temporary, though 
not enthusiastic, support of Villiers who felt there was no 
other c h o i c e . V i l l i e r s  encouraged Cristina, embittered by
^^The Times (London), 21 November 1837; and Letter, Lord 
Palmerston to Lord Granville, 3 November 1837, Bulwer, Viscount 
Palmerston, II, 245.
^^The Times (London), 27 November 1837.
^^Ofalia's ministry needed three things to survive ac­
cording to The Times : a loan, military success, and additional
aid from the allies. The first and last items the paper, like 
many opponents of Palmerston, felt should not be supplied by 
England. The Times (London), 3 January 1838. The count based 
his optimism on Louis Philippe's address to the Chambers where 
he said, "On my part, I will continue to faithfully execute 
the stipulations of the Quadruple Treaty, and I hope the cause 
that has all our support triumphs." Becker y Gonzales, Historia 
de las relaciones. I, 738.
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recent French policies, to appoint Ofalia to office. Like 
the rest of his party the new president remained suspicious 
of Britain. Moderados, sharing French attitudes, believed 
Britain sought territorial aggrandizement and exclusive com­
mercial privileges in Spain, objectives that the French, 
seemed to want.
Villiers had to dissuade the new Spanish president of 
these ideas and to combat a resurgent belief that the French 
intended aiding Spain. He denied the charges against British 
policy and expressed the cornerstone of Palmerston's policy 
which had "exercised a useful control over the policy of 
F r a n c e . T h e  minister also recounted the military aid 
Britain had already provided and informed the Spanish govern­
ment that the English public increasingly objected to the lack 
of success in Spain. Somewhat less than candidly the English 
minister added that Britain never interfered in the parties 
and personalities of foreign nations while suggesting the 
French did meddle.
With Ofalia Villiers discussed his belief that Louis 
Philippe would not aid Madrid and the activities of the French
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 17 
December 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/485, No. 321.
^^Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24
and 30 December 1837, Spain, P.O. 72/485, Nos. 386 and 396.
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Chamber of Deputies eloquently bore him out. In the Chamber 
the opposition resolution stressing the fear of counter­
revolution in Spain demanded French military intervention, 
but the government defeated it. A British request for French 
naval assistance along the coast of France failed to elicit 
a favorable response also. Mole said naval forces could not 
be spared because they already patrolled Ashmet Bay, Santo 
Domingo, Mexico, and A r g e n t i n a . Y e t  French agents in Spain 
repeatedly urged that aid be given to prevent both a loss of 
influence and the revolutionary excesses France feared. Ofalia 
quickly learned that the expected aid from France would not 
materialize nor would additional aid be granted by Britain.
Palmerston, in fact, took an increasingly threatening 
attitude toward Madrid as he tired of the reluctance of the 
Spanish government to deal effectively with Carlos and speci­
fic English problems. Complaining of the creditors who con­
stantly harrassed him to recover their money from Spain, he 
pushed for the commercial treaty again while threatening the
^^Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 30 
October 1837, France, F.O. 27/544, Secret and Confidential; and 
Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 12 January 
1838, France, F.O. 27/559, No. 11.
^^Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 13
and 20 January 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/501, Secret, and No. 26.
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48Spanish with dire consequences if satisfaction was not granted.
A Bilbao duty which discriminated against British merchants, 
aroused Palmerston. The foreign minister protested and re­
marked how unfortunate it would be if royal naval vessels 
assisted British subjects rather than the Spanish government 
as intended. The Board of Trade took a hard line, too, and
openly warned Spain of possible retaliatory trade measures
49directed against Spanish commerce.
Palmerston applied yet more pressure to Ofalia as he 
denounced Spanish affairs. He turned down requests for addi­
tional muskets and in an unprecendented move told Ofalia to 
account for the 336,600 weapons already supplied to Spain.
The matter of financial assistance arose but Palmerston re­
fused to consider the question until Spain ratified a commer­
cial agreement. Ofalia acknowledged Spain's debts to England 
and indicated he planned to preside over a general tariff re­
duction favorable to England. Upon hearing this news Villiers'
A O
Letter, George Villiers to Edward Villiers, 17 February 
1838, Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 146.
^^Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
25 January and 8 March 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/499, Nos. 16 and 
46; and Ridley, Lord Palmerston, p. 204.
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old optimism returned and he foresaw great events in Spain.
Palmerston in adopting this threatening tone revealed 
a pragmatic turn of mind previously concealed during the early 
years of the Carlist Wars. The new pragmatism coincided with 
his acknowledgement that the Anglo-French alliance lay shat­
tered when he said that, "if he couldn't praise France, he 
would not mention them." Both attitudes were reflected in 
the Port Mahon issue first raised late in 1837. Palmerston 
protested over the French base of King's Islet again and 
simultaneously demanded an explanation of the affair. Since 
he had failed to receive satisfaction he pursued the issue in 
1838 and insisted upon a full explanation with assurances that 
the Spanish government had not given France a sovereign piece 
of territory. Possessing a suspicious mind, especially with 
regard to Mole and France, the foreign minister believed the 
worst about the Minorca incident.
Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 
22 February and 22 March 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/499, Nos. 35 
and 57; and Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid,
10 March 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/502, No, 87.
^^Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, III, 343. 
The contract between Paris and Madrid stipulated occupation 
of Kings Islet, Port Mahon, for a period of two years by 
France as a coaling station between Algiers and the French 
ports. Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 
25 January 1838, Spain, F.O. 185/169, No. 12. See pp. 133 
and 135.
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Later in the year Palmerston's concern about Minorca
52grew rather than diminished. Diplomatic reports indicated
the French intended to foment disturbances on the island. The
coaling station, allegedly the reason for the base expanded
into a hospital and something of an armed depot. France
garrisoned more troops at the post than there were Spanish
soldiers on Minorca. M. Ladiev, consul for Prussia and Russia
on Minorca, said the French encouraged ideas of independence
from Spain in the islands. Palmerston readily accepted this
information and his misgivings deepened since he believed
53France had earlier had similar designs in Catalonia.
The vital concern over Port Mahon reflected the jeal­
ousy, rivalry, and mutual suspicion with which Britain and 
France had always regarded each other in Spanish affairs. 
Throughout the 1830's their respective policies mirrored these 
attitudes and prevented the two powers from concluding a mean­
ingful alliance. Palmerston worked to check the extension of
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 19 May 1838, No.
86, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48537, Palmerston Letter-Books, 
CXXI.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 19 May 
1838, Spain, F.O. 72/504, No. 191; Draft, Lord Palmerston to 
Villiers, Foreign Office, 14 June 1838, Spain, F.O. 186/169,
No. 101; Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 209; Despatch, Villiers 
to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 27 January 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/501, 
No. 34; and Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 2 
June 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/505, No. 207.
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French influence in every quarter save only one, in Western 
North Africa. There the French through military conquest 
created a colony in Algiers. Aside from this one instance 
the French were not successful in enlarging their sphere of 
influence by 1838 and the nation remained as diplomatically 
isolated as it had been in the early 1830's. France remained 
sensitive to isolation and paranoid about revolution. For 
these reasons the Mole government occasionally retreated 
from its position in Spain to encourage the moderates and 
even on a few instances to offer to cooperate with Britain.
But Mole carefully orchestrated the times and conditions of 
cooperation for he was not dominated by Palmerston nor was 
his desire for cooperation sincere.
Meanwhile, Palmerston provoked some sections of British 
public opinion to new heights of indignation in early 1838.
The focal point of the disquiet was the awarding of a Knight 
Commander, Order of the Bath, to DeLacey Evans of the defunct 
B.A.L. Greville noted that the United Service Club became 
particularly annoyed. The Times was furious. That paper
54
cited the many precedents broken by the awarding of the honor.
^^Palmerston in this public action reaffirmed his Spanish 
policies of the last few years by supporting the unpopular Evans. 
Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, IV, 29.
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With opinion already aroused because of the condition 
of ex-legionnaires who had yet to receive their pay, the Evans 
controversy precipitated a debate in Commons leading to a 
motion of censure against Palmerston's Spanish policies.
The motion proposed by Lord Eliot, similar to one made a year 
earlier, contended that the Melbourne government's actions in 
Spain were not in Britain's best interests. Debate flourished 
upon the introduction of the motion and was not concluded by 
the end of the day's session. The following day the division 
took place immediately after the session opened taking every­
body by surprise. Only Russell of the ministry was present. 
Eliot's motion failed by eight votes giving the ministry a 
weak victory. Besides being a general censure of Palmerston's 
policies the motion explicitely requested that the Order in 
Council suspending the Foreign Enlistment Act not be renewed. 
The failure of the motion did not deter the opposition from 
continued attacks upon the policies.
^^The Times (London), 12 and 22 February 9, 19, and 30 
March 1838.
^^Hansard's, 3rd Series, XLI, 1320; and Strachey and 
Fulford, Greville Memoirs, IV, 47. The Order in Council was 
not renewed because the B.A.L. had ceased to exist in December 
1837. Opposition forces in the debate wanted to guarantee the 
B.A.L. would not be recreated again. On the previous motion 
of 1837 Palmerston received a 36 vote majority which included 
support from most of the radicals.
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Increasing numbers of people joined the resistance to 
governmental policies. Palmerston reported angry outbursts 
in England directed against the incompetent Ofalia whom he 
insisted was the only person able to solve the problems .^ ^ 
Merchants, bondholders, ex-legionnaires, and Tories all had 
lists of complaints. Palmerston handled these objections in 
a doctrinaire fashion when he explained to Russell the need 
for an independent Iberia that could assist Britain in main-
CO
taining a European balance of power.
Simultaneously the foreign minister clutched at the 
idea of a negotiated settlement offered by Villiers as a 
means to end the conflict and reduce British involvement in 
Spain. The minister received Palmerston's permission to 
attempt a negotiated settlement. Instead of a fruitless ap­
proach to Carlos, Villiers decided to try to detach his guer­
rilla chieftains from the conflict. His intermediary. Lieu­
tenant Turner, R.N., approached the guerrilla chiefs at the 
same time Palmerston tried enlisting the aid of Mole in a 
joint mediation.
57Draft, Lord Palmerston co Villiers, Foreign Office,
3 May 1838, No. 79, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48537. Palmerston 
Letter-Books, CXXI.
^^Letter, Lord Palmerston to William [Temple?], 14 April 
1838, Ashley, Life and Correspondence, p. 344; The Times (London), 
9 June 1838; and Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 208.
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Villiers received word that the Carlist chiefs in­
sisted upon a guarantee by Britain and France of any terms 
negotiated. Since he acted for the Spanish government and 
knew in advance Palmerston would not accept the role of guar­
antor Villiers' negotiations temporarily foundered. Molë", 
like Palmerston and Villiers, had thought a negotiated settle­
ment an acceptable solution to the conflict. The French 
minister had similar reservations about a guarantee, but he 
encouraged Cristina to take advantage of Villier's initial 
contacts. Louis Philippe terminated French involvement in 
these peace probes by refusing to permit French officials to 
contact Don Carlos or his agents. This refusal did not mean 
the king wanted the war continued but only that he would not 
unconditionally support Isabella. Villiers sincerely believed
that Louis Philippe really did want the war continued indefi-
_ , 59nitely.
Palmerston preferred a negotiated end to the war and 
French participation in the process because he believed the 
resulting peace would last longer. He also wanted to present
^^Despatches, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 
30 April, 11 and 14 May 1838, France, F.O. 27/561, Nos. 138, 
156, and 162; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign 
Office, 19 May 1838, France, F.O. 27/556, No. 228; and Webster, 
Foreign Policy of Palmerston, II, 456.
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a united front to the rest of Europe by involving France and 
expressed great disappointment at the French refusal to coop­
erate. The foreign minister no longer believed in the Anglo- 
French alliance, but he hoped to continue exercising some 
influence over Louis Philippe's foreign affairs.
Palmerston wanted this control over Louis Philippe be­
cause he feared a Franco-Russian alliance in 1838. Both 
Russian and French policies in the Middle East alarmed him.
The naval strengths of these powers caused some alarm too.
France with a base at Minorca and another in Algiers coupled 
with a growing influence over Mohammed All in Egypt threatened 
communications with India. in addition France had fleets in 
Mexican and Argentinian waters. Russia had a Baltic fleet of 
considerable force while England's navy had declined in both 
strength and efficiency in the 1830's. Palmerston discussed 
the problem of Russian advances on India with Lord John Russell 
and told him a certain leader in Afghanistan acted as the tool 
of the tsar.^^ Later in the year Russell confided in Melbourne 
that he believed the army needed enlarging because of colonial 
and foreign affairs.
^^Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Russell, 1 October 
1838, Russell, Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell, II, 223
^^Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 8 June 1838, 
Bulwer, Viscount Palmerston, II, 268.
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Under these adverse conditions French cooperation in 
Spain took another turn for the worse. Mole permitted 
supplies to go to Carlos and made no attempt to restrain the 
Princess de Sierra, the Portuguese Princess, from traveling 
to the rebel chief. She crossed French territory to get to 
Spain and only after the fact could Palmerston protest. Mole 
said he failed to understand why the princess should have been 
stopped. Subsequently, she married Don Carlos' son and in so 
doing joined the causes of the two Iberian pretenders together. 
Supplies Mole allowed into Spain included a herd of 700 horses 
which Palmerston complained about. French sources said there 
had been only 600 horses and that, to make amends, they had 
provided Isabella's forces with compensating supplies of arms.^^
Anglo-French relations followed an ambiguous path in 
the last months of 1838, but they were essentially hostile.
MolS" still opposed French action in Spain and encouraged the 
moderados. Marshall Soult represented Louis Philippe at
^^Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 8 June 
1838, Bulwer, Viscount Palmerston, II, 268.
G3Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 
October 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/509, No. 265; Draft, Lord 
Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 30 October 
1838, France, F.O. 27/558, No. 363; and Despatch, Lord 
Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 2 November 1838, France, 
F.O. 27/564, No. 310.
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Victoria's coronation and received extensive public demon-
64strations of good will toward himself and France. No 
similar feeling emanated from the French and by late fall 
certain British circles again objected to Louis Philippe's 
actions. The French fleet blockading Mexico hurt British 
merchants with that state and aroused some concern.
Cristina confided to Villiers her concern about French 
policies which she bitterly denounced. She made no mention 
of France in her speech opening the new Cortes but indicated 
her real foreign ally was Britain.Villiers, reflecting 
his hostility toward France, advised Cristina to appoint a 
new government that excluded representatives of the moderado 
party, the majority party. He feared both a repeat of La 
Granja and the ascendance of French influence. Villiers ac­
cused the moderados of being opposed to vigorously pursuing 
an end to the war. By the middle of December Perez de Castro 
became President of the Council with the approval and backing 
of Count Luchana, the queen's most active general who shortly
^^Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, IV, 78.
^^Letter, Lord Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, 4 November 
1838; and Jones, Early Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen, I, 117.
^^Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 8
November 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/509, Nos. 266 and 288.
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replaced Cristina as regent.
During these months Villiers repeatedly warned the 
queen regent of the declining British support for her cause- 
He and Palmerston urged the regent to curry English favor by 
negotiating a commercial treaty. Since 1833 Palmerston had 
pressed for such a treaty which he saw as the solution to 
Spain's financial problems. He cited the recent example of 
the Baron de Meer, commander of Catalonia, who, when all else 
failed, liberalized tariffs in that province with the result 
that he raised sufficient revenues to pay for military opera­
tions there. Cristina, for the first time, agreed to the 
necessity of a trade treaty and put her ministers on the task 
while telling Villiers she was indifferent to the hostile re­
action she anticipated from France.
The years 1837-38 witnessed a great conflict between 
Mole and Palmerston over Spain. Neither had been able to
Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 
October and 10 November 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/509, Nos. 266 
and 288. Villiers to obtain his ends advised unconstitutional 
means in suggesting the queen appoint a cabinet. Count Luchana 
was the title General Espartero had at this point, and he was 
the most successful Isabella general.
G^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office,
15 November 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/500, No. 128; and Despatch, 
Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 December 1838, Spain, 
F.O. 72/510, No. 320.
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establish a clear ascendancy over the Spanish government. 
France, of the two powers, came out ahead with the conces­
sion Mole'received in Minorca which was the type of thing 
Palmerston had hoped to prevent. But it was at the expense 
of any residual belief Palmerston had in the French govern­
ment. Palmerston learned by the events in Spain that France 
could not be expected to honor its treaty obligations.^^ 
Repeatedly Palmerston and Villiers witnessed flagrant viola­
tions of the Quadruple Treaty by France and this soured their 
opinions of the French still further. In future crises 
Britain would not rely upon France but would look to tradi­
tional allies on the continent.
69Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 247.
CHAPTER VI
TO THE BRINK OF WAR AGAIN
The contest in Spain between Britain and France for 
the control of Spain continued after the Convention of Bergara 
ended the Carlist Wars in August 1839. A crisis external to 
the Spanish problem again brought Britain and France to the 
brink of war in Spain. It was a displacement reaction for 
the development that occurred in the Near East settling the 
Mohammed Ali problem which saw France temporarily opposed by 
all the other great powers. Spain for a while turned against 
Britain in the face of increased hostility from France until 
information supplied by Palmerston concerning French intentions 
in Minorca revealed the real designs of Louis Philippe. Through­
out these vacillations Britain insisted upon settling its out­
standing differences with the Madrid government.
Palmerston pursued his course trying to obtain payment 
for various British claims against the Spanish treasury. To 
the familiar claims of the bondholders, the B.A.L. and merchants
197
198
he added his own demands for payment of the arms supplied to 
Spain during the course of the civil war. Linked inevitably 
to these claims was the foreign minister's insistence upon a 
trade treaty which he still believed would solve all of Spain's 
financial troubles. As in the past, the prospects of an Anglo- 
Spanish treaty of this nature aroused the French to complain 
and to undermine the Spanish government. One or two other 
proposals to solve the British financial demands received some 
attention but failed to resolve the difficulty. The end of 
the war ultimately helped Spain meet her foreign obligations 
but great pressure still had to be applied.
Marriage proposals for Isabella also aroused British 
suspicions which changes in the French cabinet did not reduce. 
Mole left office to be replaced by Marshall Soult who was 
more favorable to Britain but who opposed Palmerston on the 
marriage question. A special Spanish mission to the Eastern 
Courts led by Zea Bermudez failed to alleviate the problems 
associated with the Spanish marriage. When Palmerston finally 
left office in 1841, this difficulty still had not been settled 
nor would it be for several years until after Palmerston re­
turned to office. A multitude of vexing problems faced 
Palmerston as he continued to implement British policy in 
Spain.
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Requests from Madrid for loans continued to be pressed 
but both the British and French governments refused to coop­
erate. In early January 1839 Spain negotiated a loan with 
private contractors, Boyd and Lizardi of London, under the 
direction of a new finance minister Pita Pisarro. The finance 
minister counted heavily upon obtaining the London loan to 
the point that he threatened resignation if he failed. He 
also decided to dissolve the Cortes if successful in getting 
the loan and to undertake commercial reform.
Urged by Lord Clarendon to modify the tariff Perez de 
Castro, new President of the Council, said that extreme care 
must be taken not to offend France. Castro reasoned that 
France could do a great deal of harm to Spain if offended. 
Clarendon asked how it was possible to do more harm than had 
already been done since Louis Philippe never implemented the 
Quadruple Treaty. The Englishman told Castro that Spain 
should assert its independence. Clarendon meant Spain should 
assert its independence from France while cooperating closely 
with Britain.^ Britain still objected to the special privileges
Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Clarendon, Foreign Office, 
7 February 1839, No. 17, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48538, 
Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXII. Sir George Villiers became 
Lord Clarendon upon the death of John Chamless Villiers, Third 
Earl of Clarendon, in 1838. Despatch, Lord Clarendon to Lord 
Palmerston, Madrid, 2 and 23 February 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/526, 
Nos. 36 and 53.
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France enjoyed in trade particularly in the province of 
Catalonia where French influence appeared most powerful. In 
April Castro dismissed Pita and further trade negotiations 
floundered.
Palmerston repeatedly pressed the various ministries
of the period 1839-41 for a favorable revision of the tariff
which would have started Spain on the path to free trade.
Spanish ministers responded to his efforts with delays but
tantalized him with assurances changes would be implemented.
J. M. Jemingham, British representative to Madrid beginning
in November 1839, reported some concessions which permitted
hitherto prohibited items into Spain but at a high tariff rate.
Jerningham encouraged the Spanish government to make further
changes at every opportunity he had. Palmerston wrote to
General Alava on the same subject and to recommend strongly
2
that the debts owed Britons be paid. Nevertheless, the 
Spanish continued their deceptions. They also complained 
about the amount of smuggling British subjects engaged in 
while ignoring some of the questionable French practices.
2Despatch, Jerningham to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 18 
January 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/548, No. 15; and Drafts, Lord 
Palmerston to Jerningham, Foreign Office, 6 February and 19 
March 1840, Spain, F.O. 185/182, Nos. 11 and 25.
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Palmerston's policies of aiding the Isabella faction earned 
him no special consideration in commercial matters with the 
Spanish, not even equality with France.
During the course of the next two years Anglo-Spanish 
trade relations regressed as Spanish tariffs were revised. 
New fish duties were implemented but still discriminated 
against British merchants and forced Palmerston to warn of 
retaliatory measures. Later in 1840 still another newly com­
pleted tariff schedule appeared which proved detrimental to 
British trade and provoked yet another sterner warning that 
if the measures were adopted Britain intended to impose re­
taliatory measures against Spanish trade.
The foreign secretary condemned the measures as proof 
of the hostile feeling Spain had for Britain. He said "the 
adoption of such a plan [of tariffs] would give a new, and 
unfriendly character [to] the relations between the two coun­
tries." His assertion, diplomatically correct, failed to 
obscure the fact that in 1840 Anglo-Spanish relations were 
not as cordial or frank as previously. Nor did they improve 
in 1841 on topics relating to trade despite the appointment 
of a commission in Spain to review the question of tariffs. 
P%ImerstoA léf't'- office in mid-184l still not having oi)tained
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complete satisfaction on a commercial agreement that he had 
pursued since 1833.^
Palmerston suspected France of promoting this continued 
opposition to a liberalized tariff because of past experience 
with Molf and because of French jealousy of British commercial 
prosperity. France and Catalonia proved to be the stumbling 
blocks time after time though it must be admitted there were 
few ministers at Madrid really committed to reform. Obviously 
France influenced Spain on the tariff subject as in all other 
areas of consequence because of her proximity and the Franco- 
Spanish experiences of 1807 and 1823.
French influence can be observed in the explosive Port 
Mahon squabble also. Late in 1837 Mole" established the French 
flag at King's Islet, Port Mahon under an agreement with 
Cristina’s government. Palmerston, of course, became upset 
with this arrangement and asked the Spanish not to renew the 
lease. As Anglo-French relations deteriorated over the Eastern
^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Jerningham, Foreign Office,
16 April 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/547, No. 31; Draft, Lord Palmerston 
to Aston, Foreign Office, 19 August 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/547,
No. 34; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 20 
August 1840, Spain, F.O. 185/182, No. 34; Despatch, Aston to 
Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 13 June 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/552, No.
60; and Despatch, Aston to Lord PalmerStun, Madrid, 10 July....
1841, Spain, F.O. 72/577, No. 155.
203
Mediterranean question the King's Islet base assumed greater 
significance. Not only had France acquired a base in the 
Western Mediterranean but the French fleet had been enlarged. 
The threat to British influence in the Mediterranean basin 
and the threat to imperial defense and communications prompted 
the foreign secretary's request that the lease be permitted to 
lapse.4 His entreaties fell upon deaf ears and Southern ex­
plained why in a despatch to the Foreign Office.
Southern told Palmerston the Spanish were thankful for 
the British aid given to Isabella in the past. However, Span­
iards reckoned they could rely on the continued support or at 
least the goodwill of England. On the other hand, French aid 
or intervention was not assured although French interference 
was a foregone conclusion. The result was that a political 
party, the moderados, rallied around the idea of gaining French 
support. The party had used precisely this point for several 
years in attempts to return to office or maintain power.
Throughout all of these intrigues Palmerston remained 
in an unenviable position. His suspicions about French in­
volvement in Spain forced him into an active British policy
3" "Pa'lmci's't'on to Southern, Foreign Office,
11 July 1839, Spain, F.O. 185/176, No. 40; and The Times
(London), 25 February 1840.
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in Madrid. It also meant that he would obtain few tangible 
returns on Britain's investment in Spain, a point which his 
domestic opponents attacked. Under these circumstances 
Southern ended his despatch saying, "It is for these reasons 
that the slightest movement of [French policy] produces so 
deep an impression in Spain." This fact represented the 
biggest obstacle to Palmerston's policies throughout the 
Carlist Wars.^
Port Mahon reflected just how accurate Southern's assess­
ment of the situation had been. France for a number of years 
tried to establish greater control over Minorca by bribing 
local officials and agitating among the islanders. The French 
also tried, and finally succeeded, in establishing a base on 
the island. In 1839 the recently changed government of France, 
now led by Marshall Soult, wanted to renew the lease. Palmer­
ston told Castro that French assurances of friendship were 
genuine since he wanted to reduce the friction between England 
and France, He verbally re-affirmed the idea of the Anglo- 
French alliance. The foreign minister, however, could not 
recoçiçp,l,e..himself to the, id)?;^ /'Of..v?/"Fr3nch base, ns./zatt/ar- -
^Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 22 June
1839, Spain, F.O. 72/530, No. 93.
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what the alleged reason for it, in the Western Mediterranean- 
When Castro renewed the lease in September, after having pre­
viously assured Clarendon he would not. Southern protested. 
Charged with being unreliable Castro defended himself by re­
peating earlier statements about the need for a benevolent 
France. The Spanish government in the new lease, as a con­
cession to Britain stipulated that the agreement could not be 
renewed.^
Shortly after this event Palmerston became concerned 
over rumors of another Franco-Spanish deal. In November 
1839 a French company offered a loan to Spain with the 
Philippines as security. Seeing this potential agreement 
as a secession of territory to France, Britain objected though 
a short while earlier Palmerston had tried to negotiate for 
the purchase of two small Spanish islands in the South Atlantic. 
Instead of the French loan, which Palmerston felt was thor­
oughly unjustified with the return of peace, he insisted a- 
gain upon the liberalizing of tariffs. Spain denied the loan
^Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 27 July
1839, Spain, F.O. 72/531, No. 133; Draft, Lord Palmerston to
Southern, Foreign Office, 11 July 1839, Spain, F.O. 185/176,
No. 42; Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 7
September, 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/533, No. 170; and Vidal y 
Saura, La Polftica Exterior, p. 334.
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rumors Palmerston had acted on.^
To help eradicate the slave trade the British foreign 
secretary had earlier suggested that Spain sell Fernando Po 
and Annabon Islands for £50,000. The islands were to be used 
as bases for royal navy vessels patrolling the African coast. 
Two years later the islands emerged again in a discussion 
about paying Spain's debts to British bondholders. Several 
months after this proposal the Spanish changed their ideas 
on selling the islands and made other arrangements to settle
Q
with the bondholders.
The problem of Port Mahon drew England, France, and 
Spain to the brink of war. H. M. Government requested a copy 
of the French lease to determine under what conditions King's
^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 11 
June 1840, Confidential, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48538, 
Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXIII, Draft, Lord Palmerston to 
Southern, Foreign Office, 14 December 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/524, 
No. 81; Despatch, Jerningham to Lord Palmerston, Foreign Office, 
21 December 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/524, No. 81; and Despatch, 
Jerningham to Lord Palmerston, Foreign Office, 21 December 1839, 
Spain, F.O. 72/535, No. 37.
g
Vidal y Saura, ^  Folitica Exterior, p. 334; Draft,
Lord Palmerston to Southern, Foreign Office, 18 June 1839,
Spain, F.O. 185/177, Slave Trade, No. 8; Despatch, Aston to 
Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 5 April 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/574, No. 
76; and Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 August 
1841, Spain, F.O. 72/578, No. 199. In effect Palmerston said 
the British government would assume a portion of Spain's in­
debtedness to British bondholders in return for the islands.
207
Islet was occupied.^ Late in the summer of 1840 the Balearic 
Islands became the focal point of the triangular contest.
Sir George Bulwer, Britain's representative to Paris, warned 
his government that France might intervene in Spain or the 
Balearic Islands to restore its credibility with the French 
people after the Eastern settlement. More substantial infor­
mation came to Palmerston describing a French plot to seize 
the islands in a preventive action. This plot involved the 
collecting of a French fleet under Admiral Hugous at Toulon 
to seize the islands. Motivation for this action came from 
the impending war some French sources anticipated between 
England and France because of the Mohammed Ali settlement.
The idea was to "protect" the islands for Spain and restore 
them at the conclusion of the w a r . S u p p o r t i n g  this intelli­
gence Aston at Madrid received information about several hun­
dred reinforcements recently despatched to King's Islet. 
Palmerston suggested that the Spanish garrison at Port Mahon 
be increased as a precautionary measure since the French
^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Jerningham, Foreign Office, 
5 February 1840, Spain, F.O. 185/182, No. 12.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 15
October 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/547, Secret.
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reinforcements outnumbered Isabella's forces.
Thiers, recently returned to office, complained of 
being deserted by England over the Mohammed Ali settlement 
in favor of the Eastern States. He felt particularly vulner­
able since he had in the past occasionally supported the Anglo-
*1 o
French alliance. Trying to prevent precipitate action by 
the French Bulwer suggested to Thiers that Britain and Framee 
offer Cristina joint advice in the deteriorated Spanish situ­
ation. Thiers would not coordinate the advice to Cristina,
and Bulwer suspected him of encouraging the queen regent in
13pro-French action. Again the suspicions of British officials 
concerning French reliability manifested themselves particu­
larly after July when disturbances occurred in Barcelona, 
long an area of French i n t r i g u e . A s  the summer of 1840 
progressed, Bulwer sent several additional warnings to Palmer­
ston about possible French manufactured disturbances in Spain.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 15 
October 1840, Spain, F.O. 185/182, No. 55; and Becker y Gonzales, 
Historia de las relaciones, II, 22.
^^Despatch, Bulwer to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 27 July 
1840, France, F.O. 27/604, No. 34.
^^Despatch, Bulwer to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 11 September
1840, France, F.O. 27/605, No. 75.
14p.o. 27/604, No. 34.
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The Spanish government received the reports of French 
intentions toward Spain's Balearic islands from Palmerston.
The Spanish government responded by attempting to nullify 
the French lease on the grounds that France had failed to pay 
the required expenses. France argued that its obligation had 
been met by improvements to the base. The original coaling 
station had grown to include a hospital and fortifications 
which Britain viewed with displeasure.
Relations between Spain and France cooled in view of 
the hostile intentions of Soult toward the Balearic Islands. 
Spain substantially increased the size of the garrison on the 
islands until it numbered over 3,000 men and included several 
bataillons of artillery. The Duke de la Victoria, President 
of the Council, also insisted France pay the back charges and 
in future could use Port Mahon only on the same basis as other 
nations did thus ending any claim to special privileges. 
Palmerston repeatedly urged this line of action and gave much 
encouragement to Victoria's stand against France.
l^Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 26 
November 1840, Spain, F.O. 185/182, Nos. 75 and 76; Despatch, 
Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 6 December 1840, Spain, F.O. 
72/556, No. 156; and Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 
4 June 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/576, No. 137.
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At the same time Palmerston, in continuing efforts 
to undermine and to counteract French intrigue in Spain, 
studiously tried to get recognition from the Eastern Courts 
for Isabella's government. Diplomatic recognition of the 
queen by the Eastern Powers had ceased when Isabella assumed 
the throne in 1833. Since that time no Spanish government, 
not even that of Don Carlos, had received their diplomatic 
recognition. With the war over Palmerston undertook at 
Spain's request, the task of trying to reestablish the 
severed diplomatic relations. His efforts coincided with a 
growing detente between England and the Eastern Powers over 
the Mohammed Ali question. It also underscored the real dif­
ference existing between France and England on both these
. . 15questions.
Palmerston late in 1840 viewed possible French inter­
vention in Spain seriously, and Bulwer thought much the same 
way. He cautioned the French government in strong language 
not to intervene in Spain. Palmerston approved his agent's 
actions and added, "Any such armed interference on the part
l^Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 16 November 
1840, Spain, F.O. 72/555, Secret and Confidential; and Draft, 
Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 26 November 1840, 
Spain, F.O. 72/547, No. 17.
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of France in the affairs of Spain . . . would unquestionably 
lead to the most serious consequences."^^ This statement 
reflected the abiding mistrust Palmerston had of any sug­
gestion of French involvement in Spanish affairs. It also 
indicated the fluidity of relations among the allies of the 
Quadruple Treaty.
Only a year earlier with the fall of Mole and the 
coming of Soult Palmerston had encouraged the Spanish to 
believe Soult meant well. In fact Soult had for a short 
while cooperated perhaps more sincerely with the allies than 
any other French minister since the signing of the treaty 
in April 1834. Naval cooperation improved as Spanish troops 
for the first time were conveyed by French war ships like 
Hay had been doing for years. Border vigilance improved 
and conditions temporarily approached cordiality.
The Mohammed Ali question and Thiers' buildup of French
armed forces coupled with the clandestine operations of agents
18
provocatuers from Paris spelled an end to the honeymoon.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Bulwer, Foreign Office, 18 
September 1840, France, F.O. 27/500A.
18Draft, Lord Palmerston to Southern, Foreign Office,
11 July 1839, No. 39, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48538, Palmerston 
Letter-Books, CXXII; and Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, 
Madrid, 15 June 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/530, No. 90. Palmerston
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Espartero had never expected much from Soult by way of aid 
nor did the Spanish government anticipate either the seizure 
of the Balearic Islands nor an invasion of Spain by French 
forces. Nevertheless, impressed by British intelligence and
their own reports the Isabella government had reinforced the
. T . 19islands.
In this crisis of 1840 Palmerston made no real effort 
to conciliate France. The issue remained too important to 
the British empire and besides, Palmerston had learned in 
the years the Quadruple Treaty existed that Louis Philippe’s 
government could not be trusted. His erstwhile ally had never 
fulfilled the terms of that treaty.
accused Louis Philippe of wanting, in addition to Spain, Egypt, 
Syria, and Arabia. In late 1839 French ships-of-the-line in 
European waters outnumbered British ships. Thiers wanted 
150,000 more troops added to the 440,000 already under arms. 
Accompanying this intelligence were highly inflamatory and 
provocative editorials in Paris newspapers insisting France 
should seize the Levant and Gibraltar. Despatch, Bulwer to 
Lord Palmerston, Paris, 26 October 1840, France, F.O. 27/578, 
No. 394, Becker y Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones. I, 775. 
Palmerston asked Thiers for an explanation of French military 
action in June 1840 as the Mohammed Ali issue reached crisis 
proportions. Clarendon thought Palmerston’s actions would 
precipitate war. Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 198. Clarendon 
had earlier complained that the foreign secretary had moved 
entirely to close to Russia on the Eastern question. Fulford 
and Strachey, Greville Memoirs, IV, 223.
^^Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 March
1841, Spain, F.O. 72/574, No. 55.
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In the meantime Don Carlos, estranged from his followers 
and relentlessly pursued by Espartero, retreated and eventu­
ally fled to France. The British-initiated policy of division 
among the Carlist chiefs aided by the growing dissention in 
the rebel ranks facilitated the signing of the Convention of 
Bergara in 1839. Although all opposition to Isabella did 
not cease until the following year the back of the movement 
lay broken. France had the dubious honor of Don Carlos' 
presence which Soult did not like. Palmerston insisted the 
rebel chief be held in custody which proved embarrassing to 
the French government since Carlos had not committed a crime 
in France. Soult and Louis Philippe in a short time became 
extremely reluctant to hold Carlos and not just because of 
the embarrassment. Carlos, they feared, could become the 
focal point of reactionary opposition elements in France and 
could also affect the unstable relations they had with the 
Eastern Powers.
Another disturbing situation developed later when the 
queen regent fled the powerful and popular Espartero and
^^Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 158; and Becker y Gonzales, 
Historia de las relaciones. I, 775. The author states that 
English efforts procured the best terms possible for Isabella’s 
government. The Times (London), 16 September 1839.
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entered France. Rumors of Spanish marriage alliances, long
21a topic of speculation, took on an added dimension.
The marriage of Isabella vitally concerned the French 
from the moment she gained the throne of Spain. Palmerston 
expressed a continuing interest in Isabella's marriageability 
also because he objected to the idea of a Franco-Spanish com­
pact. On numerous occasions this marriage possibility had 
been rumored. Always Palmerston spoke out heatedly against 
a renewal of the family compact in this fashion.
He remained equally opposed to an Austro-Spanish arrange­
ment and here enjoyed the support of the French government which 
feared being surrounded by Mettemichian forces. Cristina had 
asked Palmerston to name a British prince suitable for Isabella 
but had been turned down. In 1839 a special mission named by 
Cristina travelled East in search of a prince. Zea Bermudez 
and M. Marliani, the former reactionary and the latter quite 
liberal, represented the Spanish government on the mission.
Both were unfortunate choices, Zea Bermudez because he had 
never sworn an oath of allegiance to the constitution governing
21The French held Don Carlos after his capture at Bouges 
in September 1839. Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 
Paris, 21 October 1839, France, F.O. 27/587, No. 327; and Draft, 
Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 13 December 
1839, France, F.O. 27/578, No. 398.
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Spain since 1837 as the law required, and Marliani because 
his liberalism annoyed Mettemich and other princes in Germany.
Without knowing the full details of the mission Palmerston
instructed Lord William Russell, H. M. Ambassador to Berlin, to
22provide any assistance Zea Bermudez and Marliani needed. Zea 
Bermudez received instructions to negotiate for a marriage cind 
a second notice to refrain from mentioning or supporting a 
European congress to consider Spanish affairs. Additionally 
the two-man mission wanted to restore diplomatic relations with 
any power friendly to Isabella's government. This venture 
caused alarm in several chanceries. Mole took a strong line 
of opposition to the point of threatening immediate armed in­
tervention in Spain should an Austrian archduke become the 
groom. Metternich opposed an Austrian also as did Palmerston.
So alarmed was Mold that Palmerston felt constrained to tell
him he had nothing to do with the substance of the Zea Bermudez
. . 23mission.
In Berlin Zea Bermudez received a moderate welcome as 
he presented a marriage proposal. But in Vienna the proposals
22Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Clarendon, Foreign 
Office, 7 February 1839, Spain, F.O. 185/176, No. 18.
23
Despatch, Lord Clarendon to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 
27 February 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/526, No. 54; and Draft, Lord 
Palmerston to Lord Clarendon, Foreign Office, 7 March 1839, 
Spain, F.O. 185/176, No. 32.
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were met coldly by Metternich who charged Zea Bermudez with
being an embarrassment to the Austrian government. In both
instances the good offices of Britain had been requested and
used, and one cannot help speculating if the proximity of
British representatives to the Spaniard did more harm than
good especially since Palmerston stood as the enfant terrible
24in Mettemich' s eyes. Perhaps Palmerston, who did not 
agree with an Austrian prince, aided and abetted the Spanish 
as a sure means of obtaining an Eastern veto on the whole 
arrangement. The mission proved ultimately to be a failure 
in every way since no marriage developed nor did Spain obtain 
recognition from any of the Eastern Powers.
Isabella's marriageability continued to excite all 
kinds of speculation and rumor. Another rumor of this type 
occurred late in 1840 when mainy people suspected Cristina of 
going to Paris to arrange an alliance between Isabella and 
one of Louis Philippe’s sons. This accord Palmerston opposed 
above all others. Still another rumor then current thought 
the Infante Don Francisco the object of the rumored Paris trip.
^"^Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 16 
March 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/527, No. 7; Despatch, Southern to 
Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 25 April 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/528, 
No. 43; and Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 198.
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Again objections were found because of his education and
25natural defects. The Spanish government told Palmerston
Isabella could not marry anyone unless the Cortes agreed to
26it. These assurances temporarily placated him.
In September and October 1840 a more pressing problem 
faced Palmerston as the queen regent thought seriously of 
resigning her position. The formation of several juntas and 
growing liberal opposition to Cristina forced her to consider 
this move. The juntas reflected annoyance at the regents' 
efforts to eliminate some of the special municipal privileges 
the towns enjoyed. Liberals, on the other hand, believed the 
French exercised undue influence over internal Spanish affairs 
through the queen mother.
M. de la Redorte, French minister to Spain, urged 
Cristina to resist the newly formed juntas as he supported 
her anti-liberal policies. Louis Philippe feared and detested 
the liberal cause which prompted him to interfere in Spain. 
Thiers, more liberal than his master, nevertheless had an
25Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 26 
November 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/547, No. 73; and Despatch, Aston 
to Lord Palmerston, Valencia, 19 October 1840, Spain, F.O. 
72/555, Confidential.
26Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 6 December
1840, Spain, F.O. 72/556, No. 155.
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aversion to Spanish liberals of the progressive party that
Palmerston supported, and he encouraged resistance to the 
27juntas. Aston believed the reason the French urged opposi­
tion to the juntas was to see Cristina fall but this idea 
28
makes no sense. More likely Cristina's opposition to the
liberals supported by France was intended to conciliate the
Eastern Courts for the purpose of gaining recognition for
Isabella and to reduce Spanish dependence upon Britain.
Redorte thought Spain in imminent danger of disinte­
grating into several small federal states. Palmerston and 
Clarendon had long speculated upon this possibility and the 
efforts of France to detach Catalonia from Spain. The Balearic 
Island controversy which provided Granville and Bulwer with 
proo^ of French hostility reinforced these doubts about France.
Palmerston told Granville Louis Philippe lacked integrity,
29
scruples, and honesty. At virtually every turn in Spanish 
affairs the governments of London and Paris disagreed on policy 
as they had done throughout the 1830's.
2 7Despatch, Bulwer to Aston, Paris, 21 August 1840, 
France, F.O. 27/605, No. 43.
28Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Valencia, 9 October 
1840, Spain, F.O. 27/554, No. 112.
29Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 23 April 
1840, Ashley, Life and Correspondence, p. 367; and Becker y 
Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones, II, 8.
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Cristina resigned the regency 12 October 1840 after 
having failed to establish an ultra-moderado government and 
having repealed some liberal measures. Her reactionary repeal 
of municipal privileges led to Espartero's resignation from 
the government which left the queen regent in an untenable 
position. Espartero, the hero of the wars, returned to the 
government as President of the Council after her resignation.
In May 1841 the victorious general became sole regent. Cristina 
had, upon resigning her office, travelled toward Naples by way 
of Marseilles where she altered her plans and went north to 
Paris. Outside Paris Louis Philippe greeted her warmly and 
personally escorted her to the city. During the remaining 
months of Palmerston's tenure in office considerable specula­
tion about Isabella's marriage centered around Cristina's 
residence in Paris.
A new plan to wed Isabella to Louis Philippe's son 
emerged in 1841 and the Spanish minister to France, M. Olozaga, 
supported the idea. With this in mind the French government 
worked to defeat Espartero's drive to deprive Cristina of her 
guardianship over Isabella. The French felt the removal of
Annual Register, 1840, LXXXII, 202-207; and The Times
(London), 26 November 1840.
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Cristina would eliminate their influence in deciding who would 
be the prince consort. Earlier France had supported the idea 
of making Espartero sole regent in place of Cristina so it 
was obvious the marriage scheme of 1841 reflected a change 
in French a t t i t u d e s . B y  the time Palmerston left office 
in August 1841 the issue still had not been resolved.
On the question of legal guardian to Isabella Louis 
Philippe supported the queen mother while Palmerston favored 
Espartero. MolS, in the French Chambers, argued that to 
support Cristina meant in effect to give England control of 
Spain. He predicted that Britain would resolve the Spanish 
problem as it had done the Egyptian, without the aid of France 
and entirely to British satisfaction. Guizot said this possi­
bility existed since the party in power in Spain, by his own
32
admission, remained extremely pro-British. The Spanish 
government did exhibit somewhat more friendship for Britain 
under Espartero. Attempts to conciliate England included 
efforts to pay the money due to bondholders and a refusal to 
renew the Port Mahon lease with France.
^^Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 11 
June 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/570, No. 85; and Despatch, Aston to 
Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 10 July 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/577,
No. 157, Confidential.
^^Annual Register, 1841, LXXXIII, 240.
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The Carlist War gradually lost its domestic signifi­
cance in England in the late thirties. Palmerston experienced 
a significant reduction in domestic opposition to his Spanish 
policies in 1839. Not all of his critics felt satisfied with 
the cost of the war or the outcome, but the issue died with 
the Convention of Bergara. Other more pressing concerns, 
notably Chartism, Mohammed Ali, and the Opium War absorbed 
the attentions of Parliament. Clarendon, recently returned 
from his post at Madrid, replied to Lord Lyndhurst's last 
weak parliamentary attempt to make Spain an issue. The ex- 
minister to Madrid went into a justification of past and present 
policies which elicited only mild protest from Wellington and 
the opposition. Spain as a burning issue had clearly been ex­
tinguished. The Iron Duke's most serious charge was that con­
trary to Palmerston's denials England had been a belligerent
• 33in the wars.
The Whig government experienced many difficulties in 
1839 and temporarily forced out of office managed to return 
to power only because of Victoria's stubbornness on the burning 
issue of her ladies in waiting. Never a popular person, Palmerston
33Colonel Garwood, The Speeches of the Duke of Wellington 
in Parliament, 2 vols., (London: John Murray, 1854), II, 452.
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took his share of the invective hurled at the government. 
Greville reported him as abhorred, hated, and unpopular but 
"still reigning in his little kingdom of the Foreign Office.
The foreign secretary thoroughly alarmed his own cabinet over 
the Mohammed Ali dilemma vAiich made Clarendon believe Palmerston 
had got too close to Russia while keeping France in check on 
that i s s u e . S o  completely did these events occupy the minds 
of Britons that after the Convention of Bergara, despite seri­
ous problems still existing among the allies, little attention 
was focused on Spain.
In 1841 at the opening of Parliament Wellington directed 
a few remarks toward past policies in Spain. Rather surpris­
ingly he lent support to the ministers on their foreign policy 
in general. With reference to Spain and Anglo-French relations 
he also expressed approval though he denied the concept of an 
Anglo-French alliance saying,
"I have heard a great deal, on this and on other 
occasions, of what is called the alliance between 
England and France. I know that an alliance existed 
between England and France when those powers cooper­
ated on several occasions for the purpose of obtain­
ing some particular object."
34Fulford and Strachey, Greville Memoirs, IV, 137. 
^^Ibid., 225.
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They cooperated, he said, in the Netherlands and in Spain 
where they enjoyed the best understanding. "But I know of 
no other particular alliance existing between the two coun­
tries."^^
Clearly, if the best understanding England and France 
enjoyed in the 1830's was in the Netherlands and Spain, no 
rapprochement existed for these powers. France cooperated in 
the Netherlands only because of the immediate threat of war 
with England and refused time and again to cooperate in Iberia. 
Their nationalist interests in Western Europe and the world 
prevented any rapprochement with Palmerston in the 1830's.
CHAPTER VII
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CARLIST WARS,
1833-1841
British foreign policy in Spain during the Carlist War 
was remarkedly consistent and reflected the personal wishes 
of Palmerston. With his Spanish policies he wanted to re­
establish British influence within the Madrid government and 
to exercise some control over French policies there while 
lending encouragement to liberalism and constitutionalism. 
Palmerston succeeded in implementing his program.
The basis for Palmerston's policies was his sincere and 
abiding support for liberalism in the 1830's. Although a late 
convert, he nevertheless embraced liberalism as a cause worth 
defending in Europe and particularly Spain. There he could 
not only support liberalism but at the same time he could com­
bat absolutism and the French aggrandizement he feared. Not 
once during the protracted war did he try to topple a liberal 
Spanish regime. He lent his support to the most radical liberal
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governments that were established by the Spaniards and hoped 
their policies might be moderated. However, he did support 
them. Liberalism in Spain was preserved at least as long as 
Palmerston and the Whigs held office in Britain.
Palmerston enjoyed remarkable success in keeping the 
French out of Spain. Limiting Louis Philippe's freedom of 
action in Iberia was one of the fundamental goals of the 
Quadruple Treaty and although the French occasionally gained 
a temporary ascendancy in Madrid during the struggle they 
never retained it. By the end of the war their position was 
weakened and it declined still more in the last two years of 
Palmerston's tenure in office. During that time Palmerston 
made effective use of the French threat to seize the Balearic 
Islands to undermine their position with Espartero, the liberal 
general and Cristina's replacement as regent.
There is an obvious and basic disagreement between this 
study and studies made by several other historians. The most 
fundamental difference is evident in the terminology used. 
Webster, Langer, Woodward, Bell, Hall, Holt and indeed almost 
everyone that has written about the Carlist Wars have referred 
to the agreement between Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal 
in 1834 as the Quadruple Alliance. That document was a Quad­
ruple Treaty, not an alliance. A treaty implies something
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less than an entente cordiale or alliance which is the con­
tention of this study. No rapprochement or entente cordiale 
existed between Britain and France in the 1830's nor was one 
possible because the foreign and imperial policies of these 
two powers were almost everywhere in conflict.
Palmerston also used the Quadruple Treaty to insure 
the separation of France and the Eastern Powers. In 1833 
Louis Philippe had begun looking to the Eastern Courts for 
an understanding. Following the signing of the treaty no 
rapprochement between France and the Eastern Powers was even 
remotely possible. Louis Philippe gradually lost the benefits 
of the Quadruple Treaty in the following years as he further 
alienated Palmerston, but he still failed to reach an accord 
with the Eastern Courts.
One of the remarkable things about Palmerston's success 
in Spain was that he accomplished so much without overturning 
his policy of nonintervention. Palmerston was not interested 
in militarily intervening in Spain although Southgate charges 
that he was. He did not even threaten to intervene against 
Carlos to end the war. He did materially aid the Madrid govern­
ment with arms and he permitted the formation of the B.A.L., 
but he never threatened Carlos with the British army. Palmerston 
repeatedly stated his policy of nonintervention. In fact.
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rather than intervene, Palmerston said he would end the aid 
Britain was giving Isabella when her government refused to 
settle certain outstanding problems affecting British subjects.
In two areas of concern vital to British interests 
Palmerston did not do too well. Although he made repeated 
efforts to obtain a satisfactory liberal commercial treaty, 
he failed. There were some tariff revisions and he enjoyed 
partial success, but the Spanish were not prepared to go the 
way of free trade in the 1830's. Some discriminatory charges 
still remained to hamper British trade and while some tariff 
revision occurred the rates remained high generally. The 
second area of concern involved the marriage of Isabella.
The issue was not settled by 1841 when Palmerston left office, 
but he had been successful to the extent that neither a Bourbon, 
Orleanist, or Habsburg was betrothed to the young queen. His 
success was in preventing a decision rather than in obtaining 
a lasting solution.
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